發(fā)布時間：2018-05-07 21:16

  本文選題：食品供應(yīng)鏈 + 多代理　； 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著社會的進步,食品安全問題發(fā)生得越來越頻繁,對人們的身體健康、社會的和諧與穩(wěn)定造成嚴(yán)重的影響,成為全球普遍關(guān)注的問題。食品安全是一項龐大而復(fù)雜的系統(tǒng)工程,涉及領(lǐng)域非常廣泛和深入。改善食品安全現(xiàn)狀不僅僅需要建立健全食品安全監(jiān)管體系、充分利用當(dāng)前的信息技術(shù)、提高消費者的意識,更需要食品企業(yè)的共同的努力和積極的推進。本文運用多代理建模的方法,以“企業(yè)-供應(yīng)鏈-政府”這一人工生態(tài)系統(tǒng)為對象,同時考慮消費者,設(shè)計了企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)決策模型和定價模型、政府的監(jiān)管決策模型和消費者的消費決策模型。研究了價格策略與企業(yè)利潤的關(guān)系、監(jiān)管策略與監(jiān)管效果和政府總成本的關(guān)系、摻假率與企業(yè)利潤的關(guān)系、摻假率與政府總成本的關(guān)系和消費者消費行為及其效用的影響因素等問題,并針對這五類問題設(shè)計了基于多代理的計算實驗,使用NetLogo軟件對各組成部分進行仿真模擬。在計算實驗的基礎(chǔ)上,本文的結(jié)論如下：(1)影響政府監(jiān)管力度的因素主要包括抽檢頻率、罰款額及政府的監(jiān)管成本。政府應(yīng)該科學(xué)的制定監(jiān)管策略,設(shè)定合理的抽檢頻率及罰款額。政府的單位監(jiān)管成本是制約著政府監(jiān)管力度的一個重要的因素。(2)供應(yīng)鏈上各企業(yè)基于自身上一期的收益情況、市場需求狀況以及政府的監(jiān)管力度,通過調(diào)整自身的價格策略,確定摻假與否來實現(xiàn)本期利潤的最大化。供應(yīng)鏈之間存在著競爭,進而導(dǎo)致檸檬市場的出現(xiàn)。(3)消費者根據(jù)效用最大化原理確定自己的真實需求,同時根據(jù)上一期的消費情況及政府對于消費者的權(quán)益的保護的力度調(diào)整自己的需求,做出購買決策。消費者本期的實際需求會進一步影響供應(yīng)鏈上各企業(yè)的利潤,而消費者的效用受到維權(quán)便利性的影響。最后,基于以上結(jié)論,本文提出了一套系統(tǒng)的食品安全監(jiān)管策略包括：實施動態(tài)的監(jiān)管策略、建立一個共享的信息平臺、對食品供應(yīng)鏈中的價格適當(dāng)?shù)母深A(yù)、提高消費者的安全意識、優(yōu)化消費者投訴維權(quán)機制以及完善監(jiān)管體系提高監(jiān)管效率。
[Abstract]:With the progress of the society, food safety issues occur more and more frequently, which have a serious impact on people's health, social harmony and stability, and become a global concern. Food safety is a huge and complex system engineering, involving a wide range of fields and depth. To improve the present situation of food safety, we should not only establish and perfect the food safety supervision system, make full use of the current information technology and raise the consumers' consciousness, but also need the joint efforts and positive promotion of food enterprises. In this paper, using the method of multi-agent modeling, taking the artificial ecosystem of "enterprise, supply chain and government" as the object, and considering the consumers, the production decision model and the pricing model of the enterprise are designed. The government's regulatory decision model and consumer's consumption decision model. The relationship between price strategy and enterprise profit, the relationship between regulatory strategy and regulatory effect and total government cost, and the relationship between adulteration rate and enterprise profit are studied. The relationship between adulteration rate and the total cost of government and the influence factors of consumer consumption behavior and its utility are discussed. In view of these five kinds of problems, the multi-agent computing experiment is designed, and the simulation of each component is carried out by using NetLogo software. On the basis of the calculation experiment, the conclusion of this paper is as follows: (1) the factors that affect the government supervision include the sampling frequency, the amount of fine and the supervision cost of the government. The Government should scientifically formulate regulatory strategies and set reasonable sampling frequency and fines. The unit supervision cost of the government is an important factor restricting the government supervision. 2) the enterprises in the supply chain adjust their own price strategy by adjusting their own price strategy, based on the income situation of their last period, the market demand condition and the government supervision. Determine whether adulterated or not to maximize the current profit. There is competition between supply chains, which leads to the emergence of lemon market.) consumers determine their real needs according to the principle of utility maximization. At the same time, according to the consumption of the previous period and the government's protection of consumers' rights and interests, adjust their own needs, and make purchase decisions. The actual demand of consumers in the current period will further affect the profits of enterprises in the supply chain, while the utility of consumers is affected by the convenience of activism. Finally, based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward a set of systematic food safety supervision strategies, including: to implement dynamic regulatory strategies, to establish a shared information platform, to appropriate price intervention in the food supply chain. Improve consumers' safety awareness, optimize consumer complaint rights protection mechanism and improve the regulatory system to improve the efficiency of supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F203;F426.82

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