本文選題：零售商雙渠道 + 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)��； 參考：《電子科技大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,隨著電子商務(wù)的迅猛發(fā)展,不僅涌現(xiàn)出例如天貓、淘寶、京東等專業(yè)電商企業(yè),而且傳統(tǒng)家電零售巨頭蘇寧、國美也紛紛開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售渠道,力圖在電商行業(yè)分一杯羹。與專業(yè)電商企業(yè)相比,這些傳統(tǒng)零售巨頭依靠其品牌影響力、覆蓋全國范圍的零售店面和物流運(yùn)輸線路,形成了強(qiáng)勁的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。從供應(yīng)鏈角度來分析,由于零售商引入網(wǎng)上零售渠道,一方面使市場(chǎng)需求有所增加,從而從制造商處的訂貨量亦有所增加;另一方面,由于網(wǎng)絡(luò)運(yùn)營成本遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于傳統(tǒng)零售成本,其網(wǎng)絡(luò)定價(jià)普遍低于傳統(tǒng)渠道(縱使蘇寧云商與國美實(shí)行線上、線下同價(jià),但零售價(jià)仍然遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于單零售渠道情形),不僅會(huì)壓低制造商的批發(fā)價(jià)格,而且對(duì)于零售商本身也會(huì)由于存在渠道沖突,導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)有所降低。因此,零售商雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)與定價(jià)問題,得到越來越多國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的普遍關(guān)注�；谏鲜銮闆r,本文建立了由一個(gè)制造商和一個(gè)供應(yīng)商組成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈,其中零售商持有傳統(tǒng)零售渠道與網(wǎng)上零售渠道(暫不考慮制造商同時(shí)開通網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道的情形),分別探討了收益共享契約、數(shù)量折扣契約、二部線性定價(jià)契約在消費(fèi)者需求為線性與隨機(jī)情形下,能否達(dá)到供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。同時(shí)通過數(shù)值仿真方法驗(yàn)證各契約參數(shù)如何影響供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)的分配。由于目前對(duì)于零售商雙渠道協(xié)調(diào)策略研究的相關(guān)研究比較少,以往對(duì)于零售商雙渠道的研究基本上是在探討雙渠道零售商的定價(jià)均衡策略,本文試圖探討對(duì)于傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈能夠達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)的供應(yīng)鏈契約,能否使的雙渠道零售商供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)。通過模型的推導(dǎo),本文驗(yàn)證了收益共享契約、數(shù)量折扣契約、二部線性定價(jià)契約能夠使零售商雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)。同時(shí),本文也通過斯坦科爾伯格博弈過程的求解,得出了各個(gè)模型下的均衡解。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of e-commerce, not only professional e-commerce enterprises, such as Tmall, Taobao, JingDong and so on, have emerged, but Su Ning, the traditional home appliance retail giant, and Gome have also opened online retail channels one after another. Try to get a share in the ecommerce industry. Compared with the professional e-commerce enterprises, these traditional retail giants rely on their brand influence, covering the national retail stores and logistics transportation lines, forming a strong competitive advantage. From a supply chain point of view, the introduction of online retail channels by retailers on the one hand increases market demand and thus orders from manufacturers; on the other hand, Because the network operating cost is far lower than the traditional retail cost, its network pricing is generally lower than the traditional channel (even though the Su Ning cloud merchants and Gome implement the same price online and offline, But the retail price is still far lower than the single retail channel), which not only lowers the wholesale price of the manufacturer, but also reduces the profit of the supply chain because of the channel conflict for the retailer itself. Therefore, the coordination and pricing of retailers' double channel supply chain have attracted more and more attention from domestic and foreign scholars. Based on the above situation, a secondary supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a supplier is established. Among them, retailers hold traditional retail channels and online retail channels (not considering the situation that manufacturers open online channels at the same time), and discuss revenue sharing contracts and volume discount contracts, respectively. When the consumer demand is linear and stochastic, the two-part linear pricing contract can achieve the coordination of supply chain. At the same time, the numerical simulation method is used to verify how the contract parameters affect the distribution of supply chain profit. As there are few researches on the coordination strategies of retailers' dual channels, the previous researches on the dual channels of retailers are basically discussing the pricing equilibrium strategies of the retailers with dual channels. This paper attempts to discuss whether the traditional supply chain can achieve the coordination of supply chain contracts, and whether the supply chain of two-channel retailers can achieve coordination. Through the derivation of the model, this paper verifies that the revenue sharing contract, the quantity discount contract and the two linear pricing contracts can make the retailer supply chain coordinate with two channels. At the same time, the equilibrium solution of each model is obtained by solving the game process of Steinkelberg.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F713.32

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本文編號(hào)：2091481