【摘要】：隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)與經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的快速發(fā)展,市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭越趨激烈。企業(yè)為了追求自身利潤最大化,常常會(huì)引起不同企業(yè)之間利益的沖突：下游零售商為了減少庫存,會(huì)要求上游供應(yīng)商以較小的批量進(jìn)行供貨,這種方式雖然可以降低零售商的存貨成本S{導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)商存貨成本、運(yùn)輸費(fèi)用以及訂單處理成本的上升。上游供應(yīng)商為了減少庫存,會(huì)要求下游零售商增大訂貨批量,增加的量又會(huì)引起零售商存貨成本的上升,這樣,供應(yīng)商與零售商各自追求利潤最大化的過程會(huì)引起雙方利益上的矛盾沖突。本研究在一個(gè)二級(jí)分銷渠道中,提出的兩段及三段定價(jià)法可提供供應(yīng)商一個(gè)比較實(shí)用的定價(jià)策略去整合不同的零售商作為參考。 本文基于Stackelberg博弈(供應(yīng)商為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,零售商為追隨者)構(gòu)建定價(jià)模型探討定價(jià)策略對(duì)二級(jí)分銷渠道的影響,以單一價(jià)格制為基礎(chǔ),探討兩段定價(jià)法與三段定價(jià)法對(duì)供應(yīng)商和零售商的影響,供應(yīng)商首先制定產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格,零售商依據(jù)產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格信息,制定最優(yōu)的需求量來最大化自身利潤。 本文研究的二級(jí)分銷渠道的結(jié)構(gòu)為一個(gè)供應(yīng)商提供一種產(chǎn)品給多個(gè)異質(zhì)零售商,且各零售商之間相互獨(dú)立,各自擁有自己的獨(dú)占區(qū)域,各零售商之間沒有產(chǎn)品轉(zhuǎn)賣及競(jìng)爭行為。由于各零售商獨(dú)占的區(qū)域市場(chǎng)規(guī)模與價(jià)格彈性都不相同,因此不同的區(qū)域中產(chǎn)品的需求量與消費(fèi)者的購買價(jià)格亦不相同。零售商采用經(jīng)濟(jì)訂貨量(EOQ)存貨策略決定訂貨周期與訂貨量。供應(yīng)商依據(jù)各零售商的需求量向上游生產(chǎn)廠商采用逐批訂購法(Lot-for-Lot)訂購,因此供應(yīng)商的成本包括處理零售商訂單所產(chǎn)生的訂單處理成本與產(chǎn)品的派送成本。 通過數(shù)值仿真,本文得到的結(jié)論為供應(yīng)商采用兩段定價(jià)法時(shí)的利潤高于單一價(jià)格制時(shí)的利潤；供應(yīng)商采用三段定價(jià)法時(shí)的利潤高于兩段定價(jià)法的利潤；兩段定價(jià)法不一定始終對(duì)零售商有利,零售商可能因?yàn)闊o法有效降低兩段定價(jià)法下的購買成本而導(dǎo)致利潤下滑,這是由需求量與訂貨量價(jià)格區(qū)間不協(xié)調(diào)引起的。三段定價(jià)法下,零售商選擇第一個(gè)訂貨量區(qū)間的利潤與兩段定價(jià)法的利潤相同,選擇第二個(gè)訂貨量區(qū)間的零售商會(huì)因?yàn)檩^低的購買成本使得利潤高于選擇兩段定價(jià)法的利潤。因此,“多了一個(gè)選擇”的三段定價(jià)法對(duì)零售商是更有利的。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of network and economic globalization, market competition is becoming more and more fierce. In order to maximize their own profits, enterprises often cause conflicts of interests between different enterprises: downstream retailers will require upstream suppliers to supply in smaller quantities in order to reduce inventory. This approach may lower the retailer's inventory cost S {resulting in higher supplier inventory costs, shipping costs, and order processing costs. In order to reduce inventory, upstream suppliers will require downstream retailers to increase the volume of their orders, which in turn will lead to an increase in the retailer's inventory cost. The process of supplier and retailer pursuing profit maximization will lead to conflict of interests. In a secondary distribution channel, the proposed two-stage and three-stage pricing method can provide a more practical pricing strategy for suppliers to integrate different retailers as a reference. Based on Stackelberg game (supplier as leader, retailer as follower), this paper constructs a pricing model to discuss the influence of pricing strategy on secondary distribution channel, based on single price system. This paper discusses the influence of two-stage pricing method and three-stage pricing method on suppliers and retailers. The supplier first sets the price of the product and the retailer determines the optimal demand according to the price information of the product to maximize their own profits. The structure of the secondary distribution channel studied in this paper is that a supplier provides a product to multiple heterogeneous retailers, and each retailer has its own exclusive region, and each retailer has no resale or competitive behavior. Because the regional market size and price elasticity of each retailer are different, the demand of products and the purchase price of consumers are different in different regions. Retailers use the (EOQ) inventory strategy to determine the order cycle and order volume. According to the demand of each retailer, suppliers order from upstream manufacturers by batch ordering method (Lot-for-Lot). Therefore, the cost of suppliers includes the order processing cost and the delivery cost of the products caused by the processing of the retailers' orders. Through numerical simulation, the conclusion is that the profit of supplier using two-stage pricing method is higher than that of single price system, the profit of supplier using three-stage pricing method is higher than that of two-stage pricing method, and the profit of supplier using three-stage pricing method is higher than that of two-stage pricing method. Two-stage pricing may not always be beneficial to retailers, and retailers may be unable to effectively reduce the purchase costs under the two-stage pricing method and lead to a decline in profits, which is caused by the incongruity between demand and the price range of the order. Under the three-stage pricing method, the retailer chooses the profit of the first order range and the profit of the two-section pricing method, and the retailer choosing the second order volume range makes the profit higher than the profit of the two-stage pricing method because of the lower purchase cost. Therefore, the "one more option" three-paragraph pricing method is more beneficial to retailers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F224;F274

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

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本文編號(hào)：2300546