本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈契約 + 非對稱信息　； 參考：《北京郵電大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：伴隨著科學(xué)技術(shù)的快速發(fā)展,在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)日趨一體化的背景下,企業(yè)在市場經(jīng)濟(jì)中要想取得成功,不僅要關(guān)注自身結(jié)構(gòu)和效益,更要關(guān)注競爭對手的動向,時刻做好競爭應(yīng)對之策是很重要的。現(xiàn)實生活中,各個企業(yè)為了能夠在競爭中獲得有利位置,隱瞞一些自己的信息,以此獲得更多收益,但這樣不僅不能有效的增加自身利潤,反而會損害供應(yīng)鏈整體效益,因此信息共享是供應(yīng)鏈研究的重要課題,而解決信息非對稱的一個有效方法就是供應(yīng)鏈契約,因此我們在非對稱信息及契約的條件下研究供應(yīng)鏈競爭是非常有意義的。本文在傳統(tǒng)供應(yīng)鏈一對一的結(jié)構(gòu)上進(jìn)行拓展,研究兩個供應(yīng)商和一個制造商的供應(yīng)鏈,針對制造商加工成本信息與制造商需求信息的對稱與否問題,采用不同的契約即利潤共享契約和兩部收費(fèi)法契約,研究供應(yīng)鏈競爭問題,在研究過程中,綜合博弈論、供應(yīng)鏈契約及運(yùn)籌學(xué)等相關(guān)知識,建立模型并進(jìn)行求解。首先,本文通過對國內(nèi)外已有研究成果的學(xué)習(xí),總結(jié)供應(yīng)鏈競爭、非對稱信息的現(xiàn)有研究狀況,供應(yīng)鏈契約在供應(yīng)鏈管理中的應(yīng)用現(xiàn)狀與其原理。其次,本文在利潤共享契約下,分析了第二個供應(yīng)商是否加入競爭的情況,在有兩個供應(yīng)商競爭與制造商交易時,又分別討論了制造商與兩個供應(yīng)商均信息對稱、制造商與其中一個供應(yīng)商信息對稱與另一個信息非對稱、制造商與兩個供應(yīng)商均信息非對稱四種情況下的最優(yōu)決策問題;再次,在兩部收費(fèi)法契約下討論了制造商與兩個供應(yīng)商信息對稱與否情況下的最優(yōu)決策。最后,通過選取合適的數(shù)值,使用MATLAB建模軟件進(jìn)行數(shù)值分析,驗證了結(jié)論的正確性。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology, in the context of the increasingly integrated global economy, if enterprises want to achieve success in the market economy, they should not only pay attention to their own structure and efficiency, but also pay attention to the trends of their competitors. It is important to make a competitive response at all times. In real life, in order to get a favorable position in the competition and conceal some information, each enterprise can gain more income, but not only can not effectively increase its own profits, but will damage the overall efficiency of the supply chain. Therefore, information sharing is an important subject in supply chain research, and an effective method to solve information asymmetry is supply chain contract. Therefore, it is very meaningful for us to study supply chain competition under the condition of asymmetric information and contract. This paper extends the one-to-one structure of traditional supply chain, and studies the supply chain of two suppliers and one manufacturer, aiming at the problem of whether the manufacturer's processing cost information and the manufacturer's demand information are symmetrical or not. Different contracts, namely profit sharing contracts and two charging contracts, are adopted to study the competition of supply chain. In the process of research, the relevant knowledge such as game theory, supply chain contract and operational research are synthesized, and the model is established and solved. First of all, this paper summarizes the current research status of supply chain competition, asymmetric information, the application of supply chain contract in supply chain management and its principle through the study of existing research results at home and abroad. Secondly, under the profit-sharing contract, this paper analyzes whether the second supplier joins the competition. When there are two suppliers competing with the manufacturer, we discuss the symmetry of information between the manufacturer and the two suppliers. The optimal decision problem of the manufacturer and one of the suppliers is asymmetric with the other information asymmetric, the manufacturer and two suppliers are asymmetric information in four cases. In this paper, we discuss the optimal decision in the case of symmetric information between manufacturer and two suppliers under the contract of two charging methods. Finally, the correctness of the conclusion is verified by selecting appropriate numerical value and using MATLAB modeling software to carry out numerical analysis.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京郵電大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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