本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) + 利他委托人�。� 參考：《管理工程學報》2013年04期

【摘要】：研究了分散決策結(jié)構(gòu)下的具有雙邊不對稱成本信息的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題。考慮了由一個制造商和一個銷售商組成的二級供應(yīng)鏈,制造商和銷售商分別擁有私人的制造成本信息和銷售成本信息。為實現(xiàn)有效激勵,引入了利他委托人這一概念,以供應(yīng)鏈作為協(xié)調(diào)主體。為了實現(xiàn)成本信息的真實揭示,引入了AGV(d'Aspremont和Gerard-Varet)機制,并且在此基礎(chǔ)上建立非對稱信息下的供應(yīng)鏈模型。在集中決策下,給出系統(tǒng)的最優(yōu)商品交易量作為分析的基準。在分散決策的情況下,證明了在AGV機制的作用下,制銷雙方不僅能夠真實的報告私人的成本信息,而且由雙方成本確定的商品交易量等于完全信息下的最優(yōu)商品交易量。此外,為了公平的分配實現(xiàn)的鏈收益,給出了一個基于雙方期望信息租金的分配規(guī)則。在此分配規(guī)則的基礎(chǔ)上設(shè)計了一組改進的轉(zhuǎn)移支付,基于改進的轉(zhuǎn)移支付提出了一個協(xié)調(diào)機制。該機制不僅能真實的揭示信息還能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。最后給出一個數(shù)值算例對文章的主要結(jié)論進行說明。
[Abstract]:The problem of supply chain coordination with bilateral asymmetric cost information under decentralized decision structure is studied. A secondary supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a seller is considered. The manufacturer and the seller have private manufacturing cost information and sales cost information respectively. In order to achieve effective incentive, the concept of altruistic client is introduced, with supply chain as the main coordinating body. In order to realize the true disclosure of cost information, the mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet is introduced, and a supply chain model based on asymmetric information is established. Under the centralized decision, the optimal commodity trading volume of the system is given as the basis for analysis. In the case of decentralized decision, it is proved that under the action of AGV mechanism, both producers and sellers can not only report the private cost information truthfully, but also that the volume of commodity transaction determined by the cost of both parties is equal to the optimal volume of commodity trading under complete information. In addition, in order to distribute the realized chain income fairly, an allocation rule based on the expected information rent is given. Based on the allocation rules, a set of improved transfer payments is designed, and a coordination mechanism based on the improved transfer payment is proposed. This mechanism can not only reveal the information, but also realize the coordination of supply chain. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the main conclusions of the paper.
【作者單位】： 四川大學工商管理學院;西南財經(jīng)大學統(tǒng)計學院;
【基金】：國家自然科學基金資助項目(71071103)
【分類號】：F224;F274

【參考文獻】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前4條

1 李怡娜;徐學軍;;信息不對稱條件下可控提前期供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機制研究[J];管理工程學報;2011年03期

2 姚s，

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