本文關(guān)鍵詞：管理者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊相關(guān)性的實(shí)證研究　出處：《東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：針對(duì)上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊屢禁不止的現(xiàn)狀,本文試圖從一個(gè)不同于以往的角度對(duì)其形成機(jī)理進(jìn)行研究,以往的研究大多考慮財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊與公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)之間的關(guān)系,卻忽視了管理層作為公司的財(cái)務(wù)決策者,其個(gè)體特征及其他特質(zhì)間差異也對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊造成影響。目前,行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的作為—個(gè)新興學(xué)科,其“有限理性”假設(shè)相對(duì)來(lái)說(shuō)更加貼近現(xiàn)實(shí)環(huán)境,故本文結(jié)合行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)理論,在管理者“有限理性”的基本前提上,分析不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的管理者是否會(huì)對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊行為的發(fā)生產(chǎn)生影響。 本文的研究借鑒了行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)下的效用理論,行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的研究都是基于“有限理性”假設(shè)前提的,其與傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)相比,認(rèn)為決策者在行為活動(dòng)過(guò)程中并不能保持完全理性,會(huì)存在這樣或那樣的偏差,因而相對(duì)傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)來(lái)說(shuō)更加貼近現(xiàn)實(shí)環(huán)境。筆者認(rèn)為,在有限理性的前提下,不同的決策者有著不同的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好,這導(dǎo)致了同一事件會(huì)賦予不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好者不同的效用,而不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的管理者從財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊行為中可以獲得的效用是不同的,高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的管理者可能會(huì)從舞弊行為中獲得更高的效用,故而推斷管理者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊呈正相關(guān)。另外,本文還研究了當(dāng)公司控股股東性質(zhì)不同時(shí),上市公司管理者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的相關(guān)性是否會(huì)有所不同。 本文將管理者的性別、年齡、任職月份、期末財(cái)富、防御距離指標(biāo)、產(chǎn)權(quán)比例六個(gè)變量作為度量管理者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的替代變量,通過(guò)提取主成分的方法,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了管理者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的程度與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊之間的關(guān)系。本文的研究結(jié)論包括：(1)管理者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊正相關(guān)；(2)公司控股股東為國(guó)有性質(zhì)時(shí),管理者風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的正相關(guān)性顯著低于控股股東為非國(guó)有時(shí)的相關(guān)性。 文章分為六個(gè)部分：第一部分為緒論,介紹了本文的研究背景、研究目的及意義、研究方法及內(nèi)容；第二部分為文獻(xiàn)綜述,對(duì)目前國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的相關(guān)研究做出綜述,指出現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的研究不足指出以及未來(lái)可能的研究方向；第三部分為理論基礎(chǔ),對(duì)本文涉及的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行闡述,并對(duì)相關(guān)概念做了界定,同時(shí)對(duì)本文的主要解釋變量的度量方法進(jìn)行說(shuō)明；第四部分為理論分析,結(jié)合前文理論進(jìn)行推出本文研究的假設(shè),并建立數(shù)學(xué)模型,對(duì)相關(guān)變量進(jìn)行解釋,界定樣本篩選過(guò)程；第五部分為實(shí)證結(jié)果部分,實(shí)證回歸結(jié)果證實(shí)了本文的研究假設(shè)；最后一部分即為本文的結(jié)論、同時(shí)還有針對(duì)性地提出了政策性建議,并指明本文的創(chuàng)新與不足之處。 本文的貢獻(xiàn)在于：嘗試將行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的相關(guān)理念融入到公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊的相關(guān)研究中,并且通過(guò)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)的方式獲得了相應(yīng)的結(jié)論,一方面突破了以往財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊研究對(duì)于管理者有限理性前提的忽略,另一方面對(duì)于與行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)相關(guān)的研究提供了實(shí)證上的支持。
[Abstract]:According to the present situation of listed company financial report fraud repeated, this article attempts from a different perspective on the formation mechanism of most previous studies consider the relationship between financial fraud and corporate governance structure, but ignore the management as the company's financial decision-makers, the difference of the individual characteristics and other characteristics also the impact on the financial reporting fraud. At present, behavioral economics as a new subject, the "limited rationality" hypothesis is more close to the real environment, so this paper combined theory of behavioral economics, in the management of "limited rationality" premise, analyze whether the different risk preferences of managers have an effect on financial reporting fraud.
This paper uses the utility theory of behavioral economics and behavioral economics research are based on the "limited rationality" hypothesis, compared with the traditional economics, that the decision makers in the behavior process and can not keep completely rational, there will be this or that deviation, thus more relative to traditional economics is close to the real environment the author thinks that, on the premise of limited rationality, different decision makers have different risk preferences, which leads to the same events have different risk preferences of different effects, different risk preferences of managers from the financial reporting fraud can get utility is different, high risk preference managers can get more utility from fraud, so that managers positively risk preference and financial reporting fraud. In addition, this paper also studies the company Whether the property of the controlling shareholders is different, the correlation between the risk preference of the managers of the listed companies and the fraud of the financial report will be different.
The manager's gender, age, job tenure, final wealth index, defense distance, the proportion of property six variables for measurement of managers' risk preference, using the principal components method, empirical test of the relationship between the degree of managerial risk preference and financial reporting fraud. The conclusions of this study include: (1) managers' risk preference and financial reporting fraud are related; (2) the controlling shareholder of the company is state-owned property, the positive correlation between fraud risk managers and financial reporting was significantly lower than that of the controlling shareholder of the relationship between non state-owned.
The article is divided into six parts: the first part is the introduction, introduces the research background, research purpose and significance, research methods and content; the second part is the literature review, the current domestic and foreign research on financial reporting fraud and risk preference to survey the research limitations of the existing literature and points out the possible research direction in the future the third part is the theory basis; the related theory involved in this paper were discussed, and the related concepts are defined, and methods to measure the main explanatory variables of this is described; the fourth part is theoretical analysis, combined with the theory of this paper introduced the study hypothesis, and established a mathematical model to explain the relevant variables the definition, sample selection process; the fifth part is the empirical results, the empirical regression results confirmed the hypothesis; the last part is the At the same time, the article puts forward the policy suggestions pertinence, and points out the innovation and inadequacies of this article.
The contribution of this paper is: try to related concepts of behavioral economics into the research to the financial reporting fraud, and through the empirical test of the way to obtain the corresponding conclusion, on the one hand, breaking the previous study on fraudulent financial reporting for managers ignore the limited rationality premise, on the other hand to provide empirical support for research related to behavioral economics.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F231.5;F832.51;F224

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