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閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈下新產(chǎn)品再造品的生產(chǎn)銷售及碳交易決策

發(fā)布時間:2018-09-17 06:45
【摘要】:當(dāng)前,人類向大氣中排放的二氧化碳等溫室氣體不斷增加,碳減排已成為國際社會的共識。碳排放限額作為一種市場導(dǎo)向激勵型環(huán)保政策,對于促進企業(yè)節(jié)能減排有重要作用。本文將博弈論、優(yōu)化理論等研究方法相結(jié)合,著重分析了在碳排放限額約束下不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)中新產(chǎn)品、再造品的生產(chǎn)、銷售及碳交易決策等問題。 根據(jù)本文的研究需要,首先對單周期的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈、雙周期的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈及低碳制造下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈等內(nèi)容進行了全面的回顧與總結(jié),進而詳細闡述了本文研究的相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)。 其次,根據(jù)上述內(nèi)容我們構(gòu)建了兩種模型。模型一由制造商、單零售商組成。制造商在碳排放額約束下組織新產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)及廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收再造工作,零售商同時負責(zé)銷售新產(chǎn)品及再造品。模型二由制造商、雙零售商組成。制造商在碳排放額約束下組織新產(chǎn)品的生產(chǎn)及廢舊產(chǎn)品的回收再造工作,零售商一負責(zé)新產(chǎn)品的銷售工作,零售商二只銷售再造品;谏鲜瞿P臀覀冄芯苛穗p周期情境中不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)下新產(chǎn)品再造品的生產(chǎn)、銷售及碳交易決策等問題,并分析了均衡結(jié)果和碳交易價格之間的關(guān)系及實際管理意義。 最后,針對四種不同的決策模式,通過數(shù)值分析了在不同的碳交易價格及消費者數(shù)量下制造商的碳交易決策等問題,并給出了實際的管理意義。研究結(jié)果表明碳交易價格能夠提高新產(chǎn)品、再造品的批發(fā)價、零售價,壓縮新產(chǎn)品的市場需求量,其對再造品的市場需求量的影響需具體分析。碳交易價格的提升會降低零售商的利潤和制造商的碳排放總量。制造商碳排放量、制造商及零售商利潤均與消費者數(shù)量成正向遞增關(guān)系,但這是以更多的碳排放量為代價的。
[Abstract]:At present, the amount of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere is increasing, and carbon emission reduction has become the consensus of the international community. As a market-oriented incentive environmental protection policy, carbon emission limitation plays an important role in promoting energy saving and emission reduction of enterprises. This paper combines game theory and optimization theory to analyze the production, sale and carbon trading decision of new products, recycled products and carbon trading in different market structures under the restriction of carbon emission quota. According to the research needs of this paper, the contents of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain, double-cycle closed-loop supply chain and closed-loop supply chain under low-carbon manufacturing are reviewed and summarized. Furthermore, the theoretical basis of this paper is expounded in detail. Secondly, according to the above content, we construct two kinds of models. Model one consists of manufacturers and single retailers. Manufacturers organize production of new products and recycling of used and end-of-life products under carbon emissions constraints, while retailers are responsible for the sale of new and recycled products. Model two consists of manufacturer and double retailer. Manufacturers organize the production of new products and the recovery and recycling of used and end-of-life products under the control of carbon emissions. One retailer is responsible for the sale of new products and two retailers sell recycled products. Based on the above model, we study the production, sale and carbon trading decision of new products under different market structure, and analyze the relationship between equilibrium results and carbon trading price and the practical management significance. Finally, according to four different decision models, the paper analyzes the carbon trading decision of manufacturers under different carbon trading prices and the number of consumers, and gives the practical management significance. The results show that the carbon trading price can increase the wholesale price, retail price and reduce the market demand of the new product, and its influence on the market demand of the recycled product should be analyzed in detail. Higher carbon trading prices will reduce retailers' profits and manufacturers' total carbon emissions. Manufacturers' carbon emissions, manufacturers' and retailers' profits are all positively correlated with the number of consumers, but at the expense of more carbon emissions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F274;F224

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