本文關(guān)鍵詞：商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性分析　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 商業(yè)銀行 績效 高管薪酬 相關(guān)性

【摘要】：隨著我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷深化和發(fā)展,現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離使得企業(yè)資源的控制者——高級管理人員的薪酬越來越為人們所關(guān)注。銀行作為經(jīng)營貨幣商品的特殊企業(yè),其高級管理人員薪酬的制定往往受到多方面因素的影響,加之近年來,我國商業(yè)銀行逐漸實(shí)行市場化改革,高級管理人員薪酬的制定也越來越偏向市場化,而近年來,隨著商業(yè)銀行業(yè)績的逐年攀升,高管們的薪酬也在顯著增加,因此,有關(guān)銀行高管薪酬的制定以及高管薪酬與銀行績效是否掛鉤等問題也越來越多的成為了人們議論的話題。 目前,我國已基本形成了以國有大型商業(yè)銀行為主體,全國性股份制商業(yè)銀行為新的生長點(diǎn),城市商業(yè)銀行為補(bǔ)充,各類銀行并存和公平競爭的格局。在過去的幾年里,我國商業(yè)銀行總體發(fā)展迅速,并不斷進(jìn)行市場化改革,到目前為止先后共有16家銀行在滬深證券交易所或香港聯(lián)合交易所上市,另外還有多家銀行正在籌備上市。近年來,我國商業(yè)銀行業(yè)績平穩(wěn)且呈現(xiàn)上升態(tài)勢,盡管07年底始于美國的一場金融危機(jī)給全球經(jīng)濟(jì)造成了巨大影響,在危機(jī)面前,不少曾經(jīng)輝煌的金融企業(yè)遭受重創(chuàng)甚至破產(chǎn)倒閉,而我國銀行業(yè)由于參與國際資本市場的程度并不深,加之政府采取有力措施,因而,我國商業(yè)銀行在危機(jī)中并未受到太大影響。隨著我國商業(yè)銀行市場化程度的加深,銀行高管的薪酬也在不斷增加,就2010年而言,從16家上市商業(yè)銀行公布的年報(bào)中看出,有半數(shù)以上銀行高管的薪酬數(shù)額較前一年的增幅接近或超過10%。此外,另一個(gè)值得關(guān)注的現(xiàn)象是,盡管上市銀行高管薪酬數(shù)額整體呈上升趨勢,但不同銀行高管薪酬的差距卻越來越顯著。在16家上市銀行中，既有民生、深發(fā)展數(shù)位高管千萬年薪的連年跳躍,也有工農(nóng)中建幾家國有大型商業(yè)銀行平均不到200萬年薪的緩慢爬行。差異如此之大不禁讓人產(chǎn)生疑問：高管薪酬的制定與銀行績效是否掛鉤以及在多大程度上掛鉤?薪酬與績效的掛鉤程度是否受其他因素影響?這是一個(gè)廣受關(guān)注且值得研究的問題,種種疑問需要我們在分析現(xiàn)實(shí)的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合具體實(shí)證研究來解答。 本文在借鑒國內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合我國銀行業(yè)實(shí)際情況,使用理論與實(shí)證相結(jié)合的方法,分析和探討了我國上市商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性以及其他因素對績效和薪酬相關(guān)性的影響。本文共分為五個(gè)部分： 第一章是導(dǎo)論部分。本部分主要闡述了文章的研究背景、研究的目的和意義、國內(nèi)外關(guān)于績效與高管薪酬相關(guān)性問題研究的文獻(xiàn)綜述,說明了研究的主要內(nèi)容和研究方法。文獻(xiàn)綜述部分分別從企業(yè)績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性和銀行績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性兩方面對國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行梳理,指出他們研究結(jié)論的共識與分歧,為本文的研究內(nèi)容明確方向。 第二章討論了薪酬和績效的概念與相關(guān)理論。本章共分為兩小節(jié),第—小節(jié)主要介紹了薪酬的概念與構(gòu)成。第二小節(jié)首先對績效的概念進(jìn)行闡釋,接著追溯了績效評價(jià)的理論淵源,對比較基礎(chǔ)的績效評價(jià)理論：目標(biāo)管理理論和激勵(lì)理論進(jìn)行了介紹。在第二小節(jié)的最后一部分,我們對目前比較常用的績效評價(jià)指標(biāo)做了描述,主要指標(biāo)有：每股收益(EPS)、總資產(chǎn)收益率(ROA)、Tobin’s Q、和經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值(EVA),每個(gè)指標(biāo)都能夠從某一方面對績效做出描述,我們在對不同指標(biāo)進(jìn)行比較后,選擇總資產(chǎn)收益率(ROA)作為本研究所選用的度量指標(biāo)。 第三章主要對我國商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬和銀行績效的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了分析。本章分為兩部分,第一部分分析了近幾年我國商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬的變動(dòng)情況。我們選取了上市銀行行長、副行長、董事會(huì)成員、監(jiān)事會(huì)成員、董事會(huì)秘書、首席風(fēng)險(xiǎn)官和首席財(cái)務(wù)官等為研究對象,并取每家上市銀行年薪最高的三位高管的薪酬的平均值作為觀察值,選取2007年到2010年作為觀察年份。根據(jù)從上市商業(yè)銀行年度報(bào)告中得到的數(shù)據(jù)顯示,16家上市銀行高管薪酬在2007年整體相對較高,而2008年和2009年兩年里多數(shù)銀行高管薪酬呈現(xiàn)下降趨勢,在2010年薪酬整體走勢又趨于上升。另外,相同年份里,不同銀行高管間薪酬差異顯著,此外,同一家銀行里不同高管之間的薪酬同樣存在差距,這種差距主要表現(xiàn)在從境外引進(jìn)的管理者和本土管理者之間的薪酬數(shù)額上。本章第二部分主要分析了近幾年我國商業(yè)銀行績效的變動(dòng)情況。從2007年到2010四年間,我國16家上市商業(yè)銀行整體績效相對穩(wěn)定,波動(dòng)幅度不大,其中,工行、建行、中行和農(nóng)行四家國有大型商業(yè)銀行的總資產(chǎn)收益率呈現(xiàn)穩(wěn)中上升趨勢,金融危機(jī)并未對其盈利能力造成明顯影響。