本文選題：回購(gòu)契約參數(shù)　切入點(diǎn)：資金約束　出處：《海南大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著全球合作的深入開展,聯(lián)系著各廠商的供應(yīng)鏈這一概念開始出現(xiàn)在人們的視野中,供應(yīng)鏈中的企業(yè)需要更有效地協(xié)作,達(dá)成供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)最大化。在零售商面臨資金約束和市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí),制造商可以通過(guò)回購(gòu)契約幫助零售商向銀行貸款以及分擔(dān)市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)�；刭�(gòu)契約參數(shù)能否合理準(zhǔn)確地設(shè)計(jì),直接影響到供應(yīng)鏈中企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)。本文的模型研究的是由單一制造商及單一零售商組成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈的回購(gòu)契約參數(shù)設(shè)計(jì)問題。其中制造商是Stackelberg博弈的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者,在營(yíng)運(yùn)周期起始時(shí)設(shè)計(jì)契約參數(shù)并向零售商提供回購(gòu)契約;零售商根據(jù)制造商給出的契約參數(shù)選擇是否參與博弈,如果選擇參與則確定相應(yīng)的訂貨量,但不具有設(shè)計(jì)參數(shù)的能力。本文假設(shè)制造商與零售商均為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性,制造商資金充足,零售商存在資金約束,當(dāng)零售商的自有現(xiàn)金不足以支付所需訂貨量對(duì)應(yīng)貨款時(shí),選擇向銀行貸款。營(yíng)運(yùn)周期起始時(shí),制造商根據(jù)零售商的自有現(xiàn)金水平,提出回購(gòu)價(jià)與批發(fā)價(jià),零售商決定訂購(gòu)量及是否需要貸款,營(yíng)運(yùn)周期末制造商回購(gòu)所有滯銷商品,零售商償還銀行貸款。本文通過(guò)數(shù)學(xué)模型分析,主要研究了制造商公布批發(fā)價(jià)及回購(gòu)價(jià)后,零售商在不同自有現(xiàn)金水平下的最優(yōu)訂購(gòu)決策的問題;以及制造商根據(jù)零售商的訂購(gòu)決策設(shè)計(jì)回購(gòu)契約參數(shù)的方法;得到了不同決策情形下零售商訂購(gòu)量應(yīng)滿足的適用區(qū)間。在零售商資金充足、零售商資金短缺且無(wú)貸款風(fēng)險(xiǎn)這兩種情形下,達(dá)成了回購(gòu)契約下的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)。本文通過(guò)數(shù)值算例分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)回購(gòu)契約既適用于資金充足的條件,也適用于零售商資金短缺的情況。通過(guò)對(duì)系統(tǒng)參數(shù)的靈敏度分析,整理出系統(tǒng)參數(shù)的變化對(duì)零售商訂貨量適用區(qū)間的影響,并發(fā)現(xiàn)回購(gòu)契約不適用于所有市場(chǎng)環(huán)境。
[Abstract]:With the further development of global cooperation, the concept of supply chain, which is related to various manufacturers, has begun to appear in the eyes of people. Enterprises in the supply chain need to cooperate more effectively to maximize the profit of supply chain.When retailers face financial constraints and market risks, manufacturers can use repo contracts to help retailers borrow from banks and share market risks.Whether the parameters of repurchase contract can be reasonably and accurately designed will directly affect the profit of the enterprise in the supply chain.The model of this paper deals with the repurchase contract parameter design of a two-stage supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.The manufacturer is the leader of the Stackelberg game, designs the contract parameters at the beginning of the operating cycle and provides the retailer with the repo contract. The retailer chooses whether to participate in the game according to the contract parameters given by the manufacturer.If selected to participate, determine the corresponding order, but do not have the ability to design parameters.This paper assumes that both manufacturers and retailers are risk-neutral, manufacturers have sufficient funds, retailers have financial constraints, when the retailer's own cash is not enough to pay the required order quantity corresponding to the loan, choose to loan to the bank.At the beginning of the operating cycle, the manufacturer puts forward the repo price and wholesale price according to the retailer's own cash level, the retailer decides the order quantity and whether the loan is needed, the manufacturer repurchases all the unsalable goods at the end of the operating cycle, and the retailer pays back the bank loan.Through mathematical model analysis, this paper mainly studies the optimal ordering decision of retailers under different cash levels after the manufacturer publishes wholesale price and repo price.The method of designing repurchase contract parameters according to the retailer's order decision is presented, and the applicable interval of retailer's order quantity is obtained under different decision cases.The supply chain coordination under the repurchase contract is achieved under the two situations of the retailer's sufficient capital, the retailer's shortage of funds and the lack of loan risk.In this paper, a numerical example shows that the repurchase contract is not only suitable for the condition of capital adequacy, but also suitable for the shortage of retailer funds.Based on the sensitivity analysis of system parameters, the influence of system parameters on the applicable range of retailers' order volume is sorted out, and it is found that the repurchase contract is not suitable for all market environments.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：海南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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