發(fā)布時間：2019-03-07 21:41

【摘要】：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈是一種將正向物流與逆向物流相結(jié)合的新型供應(yīng)鏈管理模式,包括從原材料采購、生產(chǎn)加工、成品銷售及廢舊品回收再制造整個產(chǎn)品流動過程。節(jié)約了生產(chǎn)成本,實現(xiàn)了產(chǎn)品的循環(huán)再利用,近年來被許多企業(yè)認可并廣泛應(yīng)用,如惠普、施樂等。 閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理過程中由于各級成員都以各自利益最大化為目標(biāo),這就會引起“雙重邊際效應(yīng)”問題,使得分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的總利潤達不到集中式?jīng)Q策的水平。基于此,采用契約對分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈進行協(xié)調(diào),提高其運營績效,就成為一個亟待解決的問題。但閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈不可能一直處于相對穩(wěn)定的環(huán)境中。突發(fā)事件的發(fā)生,如：自然災(zāi)害、生產(chǎn)事故等,會對運作良好的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)生干擾。因此,如何利用契約使得分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈在穩(wěn)定環(huán)境和突發(fā)事件干擾下均能實現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)就顯得十分重要。 本文研究主要有以下幾方面的內(nèi)容： 第一,介紹閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的研究背景,對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈管理理論的相關(guān)研究進行綜述,包括閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的概念及其結(jié)構(gòu),供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)理論,以及供應(yīng)鏈應(yīng)急管理理論等內(nèi)容。 第二,針對由一個制造商和一個零售商組成的零售商負責(zé)回收閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈,研究其采用兩部收費契約在穩(wěn)定環(huán)境和突發(fā)事件干擾下的協(xié)調(diào)問題,并將模型進一步擴展到由 個制造商和兩個存在古諾競爭的零售商組成的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈。在穩(wěn)定環(huán)境下,設(shè)計了個兩部收費契約用以協(xié)調(diào)分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈�？紤]突發(fā)事件干擾最大市場需求規(guī)模的情況,運用K-T條件得出了集中式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)決策。分析表明：突發(fā)事件發(fā)生后,若分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈仍采用穩(wěn)定環(huán)境下的兩部收費契約,其協(xié)調(diào)被打破。因此,本文對穩(wěn)定環(huán)境下兩部收費契約中的契約參數(shù)進行改進,使改進后的兩部收費契約可協(xié)調(diào)突發(fā)事件干擾下的分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈。 第三、分別設(shè)計算例分析了突發(fā)事件干擾最大市場需求規(guī)模對單一零售商的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈和競爭零售商的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)產(chǎn)品供貨量、廢舊品回收率以及系統(tǒng)總利潤的影響,并對比了零售商對最優(yōu)供貨量和廢舊品回收率及時做出調(diào)整和不做調(diào)整兩種情況下的利潤。研究得出：集中式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)供貨量、最優(yōu)回收率和系統(tǒng)總利潤隨著最大市場需求規(guī)模的增大而增大。并且,當(dāng)最大市場需求規(guī)模變化比較大時,零售商若及時做出反應(yīng),即調(diào)整產(chǎn)品最優(yōu)供貨量和回收率,則可提高自身利潤；當(dāng)最大市場需求規(guī)模變化比較小時,零售商不需對最優(yōu)供貨量和廢舊品回收率做出調(diào)整,只需提高產(chǎn)品零售價格以保證利潤不會降低。 最后,對全文進行了總結(jié),并對進一步的研究進行了展望。
[Abstract]:Closed-loop supply chain is a new mode of supply chain management, which combines forward logistics with reverse logistics. It includes purchasing of raw materials, production and processing, sale of finished products and recycling and remanufacturing of old products. In recent years, it has been recognized and widely used by many enterprises, such as Hewlett-Packard, Xerox, etc. In the process of closed-loop supply chain management, because the members at all levels aim to maximize their own interests, this will lead to the problem of "double marginal effect", which makes the total profit of closed-loop supply chain with decentralized decision-making less than the level of centralized decision-making. Based on this, it is an urgent problem to use contract to coordinate decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain and improve its operational performance. However, closed-loop supply chain can not always be in a relatively stable environment. The occurrence of unexpected events, such as natural disasters and production accidents, will interfere with the well-functioning closed-loop supply chain. Therefore, it is very important to make use of contract to make decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain realize coordination under stable environment and emergency disturbance. The main contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, the research background of closed-loop supply chain is introduced, and the related research of closed-loop supply chain management is summarized, including the concept and structure of closed-loop supply chain. Supply chain contract coordination theory, and supply chain emergency management theory and so on. Secondly, for a retailer composed of a manufacturer and a retailer responsible for recycling the closed-loop supply chain, the coordination problem of adopting two-part fee contract under stable environment and emergency disturbance is studied. The model is further extended to a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers competing with Cournot. In the stable environment, a two-part fee contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain. The optimal decision-making of the closed-loop supply chain with centralized decision-making is obtained by using the K ~ (t) condition, considering the case of the maximum demand scale of the market disturbed by emergency events. The analysis shows that if the decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain still adopts the two-part fee contract under stable environment after the emergency, its coordination will be broken. Therefore, in this paper, the contract parameters in the two-part fee contract under stable environment are improved, so that the improved two-part fee contract can coordinate the decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain under the disturbance of sudden events. Thirdly, the design examples are given to analyze the effect of the maximum market demand scale of emergency disturbance on the optimal product supply volume, scrap recovery rate and total profit of the closed-loop supply chain of single retailer and competitive retailer. Compared with the optimal supply volume and the recovery rate of scrap goods, the profit of retailers is adjusted in time and without adjustment. The results show that the optimal supply volume, the optimal recovery rate and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain increase with the increase of the maximum market demand in the centralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain. Moreover, when the largest market demand changes greatly, retailers can improve their profits if they respond in a timely manner, that is, adjust the optimal supply volume and the recovery rate of the product. When the size of the largest market changes relatively little, retailers do not need to adjust the optimal supply volume and scrap recovery rate, but simply increase the retail price of the product to ensure that profits do not fall. Finally, the full text is summarized, and the future research is prospected.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F274

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