本文選題：供應(yīng)中斷 + 供應(yīng)鏈競爭��； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的發(fā)展和市場競爭的日益激烈，企業(yè)與企業(yè)之間的競爭模式已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變成供應(yīng)鏈與供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭。供應(yīng)鏈競爭這種新型的管理運(yùn)作模式，經(jīng)過近年的發(fā)展，已經(jīng)取得了比較成功的運(yùn)用。近年來伴隨企業(yè)全球化采購、非核心業(yè)務(wù)外包、單源供應(yīng)與精益供應(yīng)等業(yè)務(wù)模式的發(fā)展，供應(yīng)鏈在空間上越拉越長，在時(shí)間上越來越短，供應(yīng)鏈的這種時(shí)空變換使得不確定因素增加，加之自然和人為的災(zāi)難性事件增多，供應(yīng)鏈的不確定性越來越高，范圍越來越廣，供應(yīng)鏈也變得越來越脆弱。本文主要考慮的是供應(yīng)中斷對鏈與鏈的競爭造成的影響，在三種不同的情況下，討論了兩條競爭的供應(yīng)鏈之間的定價(jià)、訂貨等決策問題。 第一種情況是在信息不對稱下，即零售商知道自己供應(yīng)鏈的全部信息但只了解競爭對手訂貨量的分布函數(shù)，在這種情況下討論了分別由一個(gè)供應(yīng)商和一個(gè)零售商組成的兩條供應(yīng)鏈之間訂貨量競爭的問題，對合作競爭博弈、混合競爭博弈、非合作競爭博弈這三種情況下的最優(yōu)訂貨量和期望收益進(jìn)行了分析和求解，討論了在收益共享契約和獎勵(lì)-懲罰契約下決策者的選擇，可以得出：在給定一條供應(yīng)鏈策略的情況下，另一條鏈中的成員選擇合作時(shí)，整條鏈的收益最大。因此供應(yīng)鏈成員選擇合作對每一個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈來說都是最優(yōu)的決策，從長遠(yuǎn)來看，合作是唯一的均衡。從期望的市場供應(yīng)量來說，合作競爭博弈給顧客帶來的滿意度最大，混合競爭博弈次之，非合作競爭博弈最差。因此，合作能夠使市場價(jià)格更低，使顧客受益更多。 第二種情況分析了需求不確定對供應(yīng)鏈之間競爭的影響。首先，零售商決定是否與供應(yīng)商合作；若零售商選擇與供應(yīng)商合作，那么假定他們之間采用收益共享契約，由零售商決定收益共享參數(shù)，此時(shí)該供應(yīng)鏈處于協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)。若零售商選擇不與供應(yīng)商合作，那么假定他們之間采用批發(fā)價(jià)格契約，由供應(yīng)商決定批發(fā)價(jià)格，此時(shí)的供應(yīng)鏈處于非協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)，零售商與供應(yīng)商之間構(gòu)成斯坦伯格博弈。在協(xié)調(diào)競爭、混合競爭、非協(xié)調(diào)競爭這三種不同的競爭結(jié)構(gòu)下，給出了最優(yōu)批發(fā)價(jià)格所滿足的條件和兩個(gè)零售商最優(yōu)訂貨量的表達(dá)式，，得出了供應(yīng)可靠性參數(shù)和批發(fā)價(jià)格對最優(yōu)訂貨量的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)在一定的收益共享系數(shù)范圍內(nèi)，供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)競爭成立，最后通過數(shù)值計(jì)算，分析了參數(shù)對最優(yōu)訂貨量的影響，得到了一些管理啟示。 第三種情況討論了突發(fā)事件導(dǎo)致的制造成本擾動對供應(yīng)鏈上的企業(yè)造成的影響，研究了當(dāng)制造成本產(chǎn)生擾動時(shí)，兩條供應(yīng)鏈之間進(jìn)行Bertrand博弈的問題，討論了當(dāng)成本擾動時(shí)，兩條供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)定價(jià)和訂貨策略；分析了擾動成本對均衡結(jié)果的影響以及在不同參數(shù)范圍下，兩條鏈的最優(yōu)調(diào)整策略，論文發(fā)現(xiàn)只有當(dāng)擾動成本超過一定的閾值時(shí)，兩條供應(yīng)鏈的訂貨與定價(jià)策略才需要改變，訂貨與定價(jià)策略具有一定的魯棒性，最后通過數(shù)值分析驗(yàn)證了相關(guān)結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:With the development of economic globalization and the increasingly fierce competition in the market, the competition mode between enterprises and enterprises has changed into competition between supply chain and supply chain. The new management mode of supply chain competition has made a more successful application after recent development. With the development of core business outsourcing, single source supply and lean supply, the longer the supply chain is stretched and shorter in space, the time and space transformation of the supply chain increases the uncertainty, and the increase of natural and man-made catastrophic events, the increasing uncertainty of the supply chain, the wider range of supply chain, and the supply chain. The main consideration is the effect of supply interruption on the chain and chain competition. In three different cases, we discuss the pricing of the two competitive supply chains, order and other decision-making problems.
The first case is that under the information asymmetry, that is, the retailer knows all the information of its supply chain but only understands the distribution function of the quantity of the competitor's order. In this case, we discuss the problem of the competition between two supply chains, which are composed of one supplier and one retailer respectively, the game of cooperative competition, and the mixed competitive Bo. The optimal order quantity and expected return under three cases of non cooperative competition game are analyzed and solved. The choice of decision-makers under the income sharing contract and reward penalty contract is discussed. It can be concluded that in the case of a given supply chain strategy, the whole chain has the greatest benefit when the members of the other chain choose cooperation. Therefore, the selection cooperation of the supply chain is the best decision for each supply chain. In the long run, cooperation is the only equilibrium. From the expected market supply, the cooperative competition game brings the most satisfaction to the customer, the mixed competition game is the second, the non cooperative competition is the worst. Therefore, the cooperation can make the market price more expensive. Low, make the customer benefit more.
In the second case, the influence of demand uncertainty on the competition between supply chains is analyzed. First, the retailer decides whether to cooperate with the supplier. If the retailer chooses to cooperate with the supplier, it is assumed that the retailer adopts the income sharing contract and the retailer decides the income sharing parameter. At this time the supply chain is in a coordinated state. If the retailer chooses the retailer, the retailer is in a coordinated state. If the supplier is not cooperating with the supplier, it is assumed that the wholesale price contract is adopted between them and the supplier determines the wholesale price. The supply chain is in a nonconforming state at this time. The Steinberg game is formed between the retailer and the supplier. The optimal wholesale price is given under the three different competitive structures of coordinated competition, mixed competition and non coordinated competition. The conditions satisfied by the lattice and the expression of the optimal order quantity of the two retailers have obtained the influence of the supply reliability parameters and the wholesale price on the optimal order quantity. The study found that the supply chain is established in the range of the certain income sharing coefficient. Finally, the influence of the parameters on the optimal order quantity is analyzed by numerical calculation. Some management apocalypse.
The third case discusses the impact of the manufacturing cost disturbance caused by the sudden event on the enterprises in the supply chain. The problem of the Bertrand game between two supply chains is studied when the manufacturing cost is disturbed. The optimal pricing and ordering strategy of two supply chains are discussed when the cost disturbance is disturbed, and the disturbance cost pairs are analyzed. The effect of balance results and the optimal adjustment strategy of two chains under different parameters. It is found that only when the cost of the disturbance exceeds a certain threshold, the order and pricing strategy of the two supply chain needs to be changed, and the order and pricing strategy have a certain robustness. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by numerical analysis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F224.32

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