而以招行、浦發(fā)和中信為代表的一些中小型股份制商業(yè)銀行的總資產(chǎn)收益率則呈現(xiàn)先降后升的趨勢。我們可以粗略的看出我國上市商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬總體上走勢一致,當(dāng)然,銀行績效與高管薪酬的具體相關(guān)程度我們還要在接下來的實(shí)證分析中得到驗(yàn)證。 第四章是文章的實(shí)證部分。本章主要通過建立模型,對2007年到2010年我國上市商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行回歸分析,進(jìn)而對二者的相關(guān)性做出描述。由于受到來自行政方面因素的影響程度不同,我們將上市銀行分為國有大型商業(yè)銀行和中小型股份制商業(yè)銀行兩類,分別進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。研究結(jié)果表明我國國有大型商業(yè)銀行和中小型股份制商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬都呈現(xiàn)正相關(guān)性,但后者績效與薪酬的相關(guān)程度高于前者。在對影響銀行績效與高管薪酬相關(guān)性的因素進(jìn)行分析后,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),第一大股東持股比例對國有大型商業(yè)銀行和中小型股份制商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性都起到強(qiáng)化作用。而前一期的高管薪酬水平對兩類銀行當(dāng)期的績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性都起到弱化作用。另外,銀行規(guī)模和不良貸款率都能夠?qū)χ行⌒凸煞葜粕虡I(yè)銀行的績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性產(chǎn)生弱化作用,但是這兩個(gè)因素對國有大型商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性的影響卻比較小。此外,董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性和銀行資本充足率這兩個(gè)因素對國有大型商業(yè)銀行和中小型股份制商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性者不產(chǎn)生明顯影響 第五章主要總結(jié)了文章的研究結(jié)論并提出政策建議。主要分為兩個(gè)部分,第一部分對實(shí)證研究的結(jié)論進(jìn)行解釋,第二部分提出政策建議。建議主要包括：1.繼續(xù)完善年薪制,使高管年薪與銀行績效和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)充分掛鉤；2.銀行業(yè)績考核指標(biāo)復(fù)合化,為建立高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制提供可靠依據(jù)；3.減少行政干預(yù),使高管薪酬形成機(jī)制更加市場化；4.加強(qiáng)銀行董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性,充分發(fā)揮獨(dú)立董事的監(jiān)督作用。 本文采用理論與實(shí)證相結(jié)合的方法對我國商業(yè)銀行績效與高管薪酬的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行了分析。影響銀行高管薪酬與績效的因素很多,也很復(fù)雜,限于商業(yè)銀行資料來源的局限性,本文的研究尚不能給出一個(gè)透徹完整的結(jié)論,只是對該問題做了些嘗試性探索,文中的有些觀點(diǎn)和論述可能不是很成熟,還需要在以后的學(xué)習(xí)和研究中繼續(xù)完善。
[Abstract]:With the deepening and development of China's market economy, the separation of ownership and management of modern enterprise system makes the control of enterprise resources, senior management pay more and more attention. As a special commodity business bank currency, making its senior management remuneration is often influenced by many factors, and in recent years, the gradual implementation of market-oriented reform of China's commercial banks, remuneration of senior managers are also more and more to the market, but in recent years, with the performance of commercial bank is increasing year by year, executives pay has increased significantly, therefore, the bank executive compensation plan and executive compensation and bank performance is linked to other more and more problems has become a topic of discussion.
