【摘要】：基于由單個(gè)制造商和單個(gè)零售商組成的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),研究了不對(duì)稱信息下激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題。首先分析了對(duì)稱信息下供應(yīng)鏈處于集中和分散兩種模式時(shí)的成員最優(yōu)決策;其次分析了不對(duì)稱信息下零售商服務(wù)水平為私人信息時(shí)制造商的激勵(lì)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題,運(yùn)用委托-代理理論建模,運(yùn)用泛函極值理論求解;最后通過(guò)實(shí)例仿真分析,驗(yàn)證了激勵(lì)機(jī)制對(duì)于提高供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效的合理有效性。
[Abstract]:Based on a two-channel supply chain system composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, the incentive mechanism design under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the optimal decision of the members of the supply chain in centralized and decentralized mode under symmetric information is analyzed. Secondly, this paper analyzes the incentive mechanism design problem of manufacturer when the retailer service level is private information under asymmetric information, and applies principal-agent theory to model and use functional extreme value theory to solve the problem. Finally, the simulation results show that the incentive mechanism is reasonable and effective to improve the performance of supply chain.
【作者單位】： 北京科技大學(xué)數(shù)理學(xué)院;
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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本文編號(hào)：2386108