閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈下新產(chǎn)品再造品的生產(chǎn)銷售及碳交易決策
[Abstract]:At present, the amount of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere is increasing, and carbon emission reduction has become the consensus of the international community. As a market-oriented incentive environmental protection policy, carbon emission limitation plays an important role in promoting energy saving and emission reduction of enterprises. This paper combines game theory and optimization theory to analyze the production, sale and carbon trading decision of new products, recycled products and carbon trading in different market structures under the restriction of carbon emission quota. According to the research needs of this paper, the contents of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain, double-cycle closed-loop supply chain and closed-loop supply chain under low-carbon manufacturing are reviewed and summarized. Furthermore, the theoretical basis of this paper is expounded in detail. Secondly, according to the above content, we construct two kinds of models. Model one consists of manufacturers and single retailers. Manufacturers organize production of new products and recycling of used and end-of-life products under carbon emissions constraints, while retailers are responsible for the sale of new and recycled products. Model two consists of manufacturer and double retailer. Manufacturers organize the production of new products and the recovery and recycling of used and end-of-life products under the control of carbon emissions. One retailer is responsible for the sale of new products and two retailers sell recycled products. Based on the above model, we study the production, sale and carbon trading decision of new products under different market structure, and analyze the relationship between equilibrium results and carbon trading price and the practical management significance. Finally, according to four different decision models, the paper analyzes the carbon trading decision of manufacturers under different carbon trading prices and the number of consumers, and gives the practical management significance. The results show that the carbon trading price can increase the wholesale price, retail price and reduce the market demand of the new product, and its influence on the market demand of the recycled product should be analyzed in detail. Higher carbon trading prices will reduce retailers' profits and manufacturers' total carbon emissions. Manufacturers' carbon emissions, manufacturers' and retailers' profits are all positively correlated with the number of consumers, but at the expense of more carbon emissions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F274;F224
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