發(fā)布時間：2018-07-04 06:57

  本文選題：主導權 + 零售商雙渠道供應鏈　； 參考：《南京郵電大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著互聯(lián)網的迅猛發(fā)展,網絡購物的便利性的增強,網絡購物已成為人們不可或缺的購物方式。越來越多的制造商和傳統(tǒng)零售商紛紛選擇開辟網絡渠道來尋求新的增長點,希望通過制造商雙渠道戰(zhàn)略和零售商雙渠道戰(zhàn)略減弱網絡購物所帶來沖擊,拓展?jié)撛诘氖袌龇蓊~,增強企業(yè)競爭力。但是實施雙渠道戰(zhàn)略時,如果不同渠道銷售同一產品,那么制造商雙渠道之間、零售商雙渠道之間必然存在互相爭奪市場份額的情況,出現(xiàn)渠道沖突;尤其是供應鏈上的制造商和零售商均實施雙渠道戰(zhàn)略,將加劇渠道沖突,并導致雙重邊際效應,帶來供應鏈垂直沖突問題。因此,本文在分析總結國內外制造商雙渠道和零售商雙渠道研究的基礎上,以由單個制造商和單個零售商組成的雙渠道供應鏈為研究對象,運用Stackelberg博弈、數(shù)學建模及優(yōu)化理論等對不同主導權下的零售商雙渠道供應鏈和多渠道供應鏈的定價決策和契約協(xié)調機制進行研究。經過研究,本文得出的主要結論包括:(1)零售商主導和制造商主導的零售商雙渠道供應鏈和多渠道供應鏈,在Stackelberg博弈下的分散決策均存在雙重邊際效應,供應鏈整體利潤小于集中決策情境,供應鏈有進一步優(yōu)化空間。(2)不同主導權下零售商雙渠道供應鏈可通過收入共享契約和二部定價契約兩種契約模型來實現(xiàn)供應鏈的協(xié)調,提高供應鏈的整體效率,并給出了制造商占主導地位時收入共享協(xié)調機制的適用條件以及零售商占主導地位時二部制定價協(xié)調機制的適用條件,通過調節(jié)兩個契約模型的參數(shù),都可實現(xiàn)制造商和零售商的雙贏。(3)不同主導權下零售商雙渠道和制造商雙渠道并存的多渠道供應鏈,均可通過改進的收入共享契約模型來實現(xiàn)供應鏈的協(xié)調。但兩種改進的收入共享契約參數(shù)設置需滿足一定的要求,才可實現(xiàn)制造商利潤和零售商利潤的同時增加,且兩種模型的可行性都已通過MATLAB數(shù)值算例分析得以驗證。(4)不同主導權的影響從供應鏈成員角度來看,擁有主導權的成員,將做出最有益于自己的決策,最終也將獲得更大的利潤,因此制造商和零售商都應爭取主導權來增大利益;從供應鏈整體角度來說,不同主導權對供應鏈總利潤基本無影響。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the Internet and the increasing convenience of online shopping, online shopping has become an indispensable way of shopping. More and more manufacturers and traditional retailers have chosen to open up network channels to seek new growth points, hoping to reduce the impact of online shopping and expand potential market share through manufacturers' dual channel strategy and retailer's dual channel strategy. Enhance the competitiveness of enterprises. However, when implementing the dual channel strategy, if different channels sell the same product, then there must be competition for the market share between the manufacturer and the retailer between the two channels, and there will be channel conflict. In particular, both manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain implement the dual channel strategy, which will aggravate the channel conflict, lead to the double marginal effect, and bring about the vertical conflict of the supply chain. Therefore, on the basis of analyzing and summarizing the research of domestic and foreign manufacturers and retailers, this paper takes the double channel supply chain composed of single manufacturer and individual retailer as the research object, and applies Stackelberg game. Mathematical modeling and optimization theory are used to study the pricing decision and contract coordination mechanism of retailers' double-channel supply chain and multi-channel supply chain under different dominant power. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) there are double marginal effects in the decentralized decision in Stackelberg game for retailers' dual-channel supply chain and multi-channel supply chain under Stackelberg game. The overall profit of the supply chain is smaller than the centralized decision-making situation, and the supply chain has further optimization space. (2) under different dominant rights, the retailers' dual-channel supply chain can realize the coordination of the supply chain through two contract models of revenue sharing contract and two-part pricing contract. To improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain, the suitable conditions of the revenue sharing coordination mechanism when the manufacturer is dominant and the applicable condition of the two-part pricing coordination mechanism when the retailer is in the dominant position are given, and the parameters of the two contract models are adjusted by adjusting the parameters of the two contract models. (3) Multi-channel supply chain with two channels of retailers and two channels of manufacturer under different dominant rights can realize the coordination of supply chain through the improved revenue-sharing contract model. However, two kinds of improved revenue sharing contract parameters setting need to meet certain requirements, in order to achieve the manufacturer profit and retailer profit increase at the same time, And the feasibility of the two models has been verified by MATLAB numerical examples. (4) from the point of view of supply chain member, the member with the leading power will make the most beneficial decision. Therefore, both manufacturers and retailers should strive for dominance to increase profits; from the overall point of view of supply chain, different dominance has little effect on the total profit of supply chain.
【學位授予單位】：南京郵電大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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本文編號：2095215