本文關(guān)鍵詞：供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗(yàn)決策的非合作博弈分析，，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。

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數(shù)學(xué)

宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)管理與可持續(xù)發(fā)展

企業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)

計(jì)算機(jī)軟件及計(jì)算機(jī)應(yīng)用

貿(mào)易經(jīng)濟(jì)

管理學(xué)

經(jīng)濟(jì)理論及經(jīng)濟(jì)思想史

工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)

機(jī)械工業(yè)

non-cooperation game    

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    Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied.

    首先,通過兩階段的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價(jià)的非合作博弈過程,雙向動(dòng)態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價(jià)格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價(jià)格和利潤分配的影響;

短句來源

    Analyzing the Non-cooperation Game Between the Enterprise and Environmental Regulator Under Emission Trading Institution

    排污權(quán)交易制度下廠商與環(huán)保部門之間的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE

    客戶競爭驅(qū)動(dòng)的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈

短句來源

    Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain

    供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗(yàn)決策的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics.

    非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究一項(xiàng)重要工具，在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。

短句來源

更多       

    Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied.

    首先,通過兩階段的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價(jià)的非合作博弈過程,雙向動(dòng)態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價(jià)格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價(jià)格和利潤分配的影響;

短句來源

    Analyzing the Non-cooperation Game Between the Enterprise and Environmental Regulator Under Emission Trading Institution

    排污權(quán)交易制度下廠商與環(huán)保部門之間的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE

    客戶競爭驅(qū)動(dòng)的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈

短句來源

    Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain

    供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗(yàn)決策的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics.

    非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究一項(xiàng)重要工具，在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。

短句來源

更多       

    Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied.

    首先,通過兩階段的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價(jià)的非合作博弈過程,雙向動(dòng)態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價(jià)格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價(jià)格和利潤分配的影響;

短句來源

    Analyzing the Non-cooperation Game Between the Enterprise and Environmental Regulator Under Emission Trading Institution

    排污權(quán)交易制度下廠商與環(huán)保部門之間的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE

    客戶競爭驅(qū)動(dòng)的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈

短句來源

    Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain

    供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗(yàn)決策的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics.

    非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究一項(xiàng)重要工具，在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。

短句來源

更多       

    Firstly, pricing and non-cooperation game processes of intermediate products of industrial value chain are studied.

    首先,通過兩階段的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈過程討論產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈的中間產(chǎn)品的定價(jià)過程,討論了中間產(chǎn)品定價(jià)的非合作博弈過程,雙向動(dòng)態(tài)博弈下中間產(chǎn)品價(jià)格范圍的確定,以及博弈的先后順序?qū)χ虚g產(chǎn)品價(jià)格和利潤分配的影響;

短句來源

    Analyzing the Non-cooperation Game Between the Enterprise and Environmental Regulator Under Emission Trading Institution

    排污權(quán)交易制度下廠商與環(huán)保部門之間的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    NON-COOPERATION GAME FOR CUSTOMER'S COMPETITION DRIVEN JOB SCHEDULE

    客戶競爭驅(qū)動(dòng)的任務(wù)調(diào)度非合作博弈

短句來源

    Non-Cooperation Game Analysis of Sampling Inspection in Quality Management of Supply Chain

    供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗(yàn)決策的非合作博弈分析

短句來源

    Non-cooperation game theory has been an important tool in economy research and variously applied in modern economics.

    非合作博弈論已經(jīng)成為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究一項(xiàng)重要工具，在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中有著諸多應(yīng)用。

短句來源

更多       

查詢“non-cooperation game”譯詞為用戶自定義的雙語例句
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The traditional decision-making problem of enterprises is expanded to non-cooperation game with profit conflict condition, then to group negotiation problem. It is how to cooperate with each other while their non-cooperation profit not being cut down. The Pareto goal function is proposed. For the sake of coalition's stability, this paper give the concept of believable threat and the measuring method. Based on the believable threat, the alliance disburses the Pareto value. Finally a three-company...

