發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-07-05 01:37

  本文選題：訂貨決策 + 配貨博弈��； 參考：《清華大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：供應(yīng)短缺中的決策本質(zhì)上可歸結(jié)為一個(gè)博弈問(wèn)題，經(jīng)典研究基于納什理論已有一些成果。然而既有的研究范式存在著一個(gè)基本性的局限，體現(xiàn)在決策模型中對(duì)人的行為模式做了極簡(jiǎn)化假設(shè)，認(rèn)為決策者是“完全理性”人，具有完美的信息獲取和處理能力，這與實(shí)踐中人的管理決策存在著差異，進(jìn)而限制了其研究成果在管理實(shí)踐中的應(yīng)用。針對(duì)上述問(wèn)題，本文提出在配貨博弈中引入對(duì)行為決策的考量，以零售商的訂貨決策為切入點(diǎn)，通過(guò)理論和實(shí)驗(yàn)相結(jié)合的方法，，開(kāi)展行為決策研究。論文系統(tǒng)地考察了需求信息完全和不完全兩種博弈類型、按比例分配和小訂單優(yōu)先兩種規(guī)則構(gòu)成的四類配貨博弈問(wèn)題。 對(duì)完全信息配貨博弈的研究表明，被試者訂貨決策與納什均衡解存在系統(tǒng)性偏差，且被試者在重復(fù)決策中具有納什理論所未能刻畫(huà)的學(xué)習(xí)效應(yīng)。本文提煉了不同分配規(guī)則、不同運(yùn)作成本對(duì)被試者的訂貨決策和供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)作績(jī)效的影響規(guī)律。進(jìn)一步，通過(guò)定量分析，提出并建立了基于隨機(jī)最優(yōu)均衡的行為決策模型，揭示了被試者在博弈過(guò)程中的有限理性和學(xué)習(xí)效應(yīng)，模型預(yù)測(cè)結(jié)果實(shí)現(xiàn)了對(duì)實(shí)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)的準(zhǔn)確逼近。 對(duì)不完全信息配貨博弈的研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)被試者不僅存在博弈的有限理性，還對(duì)不同運(yùn)作成本持有差別化的估計(jì)。本文基于心理賬戶理論和隨機(jī)最優(yōu)均衡，提出并建立了相應(yīng)的行為決策模型；通過(guò)定量分析，揭示了被試者在不同分配規(guī)則、不同成本和不同輪次中對(duì)缺貨成本和浪費(fèi)成本持有的心理賬戶特點(diǎn)，以及系統(tǒng)運(yùn)作效率的特點(diǎn)，并實(shí)現(xiàn)了預(yù)測(cè)結(jié)果對(duì)實(shí)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)的準(zhǔn)確逼近。 通過(guò)在兩類博弈中開(kāi)展的分配規(guī)則比較研究，指出了現(xiàn)有研究尚為薄弱的小訂單優(yōu)先的優(yōu)點(diǎn)和特色：與按比例分配相比，能夠誘導(dǎo)真實(shí)人制定更貼近標(biāo)準(zhǔn)理論的訂貨決策，供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)對(duì)運(yùn)作成本的波動(dòng)具有更強(qiáng)的穩(wěn)定性，并且能夠獲得更高的運(yùn)作績(jī)效，是很多應(yīng)用場(chǎng)合中值得選用的一種分配規(guī)則。 本文建立了在配貨博弈中考察行為決策的研究框架，提出了有效的行為決策模型，為今后進(jìn)一步開(kāi)展供應(yīng)鏈優(yōu)化管理和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)研究奠定了基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:Decision making in supply shortage is essentially a game problem. Some achievements have been made in classical research based on Nash theory. However, the existing research paradigm has a basic limitation, which is reflected in the extremely simplified assumption of human behavior model in the decision-making model, which holds that the decision-maker is a "completely rational" person with the perfect ability to obtain and process information. This is different from people's management decision in practice, which limits the application of their research results in management practice. In order to solve the above problems, this paper proposes to introduce the consideration of behavior decision in the distribution game, take the ordering decision of the retailer as the starting point, through the combination of theory and experiment, carry out the behavior decision research. In this paper, four kinds of distribution game problems, which are composed of two game types of complete and incomplete demand information, proportional distribution and small order priority, are systematically investigated. The study on the game of complete information distribution shows that there is a systematic deviation between the ordering decision and Nash equilibrium solution, and that the subject has the learning effect that Nash theory can not depict in repeated decision making. This paper abstracts the influence of different allocation rules and different operating costs on the order decision and supply chain performance of the subjects. Furthermore, through quantitative analysis, a behavioral decision-making model based on stochastic optimal equilibrium is proposed and established, which reveals the limited rationality and learning effect of the subjects in the game process. The prediction results of the model achieve the accurate approximation of the experimental data. Based on the study of incomplete information distribution game, it is found that the subjects not only have the bounded rationality of the game, but also have different estimates of different operating costs. Based on the theory of psychological account and stochastic optimal equilibrium, this paper proposes and establishes the corresponding behavioral decision model, and through quantitative analysis, reveals the subjects in different allocation rules. The characteristics of psychological accounts and the operating efficiency of the system in different cost and different batches are obtained and the predicted results are accurately approximated to the experimental data. Through the comparative study of distribution rules in two kinds of games, this paper points out the advantages and characteristics that the existing research is still weak in small order priority: compared with proportional distribution, it can induce real people to make order decision which is closer to the standard theory. The supply chain system has stronger stability to the fluctuation of operating cost and can obtain higher operation performance. It is a kind of allocation rule that is worth choosing in many applications. In this paper, the research framework of behavior decision in distribution game is established, and an effective behavioral decision model is put forward, which lays a foundation for further research on supply chain optimization management and mechanism design.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F224.32

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本文編號(hào)：2098348