本文選題：消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品 + 供應(yīng)鏈管理��； 參考：《浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)居民經(jīng)濟(jì)水平的提高,電子產(chǎn)品逐步從消費(fèi)觀念中的奢侈品轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閲?guó)民生活的必需品,尤其在青少年群體中,電子產(chǎn)品已基本得到普及。近些年,隨著我國(guó)科技水平的發(fā)展,越來(lái)越多的具有自主知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的本土電子品牌相繼凸現(xiàn),但是隨著產(chǎn)品上市與銷售,往往伴其左右的是眾多的投訴與維權(quán),各類“質(zhì)量門”事件頻發(fā),嚴(yán)重影響了我國(guó)產(chǎn)品的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。一時(shí)間,質(zhì)量差、耐用度低、服務(wù)差等詞語(yǔ)相繼與我國(guó)電子產(chǎn)品掛鉤,既影響了消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈各成員企業(yè)的利益,也直接損害了我國(guó)新興電子產(chǎn)品行業(yè)的發(fā)展。因此,如何提高消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量,是我們亟待解決的問(wèn)題。鑒于此,本文將從消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制角度入手,運(yùn)用博弈理論、契約設(shè)計(jì)和相關(guān)優(yōu)化理論對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量控制進(jìn)行研究,以期得到有益結(jié)論為消費(fèi)類電子產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈各成員企業(yè)制定相關(guān)決策提供參考性意見(jiàn),并為我國(guó)相關(guān)行業(yè)管理部門提供質(zhì)量控制角度的行業(yè)規(guī)制建議。本文主要研究?jī)?nèi)容概況如下：首先,本文基于零售商主導(dǎo)的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈,結(jié)合我國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)國(guó)情,引入第三方檢測(cè)來(lái)監(jiān)管產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量。運(yùn)用演化博弈理論,構(gòu)建了二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量安全監(jiān)管模型,運(yùn)用復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程對(duì)其進(jìn)行了穩(wěn)定性分析,通過(guò)分析結(jié)果表明：供應(yīng)商與零售商為獲得長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益,通過(guò)必要檢測(cè)監(jiān)督手段,逐步促使供應(yīng)商合法生產(chǎn),提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量,實(shí)現(xiàn)整體供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找嬖鲩L(zhǎng)。其次,本文基于供應(yīng)商與零售商組成的兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),在隨機(jī)需求供應(yīng)鏈模型中,引入質(zhì)量努力概念對(duì)隨機(jī)市場(chǎng)需求下供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)和銷量等方面的影響進(jìn)行初步分析。分析了合作型供應(yīng)鏈模式下質(zhì)量努力提升對(duì)市場(chǎng)需求、供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)、訂購(gòu)批量及零售價(jià)格的影響。分析結(jié)果表明：質(zhì)量努力不斷提高,有助于供應(yīng)鏈整理利潤(rùn)和訂購(gòu)批量的增長(zhǎng),并降低零售價(jià)格,拉動(dòng)市場(chǎng)活躍度,以達(dá)到市場(chǎng)需求與各方利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)的預(yù)期。最后,本文基于收益共享契約和價(jià)格補(bǔ)貼契約相結(jié)合的理論基礎(chǔ),引入供應(yīng)商和零售商在供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中各自的質(zhì)量努力因素,研究?jī)杉?jí)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中各成員的質(zhì)量控制機(jī)制。分析了供應(yīng)商和零售商合作、不合作、采用單契約和采用雙契約雙向協(xié)調(diào)這四種情況下供應(yīng)鏈成員間的Stackelberg均衡策略,論證了契約在質(zhì)量改進(jìn)上的優(yōu)勢(shì)、質(zhì)量改進(jìn)與市場(chǎng)需求的關(guān)系。分析結(jié)果表明：當(dāng)市場(chǎng)需求變動(dòng)對(duì)產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量和營(yíng)銷質(zhì)量敏感度較高時(shí),在可承受的成本壓力范圍內(nèi),雙向契約協(xié)調(diào)有助于雙方質(zhì)量的改進(jìn)和供應(yīng)鏈的利潤(rùn)均衡,以達(dá)到市場(chǎng)需求與各方利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)的預(yù)期。
[Abstract]:With the improvement of the economic level of Chinese residents, electronic products have gradually changed from the luxury goods in the concept of consumption to the necessities of national life, especially among the young people, the electronic products have been basically popularized. In recent years, with the development of science and technology in our country, more and more local electronic brands with independent intellectual property rights have emerged one after another. However, with the product going on the market and sales, it is often accompanied by numerous complaints and rights. Various kinds of "quality door" events occur frequently, seriously affecting the market competitiveness of our products. For a time, words such as poor quality, low durability and poor service are linked to Chinese electronic products one after another, which not only affects the interests of the enterprises in the supply chain of consumer electronic products, but also directly damages the development of the new electronic products industry in our country. Therefore, how to improve the quality of consumer electronic products, is our urgent problem. In view of this, this paper will start from the point of view of supply chain quality control of consumer electronic products, use game theory, contract design and relevant optimization theory to study supply chain quality control. In order to obtain a useful conclusion for the consumer electronics supply chain member enterprises to make relevant decisions to provide reference advice, and for the relevant industry management departments in China to provide industry regulatory advice from the perspective of quality control. The main contents of this paper are as follows: firstly, based on the retailer-led secondary supply chain and the reality of our country, we introduce the third party detection to supervise the product quality. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the quality and safety supervision model of the secondary supply chain is constructed, and the stability analysis is carried out by using the replicative dynamic equation. The results show that the suppliers and retailers obtain long-term benefits. By means of necessary inspection and supervision, the supplier can produce legally, improve the product quality and realize the increase of the whole supply chain revenue. Secondly, based on the two-level supply chain system composed of supplier and retailer, this paper introduces the concept of quality effort into the stochastic demand supply chain model and analyzes the influence of the concept of quality effort on the supply chain profit and sales under the stochastic market demand. The effects of quality improvement on market demand, overall profit of supply chain, order batch and retail price in cooperative supply chain are analyzed. The results show that the continuous improvement of quality is helpful to increase the profit and order batch of supply chain, reduce the retail price and stimulate the market activity, so as to meet the expectations of market demand and profit growth. Finally, based on the theoretical basis of the combination of revenue-sharing contract and price subsidy contract, this paper introduces the quality effort factors of suppliers and retailers in the supply chain system, and studies the quality control mechanism of each member in the two-level supply chain system. This paper analyzes the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy among the supply chain members under the conditions of cooperation between supplier and retailer, non-cooperation, single contract and double contract and two-way coordination, and proves the advantages of contract in quality improvement. Relationship between quality improvement and market demand. The results show that when the market demand changes are sensitive to the product quality and the marketing quality, the two-way contract coordination is helpful to the improvement of the quality of both parties and the profit balance of the supply chain in the range of affordable cost pressure. To meet market demand and profit growth expectations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F426.63;F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 張t熞，

本文編號(hào)：2111921