【摘要】：在生態(tài)效益、法規(guī)強制、經(jīng)濟效益和社會效益等因素的驅(qū)動下,使得考慮廢舊品回收再利用的閉環(huán)供應鏈成為了供應鏈管理領域?qū)W術(shù)界和企業(yè)界共同廣泛關(guān)注的焦點。同傳統(tǒng)供應鏈一樣,實際運營閉環(huán)供應鏈中的企業(yè)均是獨立決策的個體,它們各自的自私自利行為會產(chǎn)生“雙重邊際效應”問題,造成系統(tǒng)效益的損失。同時,各類突發(fā)事件極易干擾閉環(huán)供應鏈的正常運營,往往會使穩(wěn)定環(huán)境下已制定好的計劃變得不再可行,再次造成系統(tǒng)效益的損失。因此,本文在系統(tǒng)分析閉環(huán)供應鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào),以及供應鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào)應急管理等已有研究成果的基礎上,綜合運用博弈論、優(yōu)化理論、機制設計理論、供應鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)理論和應急管理理論等理論與方法,研究閉環(huán)供應鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào)及其應對突發(fā)事件干擾的應急管理問題,并分別構(gòu)建了相應的閉環(huán)供應鏈模型。 首先,在不考慮突發(fā)事件干擾的穩(wěn)定環(huán)境下,一方面,針對通過宣傳的手段以回收率方式回收廢舊品的情況,構(gòu)建了無差別定價閉環(huán)供應鏈的定價模型,并分析了分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈中存在的“雙重邊際效應”問題,進而分別設計了兩部收費契約、數(shù)量折扣契約和收益費用共享契約用以協(xié)調(diào)無差別定價分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈,提高其運營效益；另一方面,針對利用原材料生產(chǎn)的新產(chǎn)品和利用廢舊品生產(chǎn)的再造品存在差別定價的情況,構(gòu)建了兩種產(chǎn)品存在Bertrand競爭關(guān)系的差別定價閉環(huán)供應鏈的定價模型,并分析了分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈中存在的“雙重邊際效應”問題,進而分別設計了數(shù)量折扣契約和收益共享契約用以協(xié)調(diào)差別定價分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈,提高其運營效益。 其次,構(gòu)建了無差別定價閉環(huán)供應鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào)應急管理模型�？紤]突發(fā)事件干擾零售商處產(chǎn)品的最大市場需求規(guī)模發(fā)生擾動的情況,構(gòu)建了無差別定價集中式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈應對突發(fā)事件干擾的優(yōu)化決策模型,進而分別改進了穩(wěn)定環(huán)境下設計的兩部收費契約、數(shù)量折扣契約和收益費用共享契約,以使它們具有應急管理能力,實現(xiàn)了協(xié)調(diào)突發(fā)事件干擾下的無差別定價分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈,提高其運營效益的目的。 最后,構(gòu)建了差別定價閉環(huán)供應鏈的契約協(xié)調(diào)應急管理模型�？紤]突發(fā)事件分別干擾零售商處新產(chǎn)品和再造品的最大市場需求規(guī)模發(fā)生擾動,以及制造商處新產(chǎn)品和再造品的生產(chǎn)成本發(fā)生擾動等兩種情況,構(gòu)建了兩種差別定價集中式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈應對突發(fā)事件干擾的優(yōu)化決策模型,進而分別改進了穩(wěn)定環(huán)境下設計的數(shù)量折扣契約和收益共享契約,以使它們具有不同的應急管理能力,實現(xiàn)了協(xié)調(diào)突發(fā)事件干擾市場需求或生產(chǎn)成本發(fā)生擾動下的差別定價分散式?jīng)Q策閉環(huán)供應鏈,提高其運營效益的目的。
[Abstract]:Driven by the factors of ecological benefit, law enforcement, economic benefit and social benefit, the closed-loop supply chain, which takes into account the recycling and reuse of waste products, has become the focus of attention in the field of supply chain management. As in the traditional supply chain, the enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain are all independent decision making individuals, their selfishness behavior will produce the "double marginal effect" problem, resulting in the loss of the system benefit. At the same time, all kinds of emergencies are easy to interfere with the normal operation of the closed-loop supply chain, which often make the plan that has been made under the stable environment no longer feasible, and cause the loss of the system benefit again. Therefore, on the basis of systematic analysis of contract coordination of closed-loop supply chain and contract coordination emergency management of supply chain, this paper synthetically applies game theory, optimization theory and mechanism design theory. The contract coordination theory and emergency management theory of supply chain are used to study the contract coordination of closed-loop supply chain and its emergency management to deal with the emergency disturbance, and the corresponding closed-loop supply chain models are constructed respectively. First of all, in the stable environment without considering the disturbance of unexpected events, on the one hand, the pricing model of closed-loop supply chain with no differential pricing is constructed to solve the problem of recycling waste by means of propaganda. The problem of "double marginal effect" in decentralized decision closed loop supply chain is analyzed, and then two pricing contracts are designed. Volume discount contracts and revenue-cost sharing contracts are used to coordinate non-differential pricing decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chains to improve their operational efficiency; on the other hand, In view of the differential pricing of new products produced by raw materials and recycled products produced by waste products, a pricing model of closed loop supply chain with differential pricing for two kinds of products with Bertrand competition relationship is constructed. The problem of "double marginal effect" in the decentralized decision closed loop supply chain is analyzed, and then the quantity discount contract and the revenue sharing contract are designed to coordinate the differential pricing decentralized decision closed loop supply chain to improve its operating efficiency. Secondly, the contract coordination emergency management model of closed-loop supply chain is constructed. Considering the disturbance of the maximum market demand scale of the products disturbed by the unexpected events, the optimal decision model for the closed-loop supply chain with non-differential pricing to deal with the unexpected disturbance is constructed. Furthermore, two fee contracts, quantity discount contracts and revenue-cost sharing contracts designed in a stable environment are improved to enable them to have emergency management capability. A decentralized closed-loop supply chain with non-differential pricing is realized under the interference of coordinated unexpected events, and its operation efficiency is improved. Finally, the contract coordination emergency management model of differential pricing closed-loop supply chain is constructed. Considering the disturbance of the maximum market demand scale of new products and recycled products by retailers, and the disturbance of production costs of new products and recycled products at manufacturers' premises by unexpected events, In this paper, two optimal decision models of centralized decision making closed-loop supply chain for differential pricing to deal with unexpected disturbance are constructed, and then the quantity discount contract and revenue sharing contract designed under stable environment are improved respectively. In order to make them have different ability of emergency management, the purpose of coordinating unexpected events to interfere with market demand or production cost is realized. The purpose of decentralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain with differential pricing is realized, and its operation benefit is improved.
【學位授予單位】：大連理工大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274

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