The traditional decision-making problem of enterprises is expanded to non-cooperation game with profit conflict condition, then to group negotiation problem. It is how to cooperate with each other while their non-cooperation profit not being cut down. The Pareto goal function is proposed. For the sake of coalition's stability, this paper give the concept of believable threat and the measuring method. Based on the believable threat, the alliance disburses the Pareto value. Finally a three-company group negotiation case is given and the efficiency of the proposed model is shown.

將傳統(tǒng)的企業(yè)決策問題看作具有利益沖突情況下的非合作博弈問題,并提出群體協(xié)商談判問題,即沖突條件下,不同利益集團(tuán)之間在維持非合作競爭收益的前提下如何進(jìn)行合作的問題.提出并建立了沖突各方合作的Pareto目標(biāo)函數(shù).為使談判形成的聯(lián)盟穩(wěn)定,提出了"可信威脅"的概念,給出了度量算法.基于可信威脅度,聯(lián)盟對Pareto值進(jìn)行再分配.最后,給出了一個(gè)三方?jīng)_突協(xié)商談判算例,得出若干有益的結(jié)論.

This paper discusses the relationship between absorptive capability and R&D investment,establishes two phases dynamic non-cooperation game of R&D activities based on knowledge spillover and absorptive capability in knowledge alliance,then the conditions for the existence and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium are put forward,and the importance of absorptive capability for R&D activities in knowledge alliance is analyzed.

本文在分析了吸收能力與研發(fā)投入關(guān)系的基礎(chǔ)上 ,構(gòu)建了一個(gè)基于知識(shí)溢出和吸收能力的知識(shí)聯(lián)盟R&D兩階段非合作動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型 ,提出了納什均衡存在的條件和唯一性的條件 ,探討了知識(shí)聯(lián)盟過程中吸收能力對研發(fā)活動(dòng)的重要作用

From the perspective of viewing customer's competition requirements and on the basis of analyzing the goal of each manufacturing task submitted by correspondent customer maximizing its own payoffs (mainly focusing on the finishing time of each manufacturing task), together with the deficiency of traditional strategies, methods and models of task schedule, a non-cooperation game model with complete information for task schedule is presented and established. In this task scheduling model, the players correspond...

From the perspective of viewing customer's competition requirements and on the basis of analyzing the goal of each manufacturing task submitted by correspondent customer maximizing its own payoffs (mainly focusing on the finishing time of each manufacturing task), together with the deficiency of traditional strategies, methods and models of task schedule, a non-cooperation game model with complete information for task schedule is presented and established. In this task scheduling model, the players correspond to the jobs submitted respectively by related customers, the strategies of each job correspond to the selectable geographical distributive machines related to the processes of this job, and the payoff of each job is defined as the reciprocal of its finishing time. As such, obtaining the optimal scheduling results is determined by the Nash equilibrium (NE) point of this game. In order to find the NE point, genetic algorithm is introduced. A numerical case study is given to demonstrate the feasibility of above methods.

從客戶競爭需求的角度出發(fā),在分析其提交制造任務(wù)的各自利潤最大化(重點(diǎn)考慮任務(wù)的完成時(shí)間)調(diào)度目標(biāo)的基礎(chǔ)上,針對傳統(tǒng)的任務(wù)調(diào)度策略、方法和模型的不足,采用博弈論,提出并構(gòu)建了一種具備完全信息的非合作博弈的任務(wù)調(diào)度模型。在該任務(wù)調(diào)度模型中,來源于不同客戶的制造任務(wù)被映射為博弈模型中的局中人,與各制造任務(wù)所包含的工序集對應(yīng)的可選加工設(shè)備被映射為各制造任務(wù)的可行方案集,各制造任務(wù)加工完成時(shí)間的倒數(shù)被映射為其收益函數(shù)。據(jù)此,對上述任務(wù)調(diào)度目標(biāo)的求解就等價(jià)為尋求該任務(wù)調(diào)度模型的Nash均衡點(diǎn),對Nash均衡點(diǎn)的具體求解,采用遺傳算法實(shí)現(xiàn)。最后給出具體的實(shí)例來驗(yàn)證其可行性。

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  本文關(guān)鍵詞：供應(yīng)鏈質(zhì)量管理中抽樣檢驗(yàn)決策的非合作博弈分析，由筆耕文化傳播整理發(fā)布。