本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈管理 + 信息不對(duì)稱　； 參考：《華南理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：信息問題和契約問題常見于許多發(fā)展中國家的產(chǎn)業(yè)價(jià)值鏈，在阿塞拜疆也是如此。蘇聯(lián)解體導(dǎo)致了政治混亂。盡管阿塞拜疆的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)速度等一些經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)在獨(dú)聯(lián)體國家中居于領(lǐng)先地位，但實(shí)際上工農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)值還未達(dá)到獨(dú)立前水平，經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中還存在一系列問題。經(jīng)濟(jì)癱瘓以及包括阿塞拜疆在內(nèi)的蘇聯(lián)加盟共和國的社會(huì)體制崩潰。為了建立創(chuàng)新型經(jīng)濟(jì)，科學(xué)和制造業(yè)之間的關(guān)系將得到加強(qiáng)，根據(jù)市場(chǎng)需求進(jìn)行的科學(xué)研究等必要程序?qū)⒙鋵?shí)到位。 然而，當(dāng)信息和契約問題同時(shí)存在，像引進(jìn)新技術(shù)和提供延伸服務(wù)這些傳統(tǒng)干預(yù)措施可能無法讓供應(yīng)商和制造商從他們的產(chǎn)品中獲取更高收益。這些問題會(huì)阻止買家和賣家進(jìn)入市場(chǎng)，打破買賣雙方之間的信任，并迫使市場(chǎng)參與者花更多時(shí)間來檢驗(yàn)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量和貿(mào)易商的信譽(yù)，從而削弱價(jià)值鏈的所有參與者的盈利能力，最終導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)效率低下。 美國的決策者以及阿塞拜疆的研究機(jī)構(gòu)多年來一直從事以完善市場(chǎng)協(xié)調(diào)能力和提高收入為目標(biāo)的工作來發(fā)展阿塞拜疆的工業(yè)。研究表明，信息問題和契約問題是所有供應(yīng)商即使在采取前期發(fā)展措施以后，，仍然很難進(jìn)入新的市場(chǎng)和接觸新的買家的關(guān)鍵原因。 基于上述調(diào)查結(jié)果，我們需要著重強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，要實(shí)現(xiàn)優(yōu)先發(fā)展的目標(biāo)和確保經(jīng)濟(jì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展，就必須特別注意供貨契約的研究，建立相關(guān)機(jī)制來解決包括刺激訂單，糾正阿塞拜疆市場(chǎng)的不正當(dāng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，保護(hù)本地市場(chǎng)在內(nèi)的信息問題。 這篇論文的目的是為在提供項(xiàng)目的質(zhì)量信息不對(duì)稱的條件下，設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)能使買方預(yù)期收益最大化并促使供應(yīng)商改善所提供的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的最優(yōu)合同提供一個(gè)范本。 這篇論文的目的是為在提供項(xiàng)目的質(zhì)量信息不對(duì)稱的條件下，設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)能使買方預(yù)期收益最大化并促使供應(yīng)商改善所提供的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的最優(yōu)合同提供一個(gè)范本。同時(shí)也為雙方參與者避免機(jī)會(huì)主義行為設(shè)計(jì)了激勵(lì)合同的方案。利用最優(yōu)控制理論和委托代理理論分析和描述主營商和代理商對(duì)質(zhì)量的決議，研究信息不對(duì)稱對(duì)玩家的影響結(jié)果表明，因信息不對(duì)稱遭殃的不僅僅是消費(fèi)者，隱藏的特別賣家也可能會(huì)損害供應(yīng)商的利潤(rùn)。調(diào)整制造商的失誤控制水平和懲罰比例來刺激供應(yīng)商提高質(zhì)量水準(zhǔn)是解決這些問題的最佳方法。我們希望結(jié)果將輔助呈現(xiàn)這次研究，并且有助于進(jìn)一步探索阿塞拜疆市場(chǎng)的信息和契約問題。
[Abstract]:The problem of information and contract is common in the industrial value chain of many developing countries, which is also the case in Azerbaijan. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to political confusion. Although some economic indicators, such as the speed of economic growth in Azerbaijan, are in the leading position in the CIS countries, the output value of industrial and agricultural production has not yet reached the level of pre independence. There is still a series of problems in the development. The economic paralysis and the collapse of the social system of the Soviet Republic, including Azerbaijan, will strengthen the relationship between science and manufacturing in order to build an innovative economy, and the necessary process of scientific research based on market demand will be put in place.
However, as information and contract problems exist simultaneously, traditional interventions such as introducing new technologies and providing extended services may not allow suppliers and manufacturers to gain higher returns from their products. These issues prevent buyers and sellers from entering the market, breaking the trust between buyers and sellers, and forcing market participants to spend more Time examines product quality and reputation of traders, thereby weakening the profitability of all participants in the value chain, resulting in low market efficiency.
American policymakers and Azerbaijan's research institutions have been working on the development of Azerbaijan's industry for years to improve their market coordination and income. Research shows that information and contract issues are difficult for all suppliers to enter new markets and to access new markets even after their early development measures. The key to a new buyer.
Based on the above findings, we need to emphasize that, in order to achieve the goal of priority development and to ensure sustainable economic development, we must pay special attention to the research of supply contracts and establish relevant mechanisms to solve the problems of information issues including the irritation of orders, the correction of the unfair competition in the Azerbaijan market and the protection of the local market.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model for the design of an optimal contract that maximizes the expected profit of the buyer and promotes the quality of the products provided by the supplier in the condition of the asymmetric quality information of the project.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model for the design of an optimal contract that can maximize the expected profit of the buyer and promote the quality of the products provided by the supplier in the condition of providing the quality information of the project, and also designed the incentive contract for the participants to avoid opportunism. The optimal control theory and principal-agent theory analyze and describe the resolution of the quality of the main business and agent. The results of the impact of information asymmetry on players show that the information asymmetry is not only the consumer, but the hidden special seller may also damage the supplier's profit. An example is the best way to stimulate the quality of the supplier to solve these problems. We hope that the results will assist in the presentation of this study and help further explore the information and contract issues in the Azerbaijan market.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F273.2;F274;F436.8

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 李麗君,黃小原,莊新田;雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)條件下供應(yīng)鏈的質(zhì)量控制策略[J];管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2005年01期

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