本文選題：雙渠道 + 資金約束�。� 參考：《運(yùn)籌與管理》2017年04期

【摘要】：在對稱信息框架下,針對一個風(fēng)險中性的雙渠道制造商和一個存在資金約束的風(fēng)險厭惡零售商組成的供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng),基于Stackelberg博弈理論構(gòu)建了兩種不同的融資模式下(延期支付模式與金融機(jī)構(gòu)借貸模式)雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)運(yùn)作決策模型。通過模型分析,分別給出了兩種不同融資模式下零售商和制造商的最優(yōu)運(yùn)作策略。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)零售商資金充足或存在資金約束但通過兩種不同融資模式融資時,風(fēng)險中性的雙渠道制造商都更愿意和具有風(fēng)險厭惡特性的零售商合作。當(dāng)零售商資金不足時,制造商延期支付合同的設(shè)計可以有效解決零售商資金不足問題,實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈無資金約束時的收益。進(jìn)一步研究指出,盡管金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供借貸,但在一定條件下,零售商始終不會選擇金融機(jī)構(gòu)借貸模式。數(shù)值例子發(fā)現(xiàn)當(dāng)制造商對延期支付時間長度敏感性很低時,零售商會偏愛金融機(jī)構(gòu)借貸融資模式。否則,零售商始終偏愛延期支付模式。
[Abstract]:Under the framework of symmetric information, the supply chain system is composed of a risk-neutral dual-channel manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer with financial constraints. Based on Stackelberg game theory, the optimal operation decision model of two-channel supply chain under two different financing modes (deferred payment model and financial institution lending model) is constructed. Through model analysis, the optimal operation strategies of retailers and manufacturers under two different financing modes are given respectively. It is found that when retailers have sufficient funds or have financial constraints but raise funds through two different financing modes, risk-neutral dual-channel manufacturers are more willing to cooperate with retailers with risk-averse characteristics. When the retailer is short of funds, the design of the manufacturer's deferred payment contract can effectively solve the problem of the retailer's lack of funds and realize the profit when the supply chain has no financial constraints. Further research shows that, although financial institutions provide loans, under certain conditions, retailers will never choose the lending mode of financial institutions. Numerical examples show that when manufacturers are less sensitive to the length of deferred payments, retailers prefer financial institutions to borrow and finance. Otherwise, retailers have always preferred deferred payment.
【作者單位】： 河南師范大學(xué)商學(xué)院;華南理工大學(xué)工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目(71131003,71402171) 浙江省自然科學(xué)基金項目(LY14G020004) 河南省高等學(xué)校哲學(xué)社會科學(xué)應(yīng)用研究重大項目(2017-YYZD-10) 河南省教育廳人文社會科學(xué)項目(2017-ZZJH-262) 廣州市科技計劃項目(201510010149) 博士科研啟動課題項目(5101089171136)
【分類號】：F274;F713.32;F715.5

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