發(fā)布時間：2018-06-10 16:16

  本文選題：農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) + 信息不對稱�。� 參考：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：供應(yīng)鏈管理思想誕生于上世紀(jì)九十年代，并得到了飛速的發(fā)展。近年來農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈也越來越引起國內(nèi)外學(xué)者的注意，并成為目前國內(nèi)外學(xué)者研究的一個熱點。和傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈管理一樣，農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈管理也要求從系統(tǒng)或全局的觀點來全面規(guī)劃供應(yīng)鏈中從初始的農(nóng)戶到最終顧客所涉及的所有環(huán)節(jié)，并對其中各參與成員、部門之間的物流、信息流和資金流等進(jìn)行有效的計劃、協(xié)調(diào)、組織和控制，使農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈實現(xiàn)整體優(yōu)化。即，，將傳統(tǒng)的彼此從各自利益出發(fā)的獨立運(yùn)作格局轉(zhuǎn)變成一個運(yùn)用科學(xué)管理來實現(xiàn)合作協(xié)調(diào)的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈整體，進(jìn)而提高供應(yīng)鏈整體效率，實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈成員競爭力的提升。然而人們在供應(yīng)鏈管理實踐過程中卻面臨許多難題，如怎樣讓農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈中分屬于不同經(jīng)濟(jì)實體的農(nóng)戶和銷售企業(yè)能樹立合作意識以擁有比較對稱的信息、具有風(fēng)險規(guī)避特性成員參與的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈如何協(xié)調(diào)的問題，并以最終供應(yīng)鏈整體利益為目標(biāo)來分析各自的決策行為。因此，研究信息不對稱和有風(fēng)險規(guī)避特性成員參與的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)不僅有重要的理論意義，而且與實際情況相一致的，所以研究這一領(lǐng)域也具有重要的實際意義。 本文在綜述相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，主要通過轉(zhuǎn)移支付契約模型和期權(quán)契約模型來分別解決成本信息不對稱和訂單農(nóng)業(yè)中有風(fēng)險規(guī)避特者參與情境下的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題： （1）研究由一個農(nóng)戶和一個銷售企業(yè)組成的供應(yīng)鏈在成本信息不對稱情況下的協(xié)調(diào)問題。從銷售企業(yè)的角度分析農(nóng)戶的決策行為，引進(jìn)生產(chǎn)補(bǔ)助計劃來誘導(dǎo)農(nóng)戶調(diào)整其生產(chǎn)規(guī)模，最終實現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈成員間成本信息不對稱的現(xiàn)象的作用。使得在農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈成員收益都實現(xiàn)Pareto改進(jìn)的情況下也實現(xiàn)了整個供應(yīng)鏈效率提高。 （2）接下來，研究具有風(fēng)險規(guī)避特性農(nóng)戶參與的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題。在訂單農(nóng)業(yè)的基礎(chǔ)上引入期權(quán)契約，建立由一個風(fēng)險中性的銷售企業(yè)和一個風(fēng)險規(guī)避的農(nóng)戶組成的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈模型，并在條件風(fēng)險估值（CVaR）風(fēng)險度量準(zhǔn)則下，建立具有風(fēng)險規(guī)避特性的農(nóng)戶決策目標(biāo)函數(shù)。分析了不同風(fēng)險規(guī)避度下期權(quán)契約對農(nóng)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈成員的決策行為的影響。研究結(jié)果表明對于農(nóng)戶風(fēng)險規(guī)避度η，如需求分布函數(shù)值的反函數(shù)F1(η)大于無期權(quán)協(xié)調(diào)情況下銷售企業(yè)的最優(yōu)農(nóng)產(chǎn)品訂購量Q*r，引入期權(quán)契約后農(nóng)戶和銷售企業(yè)的收益可以實現(xiàn)Pareto改進(jìn)。
[Abstract]:Supply chain management thought was born in last century 90 s, and got rapid development. In recent years, the supply chain of agricultural products has attracted more and more attention of scholars at home and abroad, and has become a hot spot of scholars at home and abroad. Like traditional supply chain management, supply chain management of agricultural products also requires a systematic or overall view of the supply chain from the initial farmers to the final customer involved in all aspects of the supply chain, and each of the participating members. Effective planning, coordination, organization and control of logistics, information flow and capital flow among departments to optimize the supply chain of agricultural products as a whole. That is to say, the traditional pattern of independent operation from their respective interests is transformed into a cooperative and coordinated agricultural product supply chain with scientific management, thus improving the overall efficiency of the supply chain and enhancing the competitiveness of the members of the supply chain. However, in the practice of supply chain management, people are faced with many difficulties, such as how to make farmers and sales enterprises belonging to different economic entities in the supply chain of agricultural products to establish a sense of cooperation in order to have more symmetrical information. The problem of how to coordinate the supply chain of agricultural products with the participation of the members of risk aversion is discussed, and their decision-making behaviors are analyzed with the overall benefit of the final supply chain as the goal. Therefore, it is not only of theoretical significance to study the coordination of agricultural product supply chain with asymmetric information and the participation of risk-averse characteristic members, but also consistent with the actual situation. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study this field. Mainly through transfer payment contract model and option contract model to solve the problem of agricultural product supply chain coordination in the context of asymmetric cost information and the participation of risk-averse characters in order-oriented agriculture: (1) the study consists of one farmer and one Coordination problem of supply chain in the case of cost information asymmetry. This paper analyzes the decision behavior of farmers from the point of view of sales enterprises, introduces production subsidy plan to induce farmers to adjust their production scale, and finally realizes the function of coordinating the cost information asymmetry among supply chain members. In the case of Pareto improvement, the efficiency of the whole supply chain is improved. (2) next, the problem of agricultural product supply chain coordination with the participation of farmers with risk aversion is studied. On the basis of order agriculture, an option contract is introduced to establish a supply chain model of agricultural products, which is composed of a risk-neutral sales firm and a risk-averse farmer, and is based on the conditional risk valuation (Cvar) risk measurement criterion. The objective function of peasant household decision with risk aversion is established. This paper analyzes the influence of option contract on the decision-making behavior of agricultural product supply chain members under different risk aversion. The results show that the inverse function F _ 1 (畏) of the value of demand distribution function is larger than the optimal agricultural product ordering quantity of the selling enterprise without option coordination, and the income of farmers and sales enterprises after the introduction of option contract. Pareto can be improved.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F323.7

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