【摘要】：為了解決供應(yīng)商隱藏成本信息、銷售商隱藏努力行動所引起的逆向選擇和道德風險問題,文章基于委托代理理論,引入虛擬第三方為協(xié)調(diào)主體,分別站在供應(yīng)商和銷售商的角度,通過設(shè)計合適的契約激勵銷售商努力工作和供應(yīng)商"說真話"。研究結(jié)果表明,當供應(yīng)鏈中只有道德風險存在時,可以通過如(16)式的契約(其中契約參數(shù)λ∈[0,1])實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的完美協(xié)調(diào);但是,當供應(yīng)鏈中不僅僅存在道德風險還存在逆向選擇時,該契約參數(shù)不再是區(qū)間[0,1]上任意的值,而是與供應(yīng)鏈交易量q及供應(yīng)商的生產(chǎn)成本c相關(guān)的定值(滿足(29)式),此時的供應(yīng)鏈才能實現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào);在該契約下,為獲得更多的利益,供應(yīng)商更有動機降低自身生產(chǎn)成本,銷售商也更有積極性提高努力水平,從而實現(xiàn)"雙贏"。最后,通過數(shù)值算例對模型進行了應(yīng)用分析。
[Abstract]:In order to solve the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the hidden cost information of suppliers and the hidden efforts of vendors, based on the principal-agent theory, the virtual third party is introduced as the coordinating body. From the point of view of suppliers and vendors, the vendors are encouraged to work hard and "tell the truth" by designing suitable contracts. The results show that when there is only moral hazard in the supply chain, the supply chain can be perfectly coordinated by a contract such as (16) (where the contract parameter 位 鈭，

本文編號：2254747