發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-01 18:48

  本文選題：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 + 再制造　； 參考：《西南交通大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中產(chǎn)品的回收歷來(lái)是研究者們關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。本文通過(guò)對(duì)現(xiàn)有研究進(jìn)行歸納總結(jié),在考察回收過(guò)程動(dòng)態(tài)特征的基礎(chǔ)上,構(gòu)建關(guān)于產(chǎn)品回收的動(dòng)態(tài)模型,利用微分對(duì)策理論探討了不同回收模式下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)控制策略及回收渠道選擇問(wèn)題。論文從構(gòu)建基本研究模型出發(fā),并從三個(gè)不同側(cè)面展開(kāi)了較為深入的研究。首先,通過(guò)考察回收過(guò)程中的動(dòng)態(tài)特征,構(gòu)建本文的基本模型,即廢舊產(chǎn)品動(dòng)態(tài)回收模型,在此基礎(chǔ)上利用微分對(duì)策理論分別探討制造商回收和零售商回收下的最優(yōu)控制策略,對(duì)最優(yōu)控制策略的性質(zhì)進(jìn)行分析,然后分析動(dòng)態(tài)回收模型下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的回收渠道選擇問(wèn)題。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在動(dòng)態(tài)回收模型下,制造商回收下系統(tǒng)的回收效率更高,同時(shí)對(duì)零售商更為有利。當(dāng)綜合考慮各種因素時(shí),制造商回收也對(duì)制造商更為有利。然后,將基本的動(dòng)態(tài)回收模型擴(kuò)展到零售商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的環(huán)境下,分別分析制造商回收和零售商回收下的最優(yōu)控制策略,并對(duì)系統(tǒng)參數(shù)對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)品回收影響展開(kāi)分析。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)供應(yīng)鏈中存在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性零售商時(shí),制造商的最優(yōu)控制策略、穩(wěn)態(tài)時(shí)的瞬時(shí)利潤(rùn)及系統(tǒng)的產(chǎn)品回收率與零售商之間的市場(chǎng)份額分配是無(wú)關(guān)的,只與兩個(gè)零售商總的市場(chǎng)份額有關(guān)。當(dāng)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中零售商負(fù)責(zé)回收時(shí),競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性零售商之間關(guān)于產(chǎn)品回收具有“先動(dòng)”優(yōu)勢(shì)。當(dāng)零售商之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)程度加強(qiáng)時(shí),對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈的產(chǎn)品回收更為有利,同時(shí)這也會(huì)帶來(lái)零售商和制造商利潤(rùn)水平的提升。再次,在零售商負(fù)責(zé)產(chǎn)品回收的背景下討論不同渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)下的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈微分對(duì)策模型,分別分析制造商和零售商N(yùn)ash博弈、制造商領(lǐng)導(dǎo)Stackelberg博弈及零售商領(lǐng)導(dǎo)Stackelberg博弈下的最優(yōu)控制策略,并在此基礎(chǔ)上展開(kāi)比較分析,探討渠道權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)品回收的影響。當(dāng)零售商占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位時(shí),其能夠獲取大部分因再制造產(chǎn)生的利益,因而此時(shí)零售商擁有更多的積極性進(jìn)行產(chǎn)品的回收。最后,將基本的動(dòng)態(tài)回收模型擴(kuò)展到隨機(jī)動(dòng)態(tài)回收模型。通過(guò)綜合考慮廢舊產(chǎn)品回收過(guò)程中存在的動(dòng)態(tài)和隨機(jī)特征,構(gòu)建產(chǎn)品回收的隨機(jī)動(dòng)態(tài)模型,分別分析集中式和分散式供應(yīng)鏈下的最優(yōu)回收控制策略,對(duì)兩種模式下閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的回收率隨機(jī)演化路徑展開(kāi)分析,并設(shè)計(jì)兩部定價(jià)契約對(duì)閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行協(xié)調(diào)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)隨機(jī)干擾強(qiáng)度上升時(shí),制造商會(huì)提高產(chǎn)品回收投入水平,但制造商和零售商的價(jià)格不會(huì)受到隨機(jī)干擾的影響。發(fā)生在回收過(guò)程中的隨機(jī)因素對(duì)系統(tǒng)產(chǎn)品回收率的影響比較明顯,但其對(duì)系統(tǒng)銷(xiāo)售速率、市場(chǎng)價(jià)格等的影響與供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)造成的影響程度相比有限。通過(guò)數(shù)值仿真發(fā)現(xiàn)分散式下的供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)相比集中式下的水平有所損失。在協(xié)調(diào)契約下,供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)能達(dá)到集中式下的利潤(rùn)水平。
[Abstract]:The recovery of products in closed-loop supply chain has always been the focus of attention of researchers. Based on the analysis of the dynamic characteristics of the recycling process, this paper constructs a dynamic model of product recovery. The optimal control strategy of closed-loop supply chain and the selection of recovery channel under different recovery modes are discussed by using differential game theory. Starting from the basic research model, the thesis carries out more in-depth research from three different aspects. First of all, by investigating the dynamic characteristics in the process of recycling, the