本文選題：現(xiàn)時(shí)偏向型偏好理論 + 隨機(jī)需求　； 參考：《華中科技大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：隨著產(chǎn)品更新速度的加快及電子商務(wù)的迅速發(fā)展,營銷已經(jīng)成為企業(yè)生存、贏得競(jìng)爭的致勝法寶。在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)的市場(chǎng)營銷策略中,返利是一種廣泛采用且影響深遠(yuǎn)的促銷手段之一。與直接打折促銷不同的是,返利促銷需要消費(fèi)者先全價(jià)付款,然后按照一定的規(guī)則在規(guī)定的期限內(nèi)進(jìn)行兌現(xiàn)。本論文在企業(yè)調(diào)研、總結(jié)與評(píng)述相關(guān)研究文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,深入探討和分析了返利模式下的供應(yīng)鏈決策與協(xié)調(diào)優(yōu)化問題。首先,基于消費(fèi)者現(xiàn)時(shí)偏向型偏好理論研究了制造商與零售商的最優(yōu)返利與定價(jià)策略；其次,探討了隨機(jī)需求下供應(yīng)鏈成員的聯(lián)合返利決策；然后,考慮了帶有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的供應(yīng)鏈返利契約如何協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的問題。最后,針對(duì)電子商務(wù)背景下日益興起的第三方返利模式進(jìn)行了研究。論文主要完成的創(chuàng)新性工作總結(jié)如下：針對(duì)返利促銷特有的對(duì)消費(fèi)者的影響機(jī)制(先購買再兌現(xiàn)),運(yùn)用現(xiàn)時(shí)偏向型偏好理論,從消費(fèi)者行為角度刻畫了返利促銷對(duì)消費(fèi)者購買決策及兌現(xiàn)行為的影響,將市場(chǎng)中的消費(fèi)者區(qū)分為天真型與經(jīng)驗(yàn)型兩類消費(fèi)者群體,并對(duì)不同類型消費(fèi)者的購買決策與兌現(xiàn)行為進(jìn)行建模,以此為基礎(chǔ)研究了供應(yīng)鏈中最常見的制造商對(duì)消費(fèi)者返利模式,基于Stackelberg博弈理論框架下分析了制造商的最優(yōu)返利策略與零售商的最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略。研究了隨機(jī)需求下的供應(yīng)鏈聯(lián)合返利決策,具體返利模式包括制造商與零售商同時(shí)向消費(fèi)者提供返利、僅制造商向消費(fèi)者提供返利及僅零售商對(duì)消費(fèi)者提供返利。在聯(lián)合返利模式下,基于兩種常見的乘法需求函數(shù)(非線性乘法需求與線性乘法需求),探討和分析了制造商的最優(yōu)返利策略及零售商的最優(yōu)返利與訂貨策略,并在博弈理論框架下證明了納什均衡的存在性和唯一性。進(jìn)一步地,通過對(duì)不同供應(yīng)鏈返利模式的對(duì)比,研究了不同返利模式對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈成員利潤的影響�？紤]了帶有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的供應(yīng)鏈返利契約。制造商經(jīng)常采用渠道返利來激勵(lì)零售商提高訂貨量,因此與返利相關(guān)的契約可以用來協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈。當(dāng)制造商面對(duì)具有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的零售商時(shí),以條件風(fēng)險(xiǎn)價(jià)值CVaR為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)度量準(zhǔn)則,研究了制造商該如何設(shè)計(jì)有效的供應(yīng)鏈返利契約來協(xié)調(diào)供應(yīng)鏈的問題。通過分析兩種不同類型的供應(yīng)鏈返利與懲罰契約(以訂貨量為基準(zhǔn)的ORP契約和以銷售額為基準(zhǔn)的SRP契約),給出了實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的契約參數(shù)條件,并與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性時(shí)的情形進(jìn)行了對(duì)比分析。結(jié)合電子商務(wù)迅速發(fā)展的時(shí)代背景,提出和研究了一種新的返利模式—第三方返利。在第三方返利平臺(tái)的參與下,消費(fèi)者除網(wǎng)絡(luò)直銷模式購買產(chǎn)品外,還可以通過返利模式購買產(chǎn)品。以消費(fèi)者效用理論為基礎(chǔ),深入研究了網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商的定價(jià)決策、傭金決策及第三方返利平臺(tái)的返利決策問題。針對(duì)兩種銷售模式的沖突問題,設(shè)計(jì)了一種改進(jìn)的收益共享契約來協(xié)調(diào)整個(gè)系統(tǒng),實(shí)現(xiàn)了網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售商與第三方返利平臺(tái)的合作共贏。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development to accelerate the speed of product updates and e-commerce, marketing has become the enterprise survival, the key to success. To win the competition in the market marketing strategy of modern enterprise, the rebate is a widely used and the influence of profound promotions. With direct discounts is different, rebate promotion requires consumers to pay full price then, cash within the prescribed time limit according to certain rules. In this paper, corporate research, and summarizes the literature review of related research, in-depth discussion and analysis of the rebate under the mode of supply chain decision and coordination optimization problems. Firstly, the current consumer biased preference theory of manufacturer and retailer's optimal rebate and based on the pricing strategy; secondly, discusses the stochastic demand and supply chain members with rebate decision; then, considering the risk preference of the supply chain with the rebate How to coordinate the supply chain contract. Finally, according to the background of e-commerce the rise of the third party rebate mode were studied. The innovative work of the thesis is as follows: according to the characteristic of consumer rebate promotion mechanism (buy cash again), the use of the present biased preference theory, from the Perspective of consumer behavior describe the rebate promotion on consumer purchase decision and influence cash behavior, will be in the market for consumers to distinguish between innocent and experience of two types of consumer groups, and for different types of consumer purchase decision-making and cash behavior modeling, based on the supply chain in the most common manufacturer to consumer rebate model, theoretical framework Stackelberg Game Analysis of the optimal pricing strategy and optimal rebate of retailers and manufacturers. Based on stochastic demand is studied for Chain joint rebate rebate mode including specific decisions, manufacturers and retailers also offer rebates to consumers, manufacturers only to provide consumers with the rebate and the only retailer offers rebates to consumers. In rebate mode, two kinds of multiplication based on demand function (non linear multiplication demand and linear multiplication demand), discussion and analysis of the optimal rebate and the optimal ordering strategy of manufacturer rebate and retailers, and prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in game theory framework. Furthermore, through the comparison of different supply chain rebate mode, the effects of different rebate mode on the profits of supply chain members. Considering the contract of supply chain with risk preference rebate the manufacturer. Often used channel rebates to encourage the retailer to increase order quantity, so the relevant contract and rebate can be used to coordinate the supply chain when. Manufacturers face the retailer with risk preferences, taking the conditional value at risk CVaR risk measurement criteria, study how to design a supply chain contract manufacturer rebate effectively to coordinate the supply chain problems. Through the analysis of two different types of supply chain, rebate and penalty contract (to order quantity as the benchmark ORP and a sales contract the benchmark SRP contract), contract implementation conditions of supply chain coordination is given, and the risk neutral situation were analyzed. With the rapid development of electronic commerce research background, a new third party rebate mode and put forward in the third party. The rebate rebate platform under the participation of consumers network marketing model to buy products, you can also buy products through the rebate mode. The consumer utility theory, in-depth study of the online retailer's pricing decision, the Commission Decision The rebate decision problem of the three party rebate platform is designed. Aiming at the conflict of two sales modes, an improved revenue sharing contract is designed to coordinate the whole system, which realizes the win-win cooperation between the online retailer and the third party rebate platform.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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