【摘要】：近年來，各國政府、企業(yè)和學(xué)者已經(jīng)形成共識，溫室效應(yīng)是全球氣候變化以及極端氣候出現(xiàn)日趨頻繁的主要原因，而人類在經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)中產(chǎn)生的碳排放是導(dǎo)致溫室效應(yīng)的主要根源。為有效地控制二氧化碳等溫室氣體的排放，以“低能耗”、“低污染”、“低排放”為基礎(chǔ)的新的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式被提出并得到大力倡導(dǎo)，，也就是低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)。所謂低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)就是指溫室氣體排放量盡可能低的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展方式，是以改善地球生態(tài)系統(tǒng)自我調(diào)節(jié)能力為目標(biāo)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展的新的經(jīng)濟(jì)形態(tài)，其實(shí)質(zhì)是提高能源利用效率和創(chuàng)建清潔的能源結(jié)構(gòu)，其核心是技術(shù)創(chuàng)新、制度創(chuàng)新和發(fā)展觀念的轉(zhuǎn)變。 消費(fèi)者低碳偏好是隨著低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的日趨發(fā)展以及消費(fèi)者環(huán)境保護(hù)意識的日趨加強(qiáng)而逐步形成的，而消費(fèi)者是否選擇低碳產(chǎn)品也很大程度上會(huì)影響到企業(yè)的產(chǎn)品決策和產(chǎn)品運(yùn)營。因此企業(yè)管理者要想實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展，必須要對消費(fèi)者的低碳偏好引發(fā)的市場需求變化有所重視，站在供應(yīng)鏈層面分析制定產(chǎn)品決策、引導(dǎo)消費(fèi)者購買決策并與上下游進(jìn)行相關(guān)議價(jià)。 本文首先基于消費(fèi)者購買行為理論，分析在低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)模式下消費(fèi)者的購買行為模式。指出消費(fèi)者在新的經(jīng)濟(jì)模式下購買行為將受到產(chǎn)品綠色屬性的影響。而后從企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任的一個(gè)方面——低碳性能對消費(fèi)者的影響入手，運(yùn)用博弈論的基本思想，對供應(yīng)鏈完全信息和非完全信息下，制銷聯(lián)盟低碳信號傳遞原理進(jìn)行了研究。而后由于消費(fèi)者低碳意識的不斷提高，消費(fèi)者對產(chǎn)品的需求將是產(chǎn)品價(jià)格、質(zhì)量和碳排放等因素的綜合函數(shù)，零售商由于接近市場終端，對消費(fèi)者低碳偏好具備完全信息并由此形成買方抗衡勢力，本文關(guān)于零售商在制造商對市場需求不具備完全信息下就低碳產(chǎn)品批發(fā)價(jià)格與其進(jìn)行的討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈過程進(jìn)行求解，而后分析了零售商將市場信息與制造商共享情況下雙方就供應(yīng)鏈總體利潤的分配因子進(jìn)行討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈的過程，并分析得出兩種情境下制造商對零售商可接受價(jià)格（可接受利潤分配因子）的預(yù)估能力對雙方收益函數(shù)的影響。
[Abstract]:In recent years, governments, businesses and scholars have reached a consensus that Greenhouse Effect is the main cause of global climate change and the increasing frequency of extreme weather events. The carbon emissions from human economic activities are the main cause of Greenhouse Effect. In order to effectively control the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, a new economic model based on "low energy consumption", "low pollution" and "low emission" has been proposed and advocated, that is, low carbon economy. The so-called low-carbon economy refers to the economic development mode with the lowest possible greenhouse gas emissions. It is a new economic form of sustainable development aimed at improving the self-regulation capacity of the Earth's ecosystem. Its essence is to improve the efficiency of energy use and to create a clean energy structure, and its core is technological innovation, institutional innovation and the transformation of the concept of development. Consumers' low carbon preference is gradually formed with the development of low-carbon economy and the strengthening of consumers' environmental protection consciousness. Whether consumers choose low-carbon products will also affect the product decision and product operation to a great extent. Therefore, if enterprise managers want to achieve sustainable development of enterprises, they must attach importance to the changes of market demand caused by consumers' low-carbon preferences, and analyze and make product decisions at the level of supply chain. Guide consumers to make purchase decisions and negotiate prices with upstream and downstream. Firstly, based on the theory of consumer purchasing behavior, this paper analyzes the consumer purchase behavior model under the low carbon economy model. It is pointed out that the purchase behavior of consumers under the new economic model will be affected by the green property of products. Then, starting with the influence of low carbon performance on consumers in a aspect of corporate social responsibility, using the basic idea of game theory, this paper studies the principle of low carbon signal transmission in manufacturing and marketing alliance under complete and incomplete information of supply chain. As consumers' low carbon awareness continues to improve, consumers' demand for products will be a comprehensive function of factors such as product prices, quality and carbon emissions, and retailers will be close to the end of the market. With complete information on consumers' low carbon preferences and thus forming a buyer's countervailing force, this paper deals with the bargaining game process between retailers and low carbon products wholesale prices without complete information of manufacturers' market demand. Then the paper analyzes the process of bargaining game between retailer and manufacturer when they share market information with manufacturer on the distribution factor of total profit of supply chain. The influence of the manufacturer's ability to estimate the acceptable price (acceptable profit distribution factor) of the retailer on the income function of both parties is analyzed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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