【摘要】：隨著溫室氣體排放所引起的環(huán)境問(wèn)題日益嚴(yán)峻,越來(lái)越多的企業(yè)在追求自身利潤(rùn)最大化的同時(shí)將碳減排問(wèn)題提到了企業(yè)發(fā)展的戰(zhàn)略層面。而面對(duì)復(fù)雜多變的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境,企業(yè)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也逐漸轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楣⿷?yīng)鏈之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng),供應(yīng)鏈中成員企業(yè)間在選擇合作策略時(shí)應(yīng)將環(huán)境效益和經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)結(jié)合考慮,如此才能在實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)的同時(shí)降低整體的碳排放,從而使整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到碳優(yōu)化狀態(tài)。對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)合作博弈的整體利潤(rùn),設(shè)計(jì)協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制對(duì)其進(jìn)行合理的分配是維持供應(yīng)鏈穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的前提。本文研究了包含單個(gè)供應(yīng)商、單個(gè)制造商和多個(gè)零售商的三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈,考慮了碳減排率和供應(yīng)鏈終端產(chǎn)品價(jià)格兩個(gè)因素,探討了供應(yīng)鏈中成員企業(yè)選擇何種合作博弈策略能夠在提高整體利潤(rùn)的同時(shí)優(yōu)化自身收益并實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈碳優(yōu)化。本文的主要工作如下：(1)模型構(gòu)建。在碳優(yōu)化理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上,用碳減排率度量碳優(yōu)化的概念。在考慮碳減排率和產(chǎn)品價(jià)格兩個(gè)因素下,構(gòu)建了四種合作博弈策略模型：獨(dú)立決策策略、基于碳減排率的合作博弈策略、基于供應(yīng)鏈終端產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的合作博弈策略、基于碳減排率和供應(yīng)鏈終端產(chǎn)品價(jià)格的兩階段合作博弈策略。并運(yùn)用邏輯推理的方法對(duì)所構(gòu)建的合作博弈策略模型進(jìn)行了求解。(2)協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制。對(duì)所構(gòu)建的四種策略模型的結(jié)果進(jìn)行了比較分析,得到了供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)最高和成員企業(yè)碳減排率最優(yōu)的合作博弈策略。并設(shè)計(jì)了兩種協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制(收益共享機(jī)制、不對(duì)稱納什協(xié)商機(jī)制)分配供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn),以確保供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)在合作博弈策略下獲得的利潤(rùn)不低于其它策略下的利潤(rùn)。(3)潛在應(yīng)用研究。以上海寶山鋼鐵有限公司不銹鋼事業(yè)部所在三級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈為例,驗(yàn)證了四種策略模型的結(jié)果,并通過(guò)協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制對(duì)合作博弈策略下整體利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行了分配,設(shè)計(jì)收益共享機(jī)制得到分配系數(shù)取值范圍,在此基礎(chǔ)上通過(guò)不對(duì)稱納什均衡協(xié)商機(jī)制得到基于滿意度的具體收益分配方案。將環(huán)境效益與企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)相結(jié)合,通過(guò)設(shè)計(jì)協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制對(duì)合作博弈整體利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行分配,能夠激勵(lì)供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)主動(dòng)參與到合作博弈中,并達(dá)到最優(yōu)的碳減排率,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的碳優(yōu)化,這一前沿性問(wèn)題的研究對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作更具有實(shí)際指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly serious environmental problems caused by greenhouse gas emissions, more and more enterprises are pursuing their own profit maximization, and the carbon emission reduction problem has been raised to the strategic level of enterprise development. In the face of complex and changeable market environment, competition among enterprises is gradually transformed into competition between supply chains. In the selection of cooperation strategies among member enterprises in the supply chain, environmental benefits and economic objectives should be taken into account. In order to achieve the economic goal of supply chain and reduce the overall carbon emissions, the whole supply chain can reach the state of carbon optimization. For the whole profit of cooperative game of supply chain member enterprises, it is the premise to design coordination mechanism to distribute it reasonably to maintain the steady development of supply chain. In this paper, a three-level supply chain including a single supplier, a single manufacturer and a number of retailers is studied. The carbon emission reduction rate and the price of the end product in the supply chain are taken into account. This paper discusses the cooperative game strategy chosen by the member enterprises in the supply chain which can improve the overall profit and optimize their own income and realize the carbon optimization of the supply chain. The main work of this paper is as follows: (1) Model construction. Based on the research of carbon optimization theory, the concept of carbon optimization is measured by carbon emission reduction rate. Under the consideration of carbon emission reduction rate and product price, four cooperative game strategy models are constructed: independent decision strategy, cooperative game strategy based on carbon emission reduction rate, and cooperative game strategy based on supply chain terminal product price. A two-stage cooperative game strategy based on carbon reduction rate and end product price in supply chain. The cooperative game strategy model is solved by logical reasoning. (2) Coordination mechanism. The results of the four strategy models are compared and analyzed, and the cooperative game strategy of the supply chain with the highest overall profit and the best carbon reduction rate of the member enterprises is obtained. Two coordination mechanisms (revenue sharing mechanism, asymmetric Nash negotiation mechanism) are designed to distribute the overall profits of the supply chain. In order to ensure that the profit of supply chain member enterprises under cooperative game strategy is not lower than that of other strategies. (3) potential application research. Taking the three-level supply chain of stainless steel division of Shanghai Baoshan Iron and Steel Co., Ltd as an example, the results of four kinds of strategy models are verified, and the overall profits under cooperative game strategy are distributed through coordination mechanism. The range of the distribution coefficient is obtained by designing the revenue-sharing mechanism, and the specific income distribution scheme based on satisfaction is obtained through the asymmetric Nash equilibrium negotiation mechanism. Combining environmental benefit with enterprise economic goal and designing coordination mechanism to distribute the overall profit of cooperative game, the supply chain member enterprises can be encouraged to participate in cooperative game actively and achieve the optimal carbon emission reduction rate. In order to realize the carbon optimization of the whole supply chain, the research of this frontier problem has more practical guiding significance for the operation of the supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;X322

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本文編號(hào)：2267098