本文選題：雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈 + 定價(jià)決策�。� 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：果蔬農(nóng)產(chǎn)品由于富含營(yíng)養(yǎng),受到了消費(fèi)者的日益喜愛(ài),消費(fèi)量逐年攀升。與此同時(shí),電子商務(wù)以及作為果蔬供應(yīng)商的農(nóng)業(yè)合作社迅猛發(fā)展,為了降低成本、擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)份額,電子直銷(xiāo)渠道受到了果蔬供應(yīng)商的日益重視。但是電子直銷(xiāo)市場(chǎng)的開(kāi)辟,使得供應(yīng)商和零售商不僅是傳統(tǒng)零售渠道的合作者,更成為了渠道之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者,使得渠道沖突問(wèn)題成為了關(guān)注的重點(diǎn);而雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)直接關(guān)系著供應(yīng)鏈的成敗。此外,由于市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的日益激烈以及果蔬農(nóng)產(chǎn)品自身的特點(diǎn),供應(yīng)鏈成員在考慮自身利益最大化的同時(shí)必須將自身的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承受能力考慮在內(nèi),甚至為了規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)放棄部分利潤(rùn),致使雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈整體利潤(rùn)受到損失。鑒于此,本文以果蔬兩級(jí)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈為研究對(duì)象,考慮供應(yīng)鏈成員為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性者和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避者兩種情形下,綜合運(yùn)用Stackelberg博弈論和供應(yīng)鏈契約等理論和方法,研究了供應(yīng)鏈成員的最優(yōu)定價(jià)決策以及如何設(shè)計(jì)契約以實(shí)現(xiàn)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化,并保證渠道成員共贏,從而提升果蔬雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的整體競(jìng)爭(zhēng)實(shí)力。首先,考慮當(dāng)供應(yīng)鏈成員為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性者時(shí),通過(guò)構(gòu)建垂直一體化決策和分散決策下果蔬雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的基本模型,得到供應(yīng)鏈決策者的最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略。并對(duì)模型進(jìn)行比較,發(fā)現(xiàn)沖突所導(dǎo)致的系統(tǒng)失調(diào),進(jìn)而加入收益共享契約進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化,并運(yùn)用數(shù)學(xué)模型對(duì)該契約協(xié)調(diào)的條件進(jìn)行論證,證明了存在共贏的情形,即該契約能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)果蔬雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化。接著假設(shè)供應(yīng)商和零售商均為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避者時(shí),運(yùn)用均值-方差模型和Stackelberg博弈模型研究收益共享契約模型對(duì)果蔬雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化,通過(guò)模型求解發(fā)現(xiàn)能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)系統(tǒng)利潤(rùn)更優(yōu)、成員雙贏。最后,分別對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避兩種情形進(jìn)行數(shù)值模擬分析。數(shù)值分析結(jié)果證明了渠道競(jìng)爭(zhēng)會(huì)造成雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)д{(diào),加入收益共享契約進(jìn)行優(yōu)化后發(fā)現(xiàn),無(wú)論是在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性還是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避情形下,當(dāng)收益共享因子在一定的范圍內(nèi)時(shí),雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈成員的利潤(rùn)均可以達(dá)到帕累托改進(jìn),即能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈完美共贏協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化,進(jìn)一步證明了收益共享契約能夠有效協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化果蔬雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈。
[Abstract]:Fruit and vegetable agricultural products are more and more popular by consumers because they are rich in nutrition, and the consumption is increasing year by year. At the same time, E-commerce and agricultural cooperatives as suppliers of fruits and vegetables are developing rapidly. In order to reduce the cost and expand the market share, electronic direct selling channels are paid more and more attention by the suppliers of fruits and vegetables. However, with the development of electronic direct marketing market, suppliers and retailers are not only partners in traditional retail channels, but also competitors among channels, which makes channel conflicts become the focus of attention. The coordination of two-channel supply chain is directly related to the success or failure of the supply chain. In addition, due to the increasingly fierce market competition and the characteristics of fruit and vegetable agricultural products, supply chain members must consider their own risk bearing capacity while considering their own interests maximization, and even give up part of the profits in order to avoid risks. As a result, the overall profit of the double channel supply chain is lost. In view of this, this paper takes the two-level two-channel supply chain of fruits and vegetables as the research object, considering that the supply chain members are risk-neutral and risk-averse, and synthetically applies the theory and methods of Stackelberg game theory and supply chain contract. This paper studies the optimal pricing decision of supply chain members and how to design contracts to realize the coordination and optimization of two-channel supply chain and ensure the win-win situation of channel members so as to enhance the overall competitive strength of the two-channel supply chain of fruits and vegetables. Firstly, when the supply chain members are risk-neutral, the optimal pricing strategy of the supply chain decision-maker is obtained by constructing the basic model of the two-channel supply chain under vertical integration decision and decentralized decision. By comparing the model, we find out the system misalignment caused by conflict, and then join the revenue-sharing contract to coordinate and optimize, and use the mathematical model to demonstrate the conditions of coordination of the contract, and prove that there is a win-win situation. That is to say, the contract can realize the coordination optimization of fruit and vegetable double channel supply chain. Then, when suppliers and retailers are both risk-averse, we use mean-variance model and Stackelberg game model to study the coordination optimization of fruit and vegetable dual-channel supply chain by means of revenue-sharing contract model. By solving the model, it is found that the system profit is better and the members win. Finally, the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases are numerically simulated and analyzed. The results of numerical analysis prove that channel competition can lead to the imbalance of the two-channel supply chain. After optimization by joining the revenue-sharing contract, it is found that in the case of risk-neutral or risk-averse, when the revenue-sharing factor is within a certain range, The profit of the members of the double-channel supply chain can reach Pareto improvement, that is, the double-channel supply chain can achieve perfect win-win coordination optimization, which further proves that the revenue-sharing contract can effectively coordinate and optimize the two-channel supply chain of fruits and vegetables.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F323.7

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