【摘要】：隨著全球環(huán)境污染和資源短缺日趨嚴重,各國政府越來越重視環(huán)境保護和資源的循環(huán)再利用發(fā)展問題。閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈遵循循環(huán)經(jīng)濟理論,以最大化產(chǎn)品生命周期為目標的將正向供應(yīng)鏈和逆向供應(yīng)鏈有機結(jié)合,能夠減少企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)成本,實現(xiàn)產(chǎn)品的循環(huán)再利用,而受到企業(yè)、政府和學(xué)術(shù)界的廣泛關(guān)注。近年來,政府更是加大了對環(huán)保的關(guān)注,陸續(xù)出臺了相關(guān)政策法規(guī)要求企業(yè)進行回收再制造活動,甚至對企業(yè)實施補貼進行激勵。 關(guān)于閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈已有的研究成果主要是關(guān)于閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的定價和協(xié)調(diào)問題,關(guān)于政府干涉的研究卻不多�？紤]政府干涉對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的影響更加具有現(xiàn)實意義。因此本文在分析和總結(jié)前人已有研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,通過模型構(gòu)建,采用定量分析方法研究了政府獎懲下不同權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的決策問題。 本文的研究工作主要有以下幾個方面： 首先,對選題的背景及意義進行了闡述,確定本文的具體研究方法和內(nèi)容。對研究相關(guān)的逆向供應(yīng)鏈、閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈、博弈論等理論基礎(chǔ)進行了介紹及相關(guān)文獻進行了綜述,并指出現(xiàn)研究存在的不足。 其次,構(gòu)建由壟斷制造商和單一零售商組成的零售商回收模式的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型。研究政府分別對制造商和零售商實施獎懲時,對集中式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈,以及制造商和零售商Nash均衡博弈、制造商領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈、零售商領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的Stackelberg博弈等三種權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈模型的決策、系統(tǒng)各成員利潤和總利潤的影響。 利用最優(yōu)化理論與方法對集中式?jīng)Q策模型進行求解,利用Stackelberg博弈理論對六種分散式?jīng)Q策模型進行求解,并對求得的最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品單位零售價格、批發(fā)價格、回收率、制造商利潤、零售商利潤以及總利潤進行了比較分析。重點研究了政府獎懲力度和最低回收率的設(shè)置對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中產(chǎn)品零售價格、批發(fā)價格和回收率等決策變量以及成員利潤的影響。研究表明,政府獎懲不僅能夠提高閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的收益,且增加環(huán)境效益。我們的研究成果豐富了閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)政府干涉的研究領(lǐng)域,為政府在閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理方面提供了一些管理學(xué)啟示。 最后,對全文進行了總結(jié),歸納了全文的主要結(jié)論以及貢獻,提出本文研究中存在的不足,并對進一步的研究工作進行了展望。
[Abstract]:With the global environmental pollution and resource shortage becoming more and more serious, governments pay more and more attention to environmental protection and recycling and development of resources. The closed-loop supply chain follows the theory of circular economy and combines the forward supply chain and reverse supply chain organically in order to maximize the product life cycle, which can reduce the production cost of the enterprise, realize the recycling of the product, and be accepted by the enterprise. The widespread concern of the government and academia. In recent years, the government has paid more attention to environmental protection, and has issued relevant policies and regulations requiring enterprises to recycle and remanufacture activities, and even to encourage enterprises to implement subsidies. The existing research results on closed-loop supply chain are mainly about the pricing and coordination of closed-loop supply chain, but there are few researches on government intervention. Considering the influence of government intervention on closed-loop supply chain, it is more practical. Therefore, on the basis of analyzing and summarizing the previous research results, this paper studies the decision-making problem of closed-loop supply chain with different power structures under different government rewards and punishments by using the quantitative analysis method and constructing the model. The main research work of this paper is as follows: firstly, the background and significance of the selected topic are expounded, and the specific research methods and contents of this paper are determined. This paper introduces the theoretical basis of reverse supply chain, closed loop supply chain, game theory and so on, and summarizes the related literatures, and points out the deficiency of the research. Secondly, the closed-loop supply chain model of retailer recovery model composed of monopoly manufacturer and single retailer is constructed. This paper studies the closed-loop supply chain with centralized decision-making, the Nash equilibrium game between manufacturer and retailer, and the Stackelberg game led by manufacturer when the government carries out rewards and punishments on manufacturers and retailers respectively. The decision-making of three decentralized power structure decision-making closed-loop supply chain models, such as retailer-led Stackelberg game, and the influence of each member's profit and total profit of the system. The optimization theory and method are used to solve the centralized decision-making model, the Stackelberg game theory is used to solve the six decentralized decision-making models, and the optimal product unit retail price, wholesale price, recovery rate and manufacturer's profit are obtained. The retailer's profit and total profit are compared and analyzed. The effects of government rewards and penalties and minimum recovery rate on the decision variables such as retail price wholesale price and recovery rate of products in closed-loop supply chain as well as the profit of members are studied. The research shows that government rewards and punishments can not only improve the return of closed-loop supply chain, but also increase the environmental benefit. Our research results enrich the research field of government intervention in closed-loop supply chain system and provide some management enlightenment for government in closed-loop supply chain management. Finally, the thesis is summarized, the main conclusions and contributions of this paper are summarized, and the shortcomings in this paper are put forward, and the future research work is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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