本文選題：兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：合作廣告　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的加劇以及人們對(duì)管理認(rèn)識(shí)的深化，供應(yīng)鏈管理逐漸成為理論與應(yīng)用熱點(diǎn)，良好的供應(yīng)鏈合作伙伴關(guān)系是供應(yīng)鏈有效運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的前提。供應(yīng)鏈合作廣告作為一種重要的合作伙伴協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制，正被越來越多的企業(yè)所采用。 現(xiàn)有供應(yīng)鏈合作廣告的研究往往注重分析制造商與零售商在合作中的最優(yōu)策略選擇以及各種因素的影響作用，對(duì)于合作廣告本身能否成功則缺乏相關(guān)的研究�；诖�，本文從企業(yè)有限理性出發(fā)，首先運(yùn)用演化博弈方法，建立了由制造商群體與零售商群體組成的兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈中企業(yè)合作廣告的博弈模型，，研究了合作廣告成敗機(jī)制并對(duì)其中的主要影響因素進(jìn)行了深入的分析；然后構(gòu)建了包含監(jiān)督懲罰機(jī)制的合作廣告擴(kuò)展模型，并探討了此時(shí)合作廣告演化的過程及變化。最后通過兩個(gè)算例對(duì)本文模型進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證。 通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，在沒有監(jiān)督懲罰機(jī)制時(shí)，如果零售商能夠成功的進(jìn)行單方廣告，則只要制造商與零售商合作時(shí)的收益大于不合作時(shí)的收益，雙方就會(huì)進(jìn)行合作廣告；當(dāng)零售商進(jìn)行單方廣告失敗時(shí)，如果雙方合作時(shí)的收益大于不合作時(shí)的收益，則合作廣告會(huì)出現(xiàn)兩種演化穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)，此時(shí)，各個(gè)參數(shù)會(huì)影響合作廣告的演化路徑，具體來說，制造商與零售商的邊際產(chǎn)品收益越大，合作與非合作時(shí)的廣告投入費(fèi)用越少，制造商的廣告分擔(dān)率越小，則雙方合作的可能性就越大。當(dāng)引入監(jiān)督懲罰機(jī)制后，零售商的違約行為受到抑制，合作廣告更有可能取得成功。另外還發(fā)現(xiàn)制造商群體與零售商群體的初始策略狀態(tài)也會(huì)影響合作廣告的成敗。 本文的相關(guān)研究不僅完善了供應(yīng)鏈合作廣告理論，而且能夠?qū)ΜF(xiàn)實(shí)中的企業(yè)實(shí)踐提供一定的指導(dǎo)幫助。
[Abstract]:With the intensification of market competition and the deepening of people's understanding of management, supply chain management has gradually become a hot topic in theory and application. A good supply chain partnership is the premise of effective operation of supply chain.As an important coordination mechanism of partners, cooperative advertising in supply chain is being adopted by more and more enterprises.The existing research on cooperative advertising in supply chain often focuses on the analysis of the optimal strategy choice of manufacturers and retailers in cooperation and the influence of various factors. However, there is a lack of relevant research on the success of cooperative advertising itself.Based on this, based on the limited rationality of enterprises, this paper first establishes a game model of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain, which is composed of manufacturer group and retailer group, by using evolutionary game method.This paper studies the success or failure mechanism of cooperative advertising and analyzes the main influencing factors. Then it constructs an extended model of cooperative advertising including supervision and punishment mechanism and probes into the evolution process and changes of cooperative advertising.Finally, the model is verified by two examples.Through the research, it is found that if the retailer can successfully carry out unilateral advertising, if the retailer can successfully carry out unilateral advertising, then if the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer is greater than that of the non-cooperation, the two sides will carry out cooperative advertising.When the retailer fails in unilateral advertising, if the profit of cooperation is greater than that of non-cooperation, there will be two evolutionary stable states in cooperative advertising. In this case, each parameter will affect the evolutionary path of cooperative advertising.The greater the marginal product income of the manufacturer and the retailer, the less the cost of advertising investment in cooperation and non-cooperation, and the smaller the share of advertising between manufacturer and retailer, the greater the possibility of cooperation.When the mechanism of supervision and punishment is introduced, the retailer's default behavior is restrained, and cooperative advertising is more likely to succeed.It is also found that the initial strategic status of manufacturers and retailers also affects the success or failure of cooperative advertising.The research in this paper not only improves the theory of cooperative advertising in supply chain, but also provides some guidance and help for the practice of enterprises in reality.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F713.8;F224.32

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