發(fā)布時間：2018-11-15 23:38

【摘要】：隨著供應(yīng)鏈體系在全球的飛速發(fā)展,供應(yīng)鏈成員間的協(xié)調(diào)成為困擾眾多企業(yè)的一個問題。協(xié)調(diào)既是供應(yīng)鏈穩(wěn)定運行的基礎(chǔ),也是建立供應(yīng)鏈合作關(guān)系的關(guān)鍵。目前國內(nèi)外學者主要從零售商作為風險厭惡者的角度進行二級供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題研究,并提出應(yīng)用契約模型來協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈,但是現(xiàn)有的研究存在研究方法較為單一、所構(gòu)建的供應(yīng)鏈模型偏于簡單等不足;該領(lǐng)域未來值得關(guān)注的研究方向包括改進數(shù)學運算技術(shù)、擴展契約模型等。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of supply chain system in the world, coordination among supply chain members has become a problem for many enterprises. Coordination is not only the foundation of stable operation of supply chain, but also the key to establish supply chain cooperation. At present, domestic and foreign scholars mainly study the coordination of secondary supply chain from the perspective of retailers as risk averse, and put forward the contract model to coordinate the supply chain, but the existing research methods are relatively single. The supply chain model is relatively simple. The future research directions in this field include improving mathematical operation technology, extending contract model and so on.
【作者單位】： 東北林業(yè)大學;
【分類號】：F274

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