【摘要】：近年來,我國食品安全問題頻發(fā),已經(jīng)引起了一定程度的社會(huì)恐慌。食品安全問題主要來自于食品供應(yīng)鏈,解決食品安全問題的主要方法之一就是控制食品供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn),提高食品供應(yīng)鏈的抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)能力,從而降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)發(fā)生率,保證食品安全。本論文運(yùn)用演化博弈理論、系統(tǒng)動(dòng)力學(xué)理論和vensim仿真方法,從分析食品供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的特征和系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理行為的動(dòng)力學(xué)特征著手,基于供應(yīng)鏈信息共享應(yīng)對(duì)和集中應(yīng)對(duì)兩個(gè)視角考慮食品供應(yīng)鏈抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模式。 文章首先對(duì)“牛鞭效應(yīng)”這一食品供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)形成原因及其與食品供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了分析,建立了食品供應(yīng)鏈訂貨和庫存控制系統(tǒng)的因果關(guān)系圖和動(dòng)力學(xué)流圖,分別對(duì)“利用在途庫存信息”和“供應(yīng)鏈信息共享”兩種信息技術(shù)對(duì)食品供應(yīng)鏈“牛鞭效應(yīng)”的影響進(jìn)行了動(dòng)力學(xué)建模,結(jié)合模型說明了利用現(xiàn)代信息技術(shù)對(duì)食品供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響,進(jìn)而提出了基于信息共享的食品供應(yīng)鏈抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模式。在文章的第四部分建立了一個(gè)供應(yīng)商和一個(gè)生產(chǎn)加工商之間基于“共享”和“不共享”兩種策略的演化博弈模型,證明在假設(shè)條件下博弈模型存在(共享,共享)和(不共享,不共享)兩種演化均衡,而當(dāng)政府懲罰力度大于其選擇不共享的超額收益時(shí),只存在(共享,共享)一種均衡狀態(tài)。接著利用vensim軟件對(duì)各個(gè)影響因素與博弈結(jié)果的相關(guān)關(guān)系進(jìn)行了仿真,仿真結(jié)果表明在食品供應(yīng)鏈信息共享博弈中,雙方實(shí)現(xiàn)共享的概率受到共享成本、共享所能獲得的收益、政府懲罰力度以及企業(yè)的信息吸收與溢出能力的影響。與信息共享模式不同,文章還提出了以核心企業(yè)為主體、以鏈內(nèi)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理小組為主體和以鏈外第三方機(jī)構(gòu)為主體的三種主體集中應(yīng)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的運(yùn)作模式,分析了他們的運(yùn)作流程和優(yōu)缺點(diǎn),指出以鏈內(nèi)專門小組為主體的模式能夠克服其他兩種模式的不足,是一種比較好的抗風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模式。本論文的研究對(duì)于從整體把握食品供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作流程、識(shí)別供應(yīng)鏈的薄弱環(huán)節(jié),提高整個(gè)系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)程度、信息共享程度和整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的效率和效益,降低食品供應(yīng)鏈脆弱性具有重大意義,從而規(guī)避食品供應(yīng)鏈風(fēng)險(xiǎn),保證食品安全。
[Abstract]:In recent years, food safety problems in China occur frequently, which has caused a certain degree of social panic. The food safety problem mainly comes from the food supply chain. One of the main ways to solve the food safety problem is to control the food supply chain risk and improve the anti-risk ability of the food supply chain so as to reduce the risk rate and ensure the food safety. In this paper, evolutionary game theory, system dynamics theory and vensim simulation method are used to analyze the characteristics of food supply chain system and the dynamic characteristics of system risk management behavior. Based on the two perspectives of supply chain information sharing response and centralized response, the anti-risk model of food supply chain is considered. This paper first analyzes the cause of "bullwhip effect" and its relationship with food supply chain risk, and establishes the causality diagram and dynamic flow diagram of food supply chain ordering and inventory control system. The effects of "inventory information in transit" and "information sharing in supply chain" on "bullwhip effect" in food supply chain were modeled. Combined with the model, the influence of modern information technology on food supply chain risk is explained, and the anti-risk model of food supply chain based on information sharing is put forward. In the fourth part of the paper, an evolutionary game model between a supplier and a producer is established based on the two strategies of "sharing" and "not sharing". It is proved that the game model exists (share, share) and (do not share) under hypothetical conditions. Two kinds of evolutionary equilibrium are not shared, but when the punishment of government is greater than the excess income that the government chooses not to share, there is only one equilibrium state (sharing, sharing). Then we use vensim software to simulate the relationship between the influence factors and the game results. The simulation results show that in the information sharing game of food supply chain, the probability of both sides to achieve the sharing is shared cost, share the income that can be obtained. The influence of government punishment and the ability of information absorption and spillover of enterprises. Different from the information sharing mode, the paper also puts forward three kinds of operation modes, which are the core enterprise as the main body, the risk management group in the chain as the main body and the third party organization outside the chain as the main body to deal with the supply chain risk. This paper analyzes their operation flow and their advantages and disadvantages, and points out that the model with the special group in the chain as the main body can overcome the shortcomings of the other two models and is a better anti-risk model. The research of this paper is aimed at grasping the operation process of food supply chain, identifying the weak link of the supply chain, improving the coordination degree of the whole system, the degree of information sharing and the efficiency and benefit of the whole supply chain. It is of great significance to reduce the vulnerability of food supply chain so as to avoid the risk of food supply chain and ensure food safety.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F326.6;N941.3

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本文編號(hào)：2388791