【摘要】：“CT”制度使碳排放權具備了經(jīng)濟資源的屬性,雙渠道分銷模式已然成為大多數(shù)企業(yè)的選擇。那么,對于碳排放依賴型企業(yè)在雙渠道分銷模式下應該怎樣優(yōu)化自己的運營決策來達到企業(yè)利潤的最大化?基于“CT”環(huán)境,本文綜合運用優(yōu)化理論、博弈理論研究了以由一個制造商和一個零售商構成的二級供應鏈三種渠道結構(R、RD、RR)模式下供應鏈的最優(yōu)運營決策及如何設計收入共享合同實現(xiàn)供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)以保證供應鏈成員雙贏,從而在激烈的商業(yè)競爭中保持供應鏈的整體競爭優(yōu)勢。首先,基于“CT”環(huán)境,分析、比較了傳統(tǒng)零售渠道結構供應鏈分別在分散化決策和集中化決策時的最優(yōu)減排策略、最優(yōu)定價策略。從供應鏈上下游結成聯(lián)盟合作減排的角度出發(fā),設計了一個收入共享合同協(xié)調(diào)機制,研究了“CT”環(huán)境下供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題。應用動態(tài)博弈理論證明了所設計合同的有效性,供應鏈成員能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)雙贏。最后,用數(shù)值模擬驗證了所設計的合同具有很好的性質(zhì)和效率。其次,基于“CT”環(huán)境,分析、比較了制造商開通網(wǎng)上直銷渠道又同時向傳統(tǒng)零售商批發(fā)銷售同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品的雙渠道結構(RD)供應鏈在分散化決策和集中化決策時的最優(yōu)減排策略、最優(yōu)定價策略。從供應鏈上下游結成聯(lián)盟合作減排和雙渠道協(xié)調(diào)的角度出發(fā),設計了一個收入共享合同的協(xié)調(diào)機制,研究了“CT”環(huán)境下RD渠道結構供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題。運用動態(tài)博弈理論證實了所設計的合同的有效性,供應鏈成員能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)雙贏。最后,用數(shù)值模擬的方法驗證了所設計的合同具有很好的性質(zhì)和效率。最后,基于“CT”環(huán)境,分析、比較了零售商既通過傳統(tǒng)零售渠道又開通網(wǎng)上直銷渠道向消費者銷售同質(zhì)產(chǎn)品的雙渠道結構(RR)供應鏈在分散化決策和集中化決策時的最優(yōu)減排策略、最優(yōu)定價策略。從供應鏈上下游結成聯(lián)盟合作減排和雙渠道協(xié)調(diào)的角度出發(fā),設計了一個收入共享合同的協(xié)調(diào)機制,研究了“CT”環(huán)境下RR渠道結構供應鏈的協(xié)調(diào)問題。運用動態(tài)博弈理論證明了所設計的合同的有效性,可以實現(xiàn)供應鏈成員雙贏。最后,用數(shù)值模擬的方法驗證了所設計的合同具有很好的性質(zhì)和效率。
[Abstract]:The "CT" system makes carbon emission rights have the attribute of economic resources, and the dual-channel distribution model has become the choice of most enterprises. So, how to optimize their own operation decisions in order to maximize the profits of carbon emissions-dependent enterprises in the dual-channel distribution mode? Based on the environment of "CT", this paper synthetically applies the optimization theory and game theory to study the three channel structures of a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The optimal operation decision of supply chain under RR) mode and how to design revenue sharing contract to realize the coordination of supply chain so as to ensure the win-win situation of supply chain members so as to maintain the overall competitive advantage of supply chain in the fierce commercial competition. Firstly, based on the "CT" environment, the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the traditional retail channel structure supply chain in decentralized and centralized decision-making are compared. From the point of view of forming an alliance between upstream and downstream of supply chain to reduce emissions, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, and the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract. Second, based on the "CT" environment, the analysis, This paper compares the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the (RD) supply chain with the dual channel structure in which the manufacturer opens the online direct selling channel and sells the homogeneous products to the traditional retailers simultaneously. The optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy are compared in the decentralized and centralized decisions of the (RD) supply chain. From the point of view of the alliance of upstream and downstream of supply chain and the coordination of two channels, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of RD channel structure supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, and the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract. Finally, based on the "CT" environment, the analysis, This paper compares the optimal emission reduction strategy and the optimal pricing strategy of the (RR) supply chain with both traditional retail channels and online direct selling channels for the distribution of homogeneous products to consumers. From the point of view of the alliance of upstream and downstream of supply chain and the coordination of two channels, a coordination mechanism of revenue sharing contract is designed, and the coordination of RR channel structure supply chain under "CT" environment is studied. The validity of the designed contract is proved by using the dynamic game theory, which can realize the win-win situation of the supply chain members. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the good properties and efficiency of the designed contract.
【學位授予單位】：深圳大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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