basic model of this paper, that is, the dynamic recovery model of waste products, is constructed. On the basis of this, the optimal control strategy under the recovery of manufacturers and retailers is discussed by using the differential game theory, respectively. The properties of the optimal control strategy are analyzed, and then the selection of the recovery channel in the closed-loop supply chain system under the dynamic recovery model is analyzed. It is found that under the dynamic recovery model, the recovery efficiency of the system is higher than that of the manufacturer, and it is more beneficial to the retailer. When a combination of factors is taken into account, manufacturer recycling is also more beneficial to the manufacturer. Then, the basic dynamic recovery model is extended to the competitive environment of retailers to analyze the optimal control strategy under manufacturer and retailer recovery, and to analyze the effect of system parameters on product recovery in closed-loop supply chain. It is found that when competitive retailers exist in the supply chain, the optimal control strategy of the manufacturer, the instantaneous profit in the steady state and the product recovery rate of the system are independent of the market share distribution among the retailers. It is only related to the total market share of the two retailers. When retailers are responsible for recycling in closed-loop supply chains, competitive retailers have a "first move" advantage in product recovery. When the competition between retailers is strengthened, it is more favorable to the product recovery of the closed-loop supply chain, which will also bring about the increase of the profit level of retailers and manufacturers. Thirdly, under the background that retailers are responsible for product recovery, the closed-loop supply chain differential game model under different channel power structure is discussed, and the Nash game between manufacturer and retailer is analyzed, respectively. The optimal control strategy under the Stackelberg game of manufacturer leadership and the Stackelberg game of retailer leader is discussed. Based on this, the influence of channel power structure on product recovery in closed-loop supply chain is discussed. When retailers occupy a dominant position, they can obtain most of the benefits arising from remanufacturing, so retailers have more enthusiasm to recycle products at this time. Finally, the basic dynamic recovery model is extended to random dynamic recovery model. By synthetically considering the dynamic and random characteristics of the recycling process, the stochastic dynamic model of product recovery is constructed, and the optimal recovery control strategies under centralized and decentralized supply chains are analyzed, respectively. This paper analyzes the stochastic evolution path of the closed-loop supply chain system under two modes, and designs two pricing contracts to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain. The study found that when the intensity of random interference increases, manufacturers will increase the level of product recovery input, but the prices of manufacturers and retailers will not be affected by random interference. The effect of random factors in the recovery process on the recovery rate of the system product is obvious, but its influence on the system sales rate and market price is limited compared with the influence of the supply chain structure. By numerical simulation, it is found that the profit of the decentralized supply chain is lower than that of the centralized supply chain. Under the coordination contract, the supply chain system can achieve the centralized profit level.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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