本文選題：多屬性逆向拍賣 + 利潤分配　； 參考：《江蘇科技大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：在電子商務快速發(fā)展的背景下，傳統(tǒng)的采購方式已無法適應企業(yè)最大限度地降低采購成本、在世界范圍內贏得競爭優(yōu)勢的要求。在線逆向拍賣技術作為一種新興的電子采購工具，因其在降低采購成本、提高采購效率方面的突出優(yōu)勢而備受矚目，越來越多的公司采用這一技術在全球范圍內采購產品或服務。而傳統(tǒng)的單屬性逆向拍賣因其對供應商利潤的過度壓榨，對采供雙方合作關系造成不利影響，多屬性逆向拍賣機制的提出為長期采供關系的構建與維系提供了可能。本研究的主要目的在于探討多屬性逆向拍賣環(huán)境下采供雙方的利潤分配及實現(xiàn)采供合作的條件，以仿真實驗的方式來驗證得出的結論，并在此基礎上探究多屬性逆向拍賣采供關系的管理策略。 本文從采供雙方非合作與合作關系的角度，針對在線逆向拍賣環(huán)境下采供利潤分配問題，以多屬性逆向拍賣為基礎，分別構建了非合作博弈模型及合作博弈模型。首先，本文分析了兩種情形下影響利潤分配的因素，以及建立和發(fā)展合作關系的條件，并確定了利潤分配的比例。其次，在基準模型的基礎上，結合實際情況調整模型及假設條件，，探討了主體風險態(tài)度和成本變動對雙方利潤分配的影響。通過仿真實驗分析，運用MATLAB7.0軟件得到圖形化界面，進而驗證了模型分析得到的以下研究結論：影響雙方非合作利潤的因素包括評分函數參量，供應商成本系數和成本參數，供應商數量等；影響雙方合作總利潤的因素包括采購商屬性偏好，供應商成本系數和成本參數；合作利潤的分配比例，受主體風險態(tài)度的影響，與各自非合作利潤有關，與討價還價能力無關；拍賣交易成本和生產成本的變動，必須在一定范圍內才能實現(xiàn)采供合作；實現(xiàn)長期合作的條件是雙方效用最大化下的分配比例。最后，提出多屬性逆向拍賣環(huán)境下采供關系的維持和改善策略，包括合理設計評分函數，重視非價格屬性，選擇合適的供應商，利潤分配應與風險承擔相對稱，建立信息共享的信任機制和利潤分配的反饋機制。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the rapid development of electronic commerce, the traditional procurement methods can not meet the requirements of the enterprises to reduce the procurement costs to the greatest extent and to win the competitive advantage in the world. As a new electronic procurement tool, online reverse auction technology has attracted much attention for its outstanding advantages in reducing procurement costs and improving procurement efficiency. More and more companies are using this technology to procure products or services worldwide. The traditional single-attribute reverse auction has a negative impact on the cooperative relationship between the supplier and the supplier because of its excessive pressure on the supplier profit. The multi-attribute reverse auction mechanism provides the possibility for the long-term construction and maintenance of the supply-gathering relationship. The main purpose of this study is to discuss the profit distribution and the conditions of cooperation between the two parties under the environment of multi-attribute reverse auction, and to verify the conclusion by simulation experiment. On this basis, this paper explores the management strategy of multi-attribute reverse auction. From the point of view of non-cooperative and cooperative relationship between the two parties, this paper aims at the problem of profit distribution in online reverse auction, based on multi-attribute reverse auction. The non-cooperative game model and the cooperative game model are constructed respectively. Firstly, this paper analyzes the factors that affect profit distribution and the conditions for establishing and developing cooperative relationship, and determines the proportion of profit distribution. Secondly, on the basis of the benchmark model, combined with the actual situation to adjust the model and hypothetical conditions, discussed the main risk attitude and the impact of cost changes on the profit distribution between the two sides. Through the simulation experiment analysis, the graphical interface is obtained by using MATLAB 7.0 software, and the following conclusions of the model analysis are verified: the factors influencing the non-cooperative profit of both sides include the scoring function parameter, the supplier cost coefficient and the cost parameter. The number of suppliers, the factors that affect the total profit of the cooperation between the two parties include the attribute preference of the purchaser, the cost coefficient and the cost parameter of the supplier; the distribution ratio of the cooperative profit is affected by the risk attitude of the main body, and it is related to the respective non-cooperative profit. It has nothing to do with bargaining power; the change of auction transaction cost and production cost must be within a certain range in order to realize the cooperation; the condition of long-term cooperation is the distribution ratio under the maximization of utility between the two sides. Finally, the strategies of maintaining and improving the supply relationship in the environment of multi-attribute reverse auction are put forward, including the rational design of scoring function, the importance of non-price attributes, the selection of suitable suppliers, and the symmetry between profit distribution and risk taking. The trust mechanism of information sharing and the feedback mechanism of profit distribution are established.
【學位授予單位】：江蘇科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F713.359;F275.4

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本文編號：1994600