本文選題：信息不對(duì)稱(chēng) + 供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)　； 參考：《華中科技大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：企業(yè)在追求自身收益最大化時(shí)常與供應(yīng)鏈整體收益最大化的目標(biāo)相沖突,擁有信息優(yōu)勢(shì)的供應(yīng)鏈成員總是想獲取更多的收益,從而隱藏與自己決策有關(guān)的私有信息,導(dǎo)致了供應(yīng)鏈中信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生。在現(xiàn)實(shí)的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)環(huán)境中,成本信息是供應(yīng)鏈中最容易產(chǎn)生不對(duì)稱(chēng)信息的區(qū)域之一,成本信息意味著企業(yè)的技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)水平,企業(yè)往往將成本信息作為商業(yè)秘密?chē)?yán)格保密。另外,隨著制造業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的加劇,生產(chǎn)企業(yè)通常將產(chǎn)能視為自己的有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)手段之一,不會(huì)將產(chǎn)能信息輕易透露給外界。本文研究了成本信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下,如何基于委托代理理論設(shè)計(jì)契約,揭露真實(shí)成本信息的同時(shí)減小信息租金的付出,使得供應(yīng)鏈整體效益得到提高,實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。此外,本文研究了裝配系統(tǒng)中,多供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)能信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下,如何結(jié)合安全多方計(jì)算,設(shè)計(jì)安全的產(chǎn)能信息共享機(jī)制,實(shí)現(xiàn)多供應(yīng)商供貨協(xié)同。據(jù)此,論文主要開(kāi)展了下述幾個(gè)方面的研究工作： 首先研究了零售商占主導(dǎo)地位的供應(yīng)鏈中,生產(chǎn)成本信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。分析了生產(chǎn)成本信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下,信息租金對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈非效率的影響�；诨A(chǔ)的信息甄別模型,設(shè)計(jì)了基于收益共享和價(jià)格補(bǔ)貼的聯(lián)合契約,其中收益共享比例和價(jià)格補(bǔ)貼滿(mǎn)足完全信息下供應(yīng)協(xié)調(diào)時(shí)的關(guān)系,通過(guò)激勵(lì)相容原理,在揭示真實(shí)的生產(chǎn)成本信息時(shí),實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。 其次探討了促銷(xiāo)努力成本信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下,如何設(shè)計(jì)契約鼓勵(lì)銷(xiāo)售商加大促銷(xiāo)投入,減少信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)帶來(lái)的非效率影響。在促銷(xiāo)努力成本信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下,基于委托代理理論和信息甄別模型。設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)回購(gòu)契約揭示真實(shí)促銷(xiāo)努力成本信息,由于信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)和促銷(xiāo)激勵(lì)不足,回購(gòu)契約下供應(yīng)鏈非效率損耗較高。在回購(gòu)契約上引入成本共擔(dān)和轉(zhuǎn)移支付形成新的聯(lián)合契約,可削弱信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)和促銷(xiāo)激勵(lì)不足的雙重影響,從而提高銷(xiāo)售商的促銷(xiāo)努力水平。通過(guò)對(duì)契約的參數(shù)設(shè)置,發(fā)現(xiàn)一定條件下聯(lián)合契約能實(shí)現(xiàn)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。 然后研究了信息預(yù)測(cè)成本不對(duì)稱(chēng)下供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。將信息預(yù)測(cè)成本作為供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)營(yíng)成本考慮到供應(yīng)鏈中,并假設(shè)零售商是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的,通過(guò)分析發(fā)現(xiàn)零售商為了得到充足的貨源,有動(dòng)機(jī)謊報(bào)信息預(yù)測(cè)成本。本文進(jìn)一步分析了信息預(yù)測(cè)成本不對(duì)稱(chēng)對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈效率的影響,設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)由回購(gòu)契約和支付方案組成的聯(lián)合契約。支付方案使得零售商必須為謊報(bào)信息預(yù)測(cè)成本產(chǎn)生的需求估計(jì)偏差支付一定費(fèi)用,理性的零售商會(huì)選擇顯示真實(shí)的信息預(yù)測(cè)成本,同時(shí)回購(gòu)契約可消除風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的影響,實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。 最后研究了私有信息保護(hù)下多供應(yīng)商供貨協(xié)同問(wèn)題。引入安全多方保密排序方案,設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)安全的信息共享機(jī)制,使得供應(yīng)鏈各供應(yīng)商在不泄露任何產(chǎn)能信息的情況下的決策與完全信息下最優(yōu)決策一致。為了吸引各供應(yīng)商參與信息共享,提出了一個(gè)基于討價(jià)還價(jià)的補(bǔ)償機(jī)制,根據(jù)每個(gè)參與方的議價(jià)能力將信息共享得到的額外利潤(rùn)進(jìn)行分配,確保各參與方通過(guò)信息共享提高收益。
[Abstract]:Enterprises in the pursuit of their own benefit maximization and often the whole supply chain profit maximization goal conflict, have information advantage in the supply chain members always want to get more revenue, and hidden about making their own private information thus leads to information asymmetry phenomenon in the supply chain. In the real production environment. Cost information is one of the most easily produce asymmetric information in regional supply chain, cost information means that the enterprise level of technical and economic indicators, enterprises tend to cost information as business secret strictly