本文選題：訂單農(nóng)業(yè) + 供應(yīng)鏈��； 參考：《昆明理工大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文以訂單農(nóng)業(yè)為研究背景,在總結(jié)前人的研究基礎(chǔ)之上,利用契約理論、博弈論基礎(chǔ),將訂單農(nóng)業(yè)視為一個(gè)特殊供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)進(jìn)行研究分析。從影響訂單農(nóng)業(yè)穩(wěn)定性的價(jià)格波動(dòng)與供需風(fēng)險(xiǎn)角度出發(fā),建立了相應(yīng)的契約價(jià)格收購機(jī)制以及供需風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)機(jī)制。旨在保護(hù)農(nóng)戶利益,規(guī)避農(nóng)戶違約的同時(shí),利用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)機(jī)制來提高訂單農(nóng)業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈的穩(wěn)定性以及效率水平。本文首先以“公司+農(nóng)戶”型訂單農(nóng)業(yè)為研究對象,將公司與農(nóng)戶分別視為經(jīng)典供應(yīng)鏈模型中的零售商與供應(yīng)商,構(gòu)建了訂單農(nóng)業(yè)的供應(yīng)鏈基本模型。在考慮批發(fā)價(jià)格存在波動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下,分別構(gòu)建了收購價(jià)格不變的固定批發(fā)價(jià)格契約機(jī)制以及“隨行就市,保底收購”的保底價(jià)格契約機(jī)制。并對兩種不同的契約價(jià)格收購機(jī)制下訂單雙方的決策行為、利潤水平等指標(biāo)變化狀況進(jìn)行了比較。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),僅從訂單價(jià)格角度進(jìn)行供應(yīng)鏈契約設(shè)計(jì)并不能對農(nóng)戶的生產(chǎn)積極性產(chǎn)生影響。另外還發(fā)現(xiàn),農(nóng)戶的談判實(shí)力越強(qiáng),公司實(shí)施保底收購契約的意愿也就越高,整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈利潤水平也會得以提高。因此“農(nóng)戶”向“農(nóng)協(xié)”轉(zhuǎn)變是提高農(nóng)戶議價(jià)實(shí)力,促使訂單農(nóng)業(yè)健康發(fā)展的重要途徑。其次,本文進(jìn)一步對實(shí)施“隨行就市,保底收購”契約的供應(yīng)鏈模型進(jìn)行分析,建立了集中式?jīng)Q策下的訂單農(nóng)業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈模型。在無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)機(jī)制時(shí),分散決策模式下農(nóng)戶的最優(yōu)農(nóng)資投入水平小于集中決策模式下供應(yīng)鏈整體的最優(yōu)水平,即存在雙邊際效應(yīng)。而此時(shí)供應(yīng)鏈的總利潤小于集中式下的供應(yīng)鏈總體利潤水平。因此設(shè)計(jì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)機(jī)制來提高農(nóng)戶的農(nóng)資投入水平,以期實(shí)現(xiàn)訂單農(nóng)業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。最后,從產(chǎn)出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)與需求風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)角度出發(fā),建立了兩種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)機(jī)制模型。通過模型解析與算例分析證明：在實(shí)施保底收購契約的前提下,公司對農(nóng)戶實(shí)施產(chǎn)出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)可以提高農(nóng)戶的農(nóng)資投入水平,同時(shí)增加自身的利潤收入。但其改善程度有限,無法實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)。而農(nóng)戶對公司實(shí)施需求風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)時(shí),通過調(diào)節(jié)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)因子,農(nóng)戶的農(nóng)資投入水平可以達(dá)到集中式供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)農(nóng)資投入水平,從而實(shí)現(xiàn)訂單農(nóng)業(yè)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。
[Abstract]:In this paper, order agriculture is regarded as a special supply chain system based on contract theory and game theory. From the point of view of price fluctuation and supply and demand risk which affect the stability of order agriculture, the corresponding contract price purchase mechanism and supply and demand risk sharing mechanism are established. The purpose of this paper is to protect farmers' interests, avoid farmers' default, and use risk-sharing mechanism to improve the stability and efficiency of the supply chain of order-oriented agriculture. In this paper, the "company farmers" type of order agriculture as the research object, the company and farmers are considered as retailers and suppliers in the classic supply chain model, the basic supply chain model of order agriculture is constructed. Considering the fluctuation risk of wholesale price, the fixed wholesale price contract mechanism and the guaranteed price contract mechanism are constructed respectively. This paper also compares the decision behavior and profit level of both parties under two different contract price purchase mechanisms. It is found that supply chain contract design only from the perspective of order price can not affect farmers' enthusiasm for production. In addition, it is also found that the stronger the negotiation strength of farmers, the higher the willingness of the company to implement the guaranteed purchase contract, and the higher the profit level of the whole supply chain will be. Therefore, the transformation from "peasant household" to "peasant association" is an important way to improve farmers' bargaining power and promote the healthy development of contract agriculture. Secondly, this paper further analyzes the supply chain model of implementing the contract of "go with the market, buy with the bottom", and establish the order agriculture supply chain model under the centralized decision. When there is no risk-sharing mechanism, the level of farmers' optimal agricultural inputs in decentralized decision-making mode is lower than that of supply chain overall optimal level in centralized decision-making mode, that is, there is a double-marginal effect. The total profit of supply chain is smaller than that of centralized supply chain. Therefore, risk sharing mechanism is designed to improve farmers' input level in order to realize the coordination of supply chain of order agriculture. Finally, from the angle of output risk sharing and demand risk sharing, two models of risk sharing mechanism are established. Through the model analysis and the example analysis, it is proved that under the premise of carrying out the guarantee purchase contract, the output risk shared by the company to the farmers can improve the input level of the farmers' agricultural resources and increase their own profit income at the same time. But its improvement degree is limited, cannot realize the supply chain coordination. When farmers implement the demand risk sharing to the company, by adjusting the risk sharing factor, the farmers' input level of agricultural resources can reach the optimal level of centralized supply chain, and the coordination of order agricultural supply chain can be realized.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：昆明理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F326.6
，

本文編號：1797801