【摘要】：隨著時代和經(jīng)濟(jì)的高速發(fā)展,行為運(yùn)籌已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟(jì)和市場營銷領(lǐng)域一個重要的學(xué)術(shù)分支并取得了一定的研究進(jìn)展。傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究中人們往往假設(shè)個體是自私的、理性的,只關(guān)心自身的實際收益,而行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究表明在社會交往中人們不僅僅只關(guān)心自身的利益還表現(xiàn)出一定的社會偏好。大量的實驗經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究表明組織和個體一樣都是有限理性的,具體表現(xiàn)有損失規(guī)避、參考點(diǎn)依賴、公平關(guān)切與風(fēng)險厭惡等。 行為研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在社會活動中人們往往表現(xiàn)出對他人的關(guān)心,即公平關(guān)切。目前關(guān)于公平關(guān)切的研究尚處于初始階段,涉及到考慮公平關(guān)切的供應(yīng)鏈研究更是少數(shù),尚未形成體系。因此,本文在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上將公平關(guān)切引入到供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,探討公平關(guān)切行為傾向?qū)⿷?yīng)鏈運(yùn)作與協(xié)調(diào)的影響。根據(jù)研究內(nèi)容的不用,大致分為兩個部分： 第一部分是基于Shapley值公平參考框架的供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作與協(xié)調(diào)研究,即本文第三章。主要考慮在一個一供應(yīng)商兩零售商供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中,假設(shè)兩零售商是公平關(guān)切的且同質(zhì),他們共同服務(wù)于同一市場,供應(yīng)商是公平中性的。這一部分最大的創(chuàng)新之處就是建立了N人博弈情況下基于Shapley值公平參考解的供應(yīng)鏈效用體系,在報童模型的背景下我們研究了零售商的公平關(guān)切行為傾向?qū)⿷?yīng)鏈運(yùn)作與協(xié)調(diào)的影響。 第二部分是考慮分布式公平關(guān)切和同行誘導(dǎo)公平關(guān)切的供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作與優(yōu)化研究,即本文第四章。在第三章研究的基礎(chǔ)上,我們假設(shè)兩同質(zhì)零售商分別服務(wù)于兩個同質(zhì)的市場,同時考慮供應(yīng)商的公平關(guān)切。供應(yīng)商與兩零售商順序展開博弈,第一個零售商是分布式公平關(guān)切的,第二個零售商既是分布式公平關(guān)切又是同行誘導(dǎo)公平關(guān)切的。我們運(yùn)用Nash討價還價解作為分布式公平關(guān)切參考點(diǎn),用第一個零售商的實際收益作為同行公平關(guān)切參考點(diǎn),據(jù)此建立兩輪博弈下的供應(yīng)鏈效用體系,以報童模型為背景,分別探討了批發(fā)價外生和批發(fā)價內(nèi)生條件下公平關(guān)切對供應(yīng)鏈決策的影響。 與傳統(tǒng)的兩階段供應(yīng)鏈模型相比,本文研究的兩個部分均是以多零售商為背景,第一部分主要考慮的是N個供應(yīng)鏈成員同時博弈,而第二部分主要考慮的是各零售商與供應(yīng)商順序展開博弈。本文的研究豐富并發(fā)展了公平關(guān)切在供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中的應(yīng)用,具有較高的理論價值和實際指導(dǎo)意義。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the times and economy, behavioral research has become an important academic branch in the field of economy and marketing. In traditional economic studies, people often assume that individuals are selfish and rational, and only care about their own actual benefits, while behavioral economics research shows that in social communication, people not only care about their own interests but also show certain social preferences. A large number of experimental economic studies have shown that organizations are as limited rational as individuals, showing loss aversion, reference point dependence, fair concern and risk aversion. Behavioral research found that in social activities, people often show concern for others, that is, fair concern. At present, the research on equity concerns is still in the initial stage, and the supply chain research involving equity concerns is even less, but has not yet formed a system. Therefore, on the basis of previous studies, this paper introduces equity concerns into the supply chain system, and discusses the influence of the tendency of fair concern behavior on the operation and coordination of the supply chain. It is divided into two parts: the first part is the supply chain operation and coordination research based on Shapley fair reference framework, which is the third chapter of this paper. The main consideration is that in the supply chain system of one supplier and two retailers, assuming that the two retailers are fair concern and homogeneity, they serve the same market together, and the supplier is fair and neutral. The biggest innovation of this part is the establishment of supply chain utility system based on Shapley fair reference solution in N-player game. In the context of newsboy model, we study the influence of retailers' tendency of fair concern behavior on supply chain operation and coordination. The second part is the research of supply chain operation and optimization considering distributed and peer-induced fair concerns, which is the fourth chapter of this paper. On the basis of the third chapter, we assume that the two homogeneous retailers serve in two homogeneous markets respectively, and consider the fairness concerns of suppliers at the same time. The first retailer is distributed fairness concern, the second retailer is both distributed fair concern and peer-induced fair concern. We use the Nash bargaining solution as the reference point of distributed fair concern, and the actual profit of the first retailer as the peer fair concern reference point. Based on this, we establish the supply chain utility system under the two-round game, taking the newsboy model as the background. The influence of equity concerns on supply chain decision under exogenous and endogenous wholesale price is discussed respectively. Compared with the traditional two-stage supply chain model, the two parts of this paper are based on the multi-retailer background. In the first part, N members of the supply chain are considered in the same game. The second part mainly considers the game between retailers and suppliers. The research in this paper enriches and develops the application of equity concerns in supply chain system, which has high theoretical value and practical significance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F724.2;F274

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本文編號：2173941