本文選題：兩級供應(yīng)鏈 + 零售商主導(dǎo)　； 參考：《財經(jīng)理論與實踐》2013年04期

【摘要】：在零售商主導(dǎo)的二級供應(yīng)鏈中,供應(yīng)商之間不同的博弈結(jié)構(gòu)對產(chǎn)品價格、供應(yīng)鏈各成員以及整體利潤有影響。當(dāng)供應(yīng)商實力均衡并同時決策時,產(chǎn)品的批發(fā)價、零售價都要低于供應(yīng)商之間為主從關(guān)系時進行決策行動的情況。此時,供應(yīng)商的利潤受損,而零售商和整體供應(yīng)鏈的利潤增加,另外,當(dāng)產(chǎn)品之間的替代率增加時,產(chǎn)品批發(fā)價、零售價和供應(yīng)商的利潤都減少,而零售商的利潤增加,供應(yīng)鏈的利潤變化不大,說明產(chǎn)品替代率的增加只是改變了供應(yīng)鏈成員的利潤分配。
[Abstract]:In the retailer led two level supply chain, the different game structure between suppliers affects the price of the product, the members of the supply chain and the overall profit. When the supplier's strength is balanced and at the same time, the wholesale price of the product is lower than the decision action between the supplier and the supplier. At this time, the supplier is the supplier. The profit of the retailer and the whole supply chain is increased. In addition, when the substitution rate increases, the wholesale price of the product, the retail price and the profit of the supplier are reduced, and the profit of the retailer is increased and the profit of the supply chain is changed little, which shows that the increase of the substitution rate of the product only changes the profit distribution of the supply chain members.
【作者單位】： 廣東金融學(xué)院工商管理系;
【基金】：教育部人文社科基金(10YJC630235) 廣東哲學(xué)社科項目(GD10YGL10) 廣州哲學(xué)社科項目(09Y56)
【分類號】：F224.32;F715;F274

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本文編號：2047100