本文選題：OO供應(yīng)鏈 + 線下到線上��； 參考：《管理學(xué)報(bào)》2017年06期

【摘要】：針對(duì)由一個(gè)線上零售商和一個(gè)線下體驗(yàn)店構(gòu)成的"線下體驗(yàn)+線上購(gòu)買"O2O供應(yīng)鏈,考慮線下體驗(yàn)店體驗(yàn)服務(wù)成本信息不對(duì)稱,建立信息對(duì)稱與不對(duì)稱情形下的委托代理模型,研究線上零售商傭金契約設(shè)計(jì)問題;進(jìn)而分析傭金契約的性質(zhì),考察不對(duì)稱信息對(duì)零售商、體驗(yàn)店及O2O供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效的影響。研究結(jié)果表明:基于不同成本類型的體驗(yàn)店,線上零售商設(shè)計(jì)傭金契約的激勵(lì)目的不一樣;不對(duì)稱信息的存在會(huì)使傭金契約參數(shù)發(fā)生變化,但不對(duì)稱信息不一定會(huì)降低O2O供應(yīng)鏈績(jī)效或產(chǎn)生信息租金。
[Abstract]:In view of the "offline experience online purchase" O2O supply chain, which is composed of an online retailer and an offline experience store, considering the information asymmetry of the offline experience store's experience service cost, a principal-agent model under the condition of information symmetry and asymmetry is established. This paper studies the design of online retailers' commission contracts, analyzes the nature of commission contracts, and examines the effects of asymmetric information on the performance of retailers, experience stores and O2O supply chains. The results show that: based on different cost types of experience stores, the incentive purpose of online retailers to design commission contracts is different, and the existence of asymmetric information will change the parameters of commission contracts. But asymmetric information does not necessarily reduce the performance of O 2 O supply chain or generate information rent.
【作者單位】： 重慶大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理學(xué)院;重慶大學(xué)工商管理與經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展研究中心;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金資助重大項(xiàng)目(15ZDB169) 國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71572020)
【分類號(hào)】：F724.2;F724.6

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