本文選題：雙渠道 + 供應(yīng)鏈��； 參考：《合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著電子商務(wù)和物流網(wǎng)絡(luò)的不斷發(fā)展，越來(lái)越多的品牌制造商在向傳統(tǒng)零售渠道出售產(chǎn)品的同時(shí)，引入直銷(xiāo)渠道，通過(guò)雙渠道銷(xiāo)售產(chǎn)品。直銷(xiāo)渠道的引入能為消費(fèi)者提供更多、更及時(shí)的產(chǎn)品信息以及更廣泛的產(chǎn)品選擇，并能降低消費(fèi)者的搜尋成本。與此同時(shí)，在制造商處于主導(dǎo)地位的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中，零售商處于被動(dòng)地位，為了生存和追求更大的利潤(rùn)空間，零售商除了制定最優(yōu)傳統(tǒng)零售價(jià)格外，還必須尋找其他突破口，如提供增值服務(wù)、降低物流和庫(kù)存費(fèi)用等分銷(xiāo)成本，以此提高自身的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)，進(jìn)而增強(qiáng)自身的盈利能力。 本文一方面分析存在零售商創(chuàng)新投入的雙渠道競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)中，零售商的創(chuàng)新投入與消費(fèi)者對(duì)直銷(xiāo)渠道的接受程度對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈參與方的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)、利潤(rùn)以及供應(yīng)鏈整體績(jī)效產(chǎn)生的影響。研究表明：制造商將直銷(xiāo)渠道的引入作為激勵(lì)零售商提高創(chuàng)新投入水平的一個(gè)工具，并從中獲益。此時(shí)，零售商能獲得較低的批發(fā)價(jià)格，且創(chuàng)新投入的增加能提高產(chǎn)品的銷(xiāo)量，進(jìn)而提高自身的利潤(rùn)。此外，在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)中，零售商創(chuàng)新投入的增加能有效緩和渠道競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和沖突，并提高供應(yīng)鏈整體績(jī)效水平。 另一方面，考慮存在零售商增值服務(wù)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中，零售商增值服務(wù)水平和消費(fèi)者對(duì)直銷(xiāo)渠道的接受程度對(duì)制造商和零售商在集中決策和分散決策下的定價(jià)和服務(wù)策略產(chǎn)生的影響。結(jié)果表明：制造商通過(guò)引入直銷(xiāo)渠道可以有效地控制零售商的定價(jià)決策和利潤(rùn)；零售商增值服務(wù)水平與消費(fèi)者對(duì)直銷(xiāo)渠道的接受程度對(duì)制造商和零售商的定價(jià)策略和利潤(rùn)均產(chǎn)生較大影響。當(dāng)服務(wù)水平小于一定界限時(shí)，，分散決策下的最優(yōu)批發(fā)價(jià)格和最優(yōu)直銷(xiāo)價(jià)格分別等于集中決策下的最優(yōu)零售價(jià)格和最優(yōu)直銷(xiāo)價(jià)格；當(dāng)增值服務(wù)水平超過(guò)一定的界限時(shí)，制造商將把直銷(xiāo)價(jià)格設(shè)定為與批發(fā)價(jià)格相同的水平。
[Abstract]:With the development of electronic commerce and logistics network, more and more brand manufacturers sell their products to traditional retail channels, at the same time, direct marketing channels are introduced, and products are sold through two channels. The introduction of direct marketing channels can provide consumers with more and more timely product information and a wider range of product choices, and can reduce consumer search costs. At the same time, in the two-channel supply chain in which manufacturers are dominant, retailers are in a passive position. In order to survive and pursue a greater profit space, retailers must find other breakthroughs in addition to making the best traditional retail prices. Such as providing value-added services, reducing distribution costs, such as logistics and inventory costs, in order to improve their own competitive advantage, and then enhance their profitability. On the one hand, this paper analyzes how the retailer's innovation input and consumers' acceptance of direct marketing channel can price the products of the supply chain participants in the double-channel competition market with retailers' innovation input. The impact of profit and the overall performance of the supply chain. The research shows that manufacturers use direct marketing channels as a tool to encourage retailers to increase their investment in innovation. At this point, retailers can get lower wholesale prices, and the increase in innovation investment can increase the sales of products, thereby increasing their own profits. In addition, in competitive market, the increase of retailer innovation investment can effectively alleviate the channel competition and conflict, and improve the overall performance level of supply chain. On the other hand, considering the existence of retailer value-added services in the two-channel supply chain, The influence of retailers' value-added service level and consumers' acceptance of direct selling channels on the pricing and service strategies of manufacturers and retailers under centralized and decentralized decisions. The results show that the manufacturer can effectively control the retailer's pricing decision and profit by introducing direct selling channel. Retailers' value-added service level and consumers' acceptance of direct selling channels have a great impact on the pricing strategies and profits of manufacturers and retailers. When the service level is less than a certain limit, the optimal wholesale price and the optimal direct selling price under the decentralized decision are equal to the optimal retail price and the optimal direct selling price under the centralized decision, respectively. Manufacturers will set direct selling prices at the same level as wholesale prices.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：合肥工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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