本文選題：批發(fā)價格契約 + 利他偏好　； 參考：《重慶理工大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：全球氣候變暖引發(fā)了以“低能耗、低污染、低排放”為發(fā)展理念的低碳經(jīng)濟,這對僅以追求經(jīng)濟效益為主要任務(wù)的傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈提出了挑戰(zhàn)。近幾年,基于碳減排的供應(yīng)鏈管理研究逐步成為研究熱點,這對提高供應(yīng)鏈的競爭力以及實現(xiàn)社會經(jīng)濟效益和環(huán)境效益的“雙贏”都有積極作用。在此背景下,在對低碳供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)、消費者低碳偏好、利他偏好以及利他偏好對供應(yīng)鏈相關(guān)決策及協(xié)調(diào)性影響等問題進行相關(guān)研究后,建立了相應(yīng)的博弈模型并得出得相關(guān)結(jié)論,延拓了低碳供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)的理論,使模型更準確地描述現(xiàn)實,亦有利于批發(fā)價格契約協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的應(yīng)用,并更科學地指導低碳供應(yīng)鏈管理實踐。論文的主要工作和重要結(jié)論如下:(1)利他偏好下的低碳供應(yīng)鏈批發(fā)價格契約決策模型。探討了利他偏好對低碳供應(yīng)鏈相關(guān)決策及其協(xié)調(diào)性的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),零售商更傾向于與低碳型制造商合作,零售商的利他偏好能在一定程度上鼓勵制造商投資減排,因而制造商更傾向于與利他偏好型零售商合作。在制造商面臨碳減排壓力下,零售商更應(yīng)承擔起整個供應(yīng)鏈的效用責任,除了考慮自身效用外,還需考慮制造商的效用,其利他性應(yīng)高于制造商,進而推動供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)效用的提升。但在批發(fā)價格契約下,無論零售商和制造商是否具有利他偏好行為,均不能改變傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)性,即不能實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。(2)消費者低碳偏好下考慮利他偏好的低碳供應(yīng)鏈批發(fā)價格契約協(xié)調(diào)研究。探討了在消費者低碳偏好下,決策主體的利他偏好對低碳供應(yīng)鏈決策及其協(xié)調(diào)性的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),消費者低碳偏好能促進制造商和零售商的利他合作,并能鼓勵制造商投資減排以實現(xiàn)真正的“低碳”;在消費者低碳偏好下,零售商的利他偏好能在一定程度上鼓勵制造商投資減排,提升企業(yè)的社會形象,從而提高產(chǎn)品銷售量,以實現(xiàn)雙方收益的增加。因此,在低碳背景下,更應(yīng)該激勵零售商的利他偏好行為,從而更大程度地提高碳減排率。(3)利他偏好信息非對稱下的低碳供應(yīng)鏈批發(fā)價格契約協(xié)調(diào)研究。在利他偏好信息非對稱下,按零售商利他偏好信息完備程度與理性程度將零售商和制造商的博弈分為五階段,研究了零售商利他偏好行為對低碳供應(yīng)鏈決策的影響,研究發(fā)現(xiàn),在博弈第四階段當零售商利他偏好信息與制造商識別的利他信息相等時即當信息完備時,碳減排率達到最大值,制造商利潤和供應(yīng)鏈利潤也達到最大值且大于傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈,而這時零售商的利潤卻降到最低;當零售商偽裝自身利他偏好信息時,制造商和供應(yīng)鏈的利潤降到最低且低于傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈,零售商的利潤提高,但仍小于博弈第一階段即傳統(tǒng)自利型供應(yīng)鏈。
[Abstract]:Global warming has led to a low-carbon economy with the concept of "low energy consumption, low pollution and low emission", which challenges the traditional supply chain, whose main task is to pursue economic benefits. In recent years, the research on supply chain management based on carbon emission reduction has gradually become a research hotspot, which has a positive effect on improving the competitiveness of supply chain and realizing the "win-win" of social and economic benefits and environmental benefits. In this context, after the research on low carbon supply chain coordination, consumer low carbon preference, altruistic preference and altruistic preference on supply chain related decisions and coordination issues, This paper establishes the corresponding game model and draws the relevant conclusions, extends the theory of low-carbon supply chain contract coordination, makes the model describe the reality more accurately, and is also advantageous to the wholesale price contract coordination supply chain application. And more scientific guidance of low-carbon supply chain management practice. The main work and important conclusions are as follows: 1) A low carbon supply chain Wholesale Price contract decision Model with altruistic preference. This paper discusses the influence of altruistic preference on the decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain. It is found that retailers are more inclined to cooperate with low-carbon manufacturers, and that the altruistic preference of retailers can encourage manufacturers to invest in emission reduction to a certain extent. As a result, manufacturers tend to work with altruistic retailers. When manufacturers are under pressure to reduce carbon emissions, retailers should assume the utility responsibility of the whole supply chain. Besides considering their own utility, they should also consider the utility of the manufacturer, whose altruism should be higher than that of the manufacturer. Furthermore, the utility of supply chain system is promoted. However, under the wholesale price contract, whether retailers and manufacturers have altruistic behavior or not, it can not change the coordination of traditional supply chain. That is, the coordination of wholesale price contracts in low carbon supply chain considering altruism under low carbon preference can not be realized. This paper discusses the influence of altruistic preference of decision makers on low-carbon supply chain decision making and its coordination under low carbon consumers' preference. It is found that consumers' low carbon preference can promote altruistic cooperation between manufacturers and retailers. And it can encourage manufacturers to invest in emission reduction to achieve a true "low carbon"; under the low carbon preference of consumers, retailers' altruistic preference can to some extent encourage manufacturers to invest in emission reduction, enhance the social image of enterprises, and thus increase product sales. In order to achieve both sides of the increase in revenue. Therefore, in the context of low carbon, it is necessary to encourage retailers' altruistic behavior, so as to improve the carbon abatement rate to a greater extent) the coordination study of wholesale price contract of low carbon supply chain under asymmetric preference information of altruism. Under asymmetric altruistic preference information, the game between retailer and manufacturer is divided into five stages according to the completeness and rationality of retailer's altruistic information. The influence of retailer's altruistic behavior on low-carbon supply chain decision is studied. In the fourth stage of the game, when the retailer's altruistic preference information is equal to the altruistic information identified by the manufacturer, that is, when the information is complete, the carbon abatement rate reaches the maximum, and the manufacturer's profit and the supply chain profit also reach the maximum and are larger than the traditional supply chain. When retailers disguise their altruistic preferences, the profits of manufacturers and supply chains are minimized and lower than those of traditional supply chains. However, it is still smaller than the first stage of the game, that is, the traditional self-profit supply chain.
【學位授予單位】：重慶理工大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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