【摘要】：研究了多零售商橫向轉(zhuǎn)載的供應(yīng)鏈批發(fā)價契約協(xié)調(diào)問題。以包含一個制造商和多個零售商的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)為研究對象,基于批發(fā)價契約研究了零售商轉(zhuǎn)載下的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題,獲取了批發(fā)價契約可以協(xié)調(diào)零售商存在橫向轉(zhuǎn)載的供應(yīng)鏈的理論證據(jù),并給出了相應(yīng)的產(chǎn)生供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的條件,詳細(xì)分析了協(xié)調(diào)情形下供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)訂貨量與多零售商無轉(zhuǎn)載及單報童等情形下的最優(yōu)訂貨量之間的關(guān)系。進(jìn)一步研究了制造商與零售商在Stackelberg博弈下,零售商橫向轉(zhuǎn)載對制造商收益的影響,并提出了在Stackelberg博弈模型中,批發(fā)價契約也有可能促使制造商選擇供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)訂貨量所對應(yīng)的批發(fā)價格,使得供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào),且給出了此種協(xié)調(diào)產(chǎn)生的具體條件。數(shù)值算例則對兩種供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)情形下的訂貨量、批發(fā)價格及期望收益進(jìn)行了計算與仿真。研究表明,批發(fā)價契約可能會使得多零售商存在轉(zhuǎn)載的供應(yīng)鏈實現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào),傳統(tǒng)的雙重邊際化效應(yīng)將會由于制造商和零售商的理性而被弱化。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the coordination of supply chain wholesale price contract which is reprinted horizontally by multiple retailers. Taking the supply chain system including one manufacturer and multiple retailers as the research object, this paper studies the supply chain coordination problem reprinted by retailers based on the wholesale price contract. The theoretical evidence that wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain of retailers is obtained, and the corresponding conditions for supply chain coordination are given. The relationship between the optimal order quantity of supply chain system and the optimal order quantity of multiple retailers without reprint and single newsboy is analyzed in detail. In this paper, we further study the effect of retailer horizontal reprinting on manufacturer's income under Stackelberg game, and propose a Stackelberg game model. The wholesale price contract may also urge the manufacturer to choose the wholesale price corresponding to the optimal order quantity of the supply chain system, which makes the supply chain coordinate, and gives the concrete conditions for such coordination. Numerical examples are given to calculate and simulate the order quantity, wholesale price and expected income of the two supply chain coordination cases. The research shows that wholesale price contract may make the supply chain coordination of multiple retailers reprinted, and the traditional double marginalization effect will be weakened by the rationality of manufacturer and retailer.
【作者單位】： 南通大學(xué)商學(xué)院;中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;江蘇大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家社會科學(xué)基金資助項目(10CGL025) 教育部人文社會科學(xué)基金資助項目(11YJA870021) 江蘇省高校哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)基金資助項目(2010SJB630055) 江蘇省高校優(yōu)秀青年骨干教師基金資助項目(蘇教師2010第27號) 南通大學(xué)百名科研創(chuàng)新人才培養(yǎng)基金(通大社科2011第8號) 南通大學(xué)交通科學(xué)專項基金資助項目(11ZJ008)
【分類號】：F274;F224.32

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