At present, China has basically formed the main state-owned large commercial banks, national joint-stock commercial banks as a new growth point of the city commercial banks to supplement, all banks coexist and fair competition pattern. In the past few years, China's commercial banks overall rapid development and continuous market the reform, so far a total of 16 banks listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hongkong stock exchange, in addition to a number of banks are preparing for listing. In recent years, the performance of China's commercial banks and steady upward trend, although the 07 at the end of the year begins with a financial crisis in the United States has a tremendous impact on the global economy, in the before the crisis, many have brilliant financial enterprises suffered heavy losses or even bankruptcy, while China's banking industry because of the involvement of the international capital market is not deep, coupled with the government to take effective measures, therefore, I China's commercial bank has not been much affected in the crisis. With the degree of China's commercial bank market deepening, the bank executive compensation is also increasing, as of 2010, announced that from the 16 listed commercial banks in the annual report, more than half of bank executives pay the amount of the previous year's growth rate or more than 10%. in addition, another noteworthy phenomenon is that although the listed bank executive compensation amount of the overall upward trend, but the executive compensation gap of different banks has become increasingly significant. In the 16 listed banks, both the people's livelihood, Shenzhen Development of several senior executives million annual successive jumps, there are workers and peasants in the construction of several large state-owned commercial banks on average less than 2 million a year slow crawl. So much difference can not help but doubt: the development of executive compensation and bank performance is a hook and a hook in the extent of compensation? Is the degree of performance related to other factors? This is a widely concerned and worth studying problem. We need to answer questions based on the analysis of reality and concrete empirical research.
In this paper, on the basis of research results of scholars at home and abroad, combined with the actual situation of China's banking industry, using a combination of theoretical and empirical analysis, and discusses the influence of correlation between bank performance and executive compensation of listed and other factors on the relationship between performance and compensation. This paper is divided into five parts:
The first chapter is the introduction part. This part mainly expounds the research background, purpose and significance of the study, literature review research on the correlation between executive compensation and performance problems, explains the main content and method of the research. The literature review section are facing the domestic and foreign relevant literature was combed from the correlation between corporate performance and executive compensation the correlation between bank performance and executive compensation and the two party, and pointed out the differences in their research conclusions as the research contents of this consensus, a clear direction.