confidential. In addition, with the manufacturing industry competition, enterprises will usually be regarded as one of the effective means of competition capacity of their own, not the capacity of information easily revealed to the outside world. This paper studies the cost under asymmetric information, how to design the contract based on the principal-agent theory, revealing the true cost information at the same time reduction Small information rent to pay, the overall benefit of the supply chain to improve supply chain coordination. In addition, this paper studies the assembly system, multi supplier capacity under asymmetric information, how to combine the secure multi-party computation, the safety design of the capacity of the information sharing mechanism, to achieve multi supplier collaboration. Accordingly, the paper carried out the following research work several aspects of the:
Firstly, the retailer dominated supply chain, supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information of product costs. The production cost analysis of asymmetric information, the information rent of supply chain non efficiency. The influence of information screening model based on the combined contract revenue sharing and price subsidies based on the revenue sharing ratio and the price subsidy to meet relationship under complete information supply coordination, the incentive compatibility principle, the production cost of the information revealing the truth, to achieve supply chain coordination.
Then discusses the promotional cost under asymmetric information, how to design a contract to encourage vendors to increase promotional investment, reduce the impact of non efficiency caused by asymmetric information. The asymmetry in the promotional effort cost information, principal-agent theory and information screening model. Based on the design of a buyback contract reveal the true sales effort cost information, due to lack of information asymmetry and promotion incentive, non high efficiency loss buyback contract of supply chain. The introduction of cost sharing and transfer payment form a joint contract in the new buyback contract, double effect can weaken the information asymmetry and promotion incentive, so as to improve the retailer's promotional effort level. Through the parameters of the contract set, found the combined contract under certain conditions can be achieved supply chain coordination under asymmetric information.
And then study the information asymmetry cost prediction of supply chain coordination. The information cost projections as supply chain operations to take into account the cost of the supply chain, and assuming that the retailer is risk averse, through the analysis found that retailers in order to get adequate supply, motivation and interest lie cost projections. This paper further analyzes the influence of information asymmetry on the cost forecast the efficiency of the supply chain, the design consists of a buyback contract and payment scheme combined contract payment scheme. Retailers must produce false information to predict the cost needs to pay a cost estimation bias, rational choice that predicted the retailer cost real information, at the same time, the buyback contract can eliminate the influence of risk aversion and supply chain coordination.
At the end of the multi vendor private information under the protection of supply coordination problem. The introduction of safety secure multi-party ranking scheme, design a secure information sharing mechanism, which makes the supplier supply chain did not divulge any information in the production decision under complete information and the optimal decision. In order to attract suppliers to participate in information sharing, put forward a compensation mechanism based on bargaining, according to each participant's bargaining power will get extra profit sharing information distribution, to ensure that the party involved in improving revenue through information sharing.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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