零售商占優(yōu)下的庫存與定價決策研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-17 22:11
【摘要】：在供應(yīng)鏈管理中,傳統(tǒng)的模型是建立在制造商占優(yōu)的基礎(chǔ)之上,但隨著市場的變化,企業(yè)的決策權(quán)逐漸轉(zhuǎn)移到零售商,零售商在某些情況下比制造商擁有了更強的力量。那么在零售商占優(yōu)的情況下供應(yīng)鏈成員應(yīng)該怎樣決策,國內(nèi)外很多專家學者對此做了大量的研究和探討。本文從逆向拍賣方式和合同關(guān)系兩方面研究零售商占優(yōu)下的庫存與定價決策。 在逆向拍賣機制下,利用缺貨損失率彈性分析一般隨機需求下零售商的采購與定價決策,并給出截尾正態(tài)分布需求下的數(shù)值例子,為零售商利用逆向拍賣進行采購和利用定價營銷提供了重要的參考依據(jù)。對合同關(guān)系下的采購情景,在乘式需求下研究零售商占優(yōu)時批發(fā)價合同和兩部定價合同,并從理論和數(shù)值兩方面與制造商占優(yōu)的情景進行比較。最后,從逆向拍賣機制和兩部定價合同兩方面說明當前零售業(yè)中入場費現(xiàn)象的合理性。
[Abstract]:In supply chain management, the traditional model is based on the dominance of manufacturers, but with the change of market, the decision-making power of enterprises is gradually transferred to retailers, and retailers have more power than manufacturers in some cases. Many experts and scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research and discussion on how supply chain members should make decisions when retailers are dominant. This paper studies the inventory and pricing decisions under the dominance of retailers from the aspects of reverse auction and contract relationship. Under the mechanism of reverse auction, the elasticity of stock shortage loss rate is used to analyze the purchasing and pricing decisions of retailers under general stochastic demand, and a numerical example is given under the demand of truncated normal distribution. It provides an important reference for retailers to purchase by reverse auction and to use pricing marketing. Under the demand of multiplicative demand, the wholesale price contract and two pricing contracts are studied under the contract relationship, and the theoretical and numerical results are compared with those of the manufacturer. Finally, the rationality of entry fee in retail trade is explained from two aspects: reverse auction mechanism and two pricing contracts.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F224;F274;F713.3
本文編號：2131085
[Abstract]:In supply chain management, the traditional model is based on the dominance of manufacturers, but with the change of market, the decision-making power of enterprises is gradually transferred to retailers, and retailers have more power than manufacturers in some cases. Many experts and scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research and discussion on how supply chain members should make decisions when retailers are dominant. This paper studies the inventory and pricing decisions under the dominance of retailers from the aspects of reverse auction and contract relationship. Under the mechanism of reverse auction, the elasticity of stock shortage loss rate is used to analyze the purchasing and pricing decisions of retailers under general stochastic demand, and a numerical example is given under the demand of truncated normal distribution. It provides an important reference for retailers to purchase by reverse auction and to use pricing marketing. Under the demand of multiplicative demand, the wholesale price contract and two pricing contracts are studied under the contract relationship, and the theoretical and numerical results are compared with those of the manufacturer. Finally, the rationality of entry fee in retail trade is explained from two aspects: reverse auction mechanism and two pricing contracts.
【學位授予單位】：湘潭大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F224;F274;F713.3
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，本文編號：2131085
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