The second chapter discusses the concept of salary and performance and related theories. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section mainly introduces the concept of compensation and composition. The second section firstly expound the concept of performance, and then traces the theoretical origin of performance evaluation, performance evaluation on the basis of comparison of the theory of objective management theory and the incentive theory are introduced. In the last part of the second section, we present the performance evaluation indexes commonly used are described, the main indicators are: earnings per share (EPS), the rate of return on total assets (ROA), Tobin s Q, and the economic value added (EVA), each index can make description of the performance on the one hand, we are comparing different indicators, select the rate of return on total assets (ROA) as a metric used in this study.
The third chapter analyzes the main status of the performance of China's commercial bank executive pay and bank. This chapter is divided into two parts, the first part analyzes the changes of compensation in our country's commercial bank executives in recent years. We selected the listed bank president, vice president, members of the board of directors, members of the board of supervisors, the Secretary of the board of directors, the chief risk officer and chief financial officer as the research object, and take the average value of each of the three listed banks in the annual salary of the highest executive pay as the observation value, from 2007 to 2010 as the observation year. According to the listed commercial banks in the annual report data show that 16 listed banks in 2007 relative to the overall executive compensation high, while in 2008 and 2009 two years of executive compensation for most banks showed a downward trend, in 2010 the overall trend of compensation and tend to rise. In addition, the same year, different banks high tube salary In addition, with a significant difference between different bank executives pay the same gap, the gap is mainly reflected in between imported from overseas managers and local managers compensation. The second part of this chapter mainly analyzes the changes in recent years, the performance of commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2010 four. From the 16 listed commercial banks in China's overall performance is relatively stable, volatility is not, among them, ICBC, CCB, BOC and bank total assets of four large state-owned commercial bank rate showed a steady upward trend, the financial crisis did not cause significant impact on its profitability. The total assets of China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development and as the representative of some small and medium-sized joint-stock commercial banks was decreased and then increased. We can roughly see China's listed commercial bank performance and executive compensation on a general trend Of course, of course, the specific correlation between bank performance and executive compensation should be verified in the following empirical analysis.
The fourth chapter is the empirical part of the article. This chapter mainly through the establishment of model, regression analysis was carried out in 2010 of China's listed commercial bank performance and executive compensation data of 2007, and then make a description of the relationship between the two. Due to the influence degree from administrative factors are different, we will be listed banks into large state-owned commercial banks small and medium-sized joint-stock commercial banks two categories, respectively for empirical research. The results indicated that the large state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial bank performance and executive compensation have a positive correlation, but the extent of the performance and the salary is higher than the former. In the analysis of the factors affecting the correlation between bank performance and executive compensation later, we found that related to the proportion of the largest shareholder of large state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial bank performance and executive compensation Can play the role of reinforcement. The correlation between the level of executive compensation issue on the two types of bank current performance and executive compensation have a weakening effect. In addition, the size of the bank and the bad loan rate can correlation on the performance and executive compensation in small joint-stock commercial banks have weakened, but the impact of this relationship two factors of large state-owned commercial bank performance and executive compensation is relatively small. In addition, the board does not affect the independence and the bank capital adequacy ratio of the two factors of large state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial bank performance and executive compensation.
The fifth chapter summarizes the research conclusion and puts forward policy suggestions. Mainly divided into two parts, the first part explains the conclusions of empirical studies, the second part puts forward policy suggestions. The suggestions mainly include: 1. to improve the salary system, the annual salary of executives and bank performance and risk fully linked; 2. bank performance evaluation index composite and provide a reliable basis for the establishment of executive compensation incentive mechanism; 3., reduce administrative intervention, making executive compensation more market-oriented; strengthen the independence of the 4. board of directors of the bank, give full play to the supervisory role of independent directors.
This paper uses the combined method of theoretical and empirical relevance of our commercial bank performance and executive compensation is analyzed. Many factors affecting executive compensation and performance, is also very complex, limited to the limitations of the data source of commercial bank, this paper is not to give a thorough and complete conclusion, just for this made a tentative exploration in this paper, some views and opinions may not be very mature, also need to in the future study and research continue to improve.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.33;F272.92;F224

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