【摘要】：經(jīng)濟(jì)的高速發(fā)展，社會的不斷進(jìn)步，居民生活水平的顯著提高，各種各樣的家電產(chǎn)品作為生活必需品走進(jìn)了千家萬戶，擁有數(shù)百億的龐大的社會擁有量。每年因家電使用壽命終結(jié)而報廢的和因消費者對其進(jìn)行更新?lián)Q代而棄之不用的家電產(chǎn)品高達(dá)數(shù)億臺，并呈幾何級數(shù)倍增。在家電產(chǎn)品極大的改善生活的同時，廢舊家電的隨意丟棄以及處理不當(dāng)卻對社會資源造成了極大的浪費以及嚴(yán)重的環(huán)境污染。資源危機和環(huán)境危機的雙重壓力，以及可持續(xù)發(fā)展的理念日益深入人心，按照生產(chǎn)責(zé)任延伸制原則，制造商必須對廢舊家電進(jìn)行回收再制造，并且政府也開始參與進(jìn)來。因此，研究政府約束下廢舊家電回收再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈定價決策顯得格外重要。 本文引入政府的約束函數(shù)，以博弈論為工具，對廢舊家電回收再制造閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行建模與優(yōu)化。首先，以閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的相關(guān)理論成果為基礎(chǔ)，提出由單一制造商和單一零售商構(gòu)成的混合渠道回收模式，接著對廢舊家電回收再制造的概念進(jìn)行界定，并對其現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行分析。然后，構(gòu)建混合渠道模式下的廢舊家電回收再制造決策模型，并引入政府的獎懲函數(shù)，以政府為獎懲主體，制造商為獎懲對象，應(yīng)用Stackelberg博弈方法，分別構(gòu)建了“單渠道銷售——單渠道回收”、“單渠道銷售——雙渠道回收”、“雙渠道銷售——單渠道回收”三種情況下的制造商和零售商決策模型，運用最優(yōu)化理論分別求出三種模式下的最優(yōu)解。最后，結(jié)合實際進(jìn)行數(shù)值仿真，比較了三種模式下的最優(yōu)解，討論不同渠道模式下政府約束對制造商和零售商決策值的影響。 本文得出以下結(jié)論：（1）三種渠道模式均需要實施政府約束，否則以利潤最大化為目標(biāo)的制造商和零售商沒有進(jìn)行廢舊家電回收的動力，廢舊家電回收量趨于基本最低回收量；（2）實施政府約束的情形下，，制造商和零售商的銷售價格保持不變，不受其影響，但回收價格隨著政府的激勵力度的提高而增加，這種情況下，零售商的利潤保持穩(wěn)步增長，與政府的激勵力度成正比，但制造商利潤不僅受激勵力度的影響，還受最低回收量的影響，所以利潤或增或減，取決于政府規(guī)定的最低回收量；（3）實施政府約束能有效促進(jìn)廢舊家電回收量的提高，并且若能積極引導(dǎo)制造商和零售商實現(xiàn)合作決策，廢舊家電回收量會達(dá)到分散決策下的兩倍，合作效果極其明顯。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the continuous progress of the society and the remarkable improvement of the living standard of the residents, a variety of household appliances, as necessities of life, have entered into thousands of households, with tens of billions of huge social ownership. Every year, hundreds of millions of household electrical appliances are discarded because of the end of their service life and replaced by consumers. At the same time, the discarded and improper disposal of discarded household appliances has caused a great waste of social resources and serious environmental pollution. The dual pressure of resource crisis and environmental crisis, as well as the concept of sustainable development, is increasingly popular. According to the principle of extended production responsibility, manufacturers must recycle and remanufacture used household appliances, and the government is also taking part in it. Therefore, it is very important to study the closed-loop supply chain pricing decision of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances under government constraints. In this paper the government constraint function is introduced and the closed-loop supply chain for recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances is modeled and optimized by using game theory. Firstly, based on the related theoretical results of closed-loop supply chain, a hybrid channel recovery model consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer is proposed, and then the concept of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances is defined, and its present situation is analyzed. Then, the decision model of recycling and remanufacturing of used household appliances under the mixed channel model is constructed, and the government's reward and punishment function is introduced. The government is regarded as the subject of reward and punishment, the manufacturer is the object of reward and punishment, and the Stackelberg game method is applied. The decision models of manufacturers and retailers under the conditions of "single channel sales-single channel recovery", "single channel sales-double channel recovery", "dual channel sales-single channel recycling" are constructed, respectively. The optimal solutions of the three models are obtained by using the optimization theory. Finally, combined with the actual numerical simulation, the optimal solutions of the three modes are compared, and the influence of government constraints on the decision value of manufacturers and retailers under different channel modes is discussed. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) all three channel models need to be restricted by the government, otherwise, the manufacturers and retailers who aim to maximize profits have no incentive to recycle used household appliances. The recovery amount of waste household appliances tends to be the basic minimum recovery amount; (2) under the condition of government restraint, the sales price of manufacturers and retailers remains unchanged and unaffected, but the recovery price increases with the increase of government incentives. In this case, the profits of retailers increase steadily. It is directly proportional to the government's incentive strength, but the manufacturer's profit is not only affected by the incentive strength, but also by the lowest recovery amount, so the profit or increase or decrease depends on the minimum recovery amount stipulated by the government; (3) the implementation of government restriction can effectively promote the increase of recycling amount of used household appliances, and if manufacturers and retailers can be actively guided to realize cooperative decision-making, the amount of recycling of used and used household appliances will be twice as large as that under decentralized decision-making, and the effect of cooperation is extremely obvious.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F713.2;F426.6

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本文編號：2312020