本文選題：技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散 + 互惠利他偏好��； 參考：《中北大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散源于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新不斷的積累,是促進(jìn)創(chuàng)新水平發(fā)展與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的源泉。但是,技術(shù)創(chuàng)新本身無法對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)產(chǎn)生直接影響、使社會(huì)生產(chǎn)力得到提高,要在最大程度上發(fā)揮一項(xiàng)新技術(shù)的潛在效益,只有通過技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的擴(kuò)散才能實(shí)現(xiàn)。本文從心理博弈的視角出發(fā),賦予技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散系統(tǒng)成員以非理性特征的社會(huì)偏好(利他、互惠和公平等)。現(xiàn)有技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散主體特性的研究集中于擴(kuò)散主體的純粹利他心理,沒有認(rèn)識(shí)到合作中互惠與利他回報(bào)相關(guān),而且在技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散領(lǐng)域?qū)⒐絻A向納入研究的也甚少。本文將互惠偏好和利他偏好的關(guān)系結(jié)合起來探討對(duì)擴(kuò)散主體的綜合作用,描述主體間的顯現(xiàn)回報(bào)效應(yīng);并且根據(jù)納什討價(jià)還價(jià)思想,將公平偏好對(duì)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散的影響融入本項(xiàng)研究,探究互惠利他偏好及公平偏好下擴(kuò)散主體的行為傾向。本文以技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散的基本理論為起點(diǎn)研究擴(kuò)散價(jià)格與決策問題�；诨セ堇煤凸狡梅謩e構(gòu)建擴(kuò)散模型,探究各主體的最佳擴(kuò)散決策,利用Matlab進(jìn)行數(shù)值仿真。本研究重點(diǎn)探究互惠利他和公平偏好對(duì)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新擴(kuò)散的作用方式,并闡明其中的規(guī)律,據(jù)此總結(jié)出管理啟示來指導(dǎo)擴(kuò)散主體的行為。本文的結(jié)論表明:擴(kuò)散價(jià)格與供給者利他傾向?yàn)樨?fù)相關(guān),與系統(tǒng)互惠傾向?yàn)檎嚓P(guān),可知供給者的利他傾向會(huì)使擴(kuò)散價(jià)下降而使采納方福利增多,進(jìn)一步增加社會(huì)總體效用,互惠偏好一定程度上可以緩解主體間利他傾向差異造成的效用差別,以達(dá)到各主體收益的平衡。擴(kuò)散主體收益隨自身公平傾向的增大而增加,對(duì)方及自身公平傾向的變化都會(huì)改變成員的效用,各主體的效用在系統(tǒng)中的所占比例此消彼長(zhǎng)。
[Abstract]:Technological innovation diffusion originates from the accumulation of technological innovation and is the source of promoting innovation level development and economic growth. However, technological innovation itself can not have a direct impact on the economy and society, so that the social productivity can be improved. To maximize the potential benefits of a new technology, only through the diffusion of technological innovation can it be realized. From the perspective of psychological game, this paper gives the members of the diffusion system of technological innovation with irrational social preferences (altruism, reciprocity and fairness). The existing research on the main characteristics of diffusion of technological innovation focuses on the pure altruistic psychology of the diffuser, and does not realize that reciprocity and altruistic return are related in cooperation, and there are few researches on the tendency of fairness in the field of technological innovation diffusion. In this paper, the relationship between reciprocal preference and altruistic preference is combined to discuss the comprehensive effect on diffusive agents, to describe the apparent return effect among the agents, and to discuss the relationship between reciprocal preferences and altruistic preferences, and according to Nash's bargaining thought, The influence of fair preference on diffusion of technological innovation is integrated into this study to explore the behavior tendency of diffusion subject under reciprocal altruistic preference and fair preference. In this paper, the basic theory of diffusion of technological innovation is taken as the starting point to study the price and decision-making of diffusion. Based on the reciprocal altruistic preference and the fair preference, the diffusion model is constructed, and the optimal diffusion decision of each agent is explored, and the numerical simulation is carried out by using Matlab. This study focuses on the role of reciprocal altruism and fairness preference in the diffusion of technological innovation, and clarifies the rules therein, and then summarizes the implications of management to guide the behavior of diffusing agents. The conclusion of this paper shows that the diffusion price is negatively correlated with the altruistic tendency of the supplier, and is positively correlated with the tendency of systemic reciprocity. It can be seen that the altruistic tendency of the supplier will decrease the diffusion price and increase the welfare of the adopter, and further increase the overall social utility. To some extent reciprocal preference can alleviate the utility difference caused by altruistic tendency difference among subjects in order to achieve the balance of each subject's income. The profit of diffuser increases with the increase of its own fairness tendency, the change of the other party and its own fairness tendency will change the utility of the member, and the proportion of the utility of each main body in the system will change one after another.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F273.1

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