本文關(guān)鍵詞：中國上市銀行行長薪酬、薪酬差距與銀行績效的實證研究　出處：《重慶大學》2012年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

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【摘要】：我國金融市場完全對外開放后，國內(nèi)外銀行之間的競爭加劇。這場競爭，實質(zhì)上是現(xiàn)代銀行制度的競爭，而現(xiàn)代銀行制度的核心就是現(xiàn)代銀行公司治理機制。因此，治理結(jié)構(gòu)的優(yōu)化是提高我國商業(yè)銀行競爭力的必由之路。商業(yè)銀行作為一類特殊的公司，既有一般公司的普遍性，也有其特殊性。 為探討當前國內(nèi)外銀行業(yè)對高管實施限薪的合理性、可行性，發(fā)掘引發(fā)國內(nèi)外政府對上市銀行高管實行限薪的問題根源，以及解決該問題的更好途徑。本論文以我國14家上市銀行為樣本，首先，對我國上市銀行高管薪酬的影響因素進行了實證研究；其次，本文從中國上市銀行內(nèi)部薪酬差距的角度出發(fā)，依據(jù)錦標賽理論和行為理論，探討了銀行內(nèi)部薪酬差距與銀行績效之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系。最后，對我國上市銀行高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)與對應銀行績效之間的關(guān)系進行了實證研究。 研究結(jié)果表明，，中國上市銀行高管層的薪酬和銀行績效沒有明顯的相關(guān)關(guān)系,而員工薪酬激勵與銀行績效有顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系；股權(quán)激勵對上市銀行績效的影響并不顯著；銀行高管內(nèi)部薪酬差異存在錦標賽競爭機制，即銀行高管間適當?shù)男匠瓴町惪梢蕴嵘y行績效。通過與其他行業(yè)薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)的對比發(fā)現(xiàn)，中國上市銀行的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)具有一定的合理性。另外過對銀行行長與銀行績效的回歸分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，銀行行長薪酬與銀行績效的聯(lián)系程度還不夠緊密，需要以后的薪酬制度改革中進一步的加強。
[Abstract]:Full opening of China's financial markets, increased competition between domestic and foreign banks. This competition is essentially the competition of modern banking system, and the core of the modern banking system is modern banking corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the optimization of governance structure is the only way which must be passed to improve the competitiveness of China's commercial banks. Commercial banks as a class special company, both universal company, has its own particularity.
In order to investigate the rationality, implementation of the salary limit of current domestic and foreign banking executives explore feasibility, triggered by the domestic government problems of listed bank executives salary limit, and solve the problem of a better way. In this paper, 14 listed banks in China as the sample, firstly, the influence factors of executive compensation of listed banks the empirical research; secondly, this article from the Chinese listed the pay gap within the bank's point of view, on the basis of the tournament theory and behavior theory, discusses the relationship between the performance of the pay gap within the bank. Finally, the relationship between China's listed banks executive compensation structure and the corresponding bank performance by empirical research.
The results showed that there was no significant correlation between Chinese listed bank executives pay and bank performance, and there is a significant positive correlation between the performance of employee incentive compensation and bank; equity incentive effect on the performance of listed banks is not significant; championship competition mechanism of bank executives internal salary differences, namely bank executives salary differences can be appropriate to improve the bank performance. Compared with other sectors of the salary structure, salary structure Chinese listed banks has certain rationality. In addition a return to bank and bank performance analysis found that the degree of contact with the governor of the Bank of compensation and bank performance is not close enough, the need to further strengthen the reform of the remuneration system.

【學位授予單位】：重慶大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.3;F272.92;F224

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