本文選題：碳減排　切入點(diǎn)：縱向合作　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：出于緩解溫室效應(yīng)而形成的全球性減排問題已遍及到中國。在低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的背景下，不論是出于政府的管制，抑或企業(yè)的社會(huì)責(zé)任，生產(chǎn)型高耗能企業(yè)已逐漸感受到減排的壓力。高耗能供應(yīng)商作為供應(yīng)鏈中的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)，其減排成果會(huì)影響到其余供應(yīng)鏈伙伴的收益。因此，從供應(yīng)鏈上下游合作的角度考慮供應(yīng)鏈整體低碳化優(yōu)化問題有其重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文主要研究一對(duì)多的供應(yīng)鏈結(jié)構(gòu)中，考慮減排成本和碳交易的企業(yè)利潤(rùn)函數(shù)，壟斷供應(yīng)商的減排決策，及多個(gè)寡頭競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的下游企業(yè)參與減排合作的決策，，并采用契約機(jī)制和模型最優(yōu)化理論分析一對(duì)多供應(yīng)鏈的減排合作聯(lián)盟能否形成及聯(lián)盟形成的契約條件。 在供應(yīng)商減排程度決策和制造商種群對(duì)其投資決策的演化博弈中，考慮高減排率給供應(yīng)鏈帶來額外收益的因素，分析減排成本、減排成本分擔(dān)比例、收益分享比例、成本和收益的關(guān)系等對(duì)演化結(jié)果的影響，得出供應(yīng)商選擇高減排率且制造商選擇為其投資的條件。 分別在自愿減排市場(chǎng)和碳配額市場(chǎng)下，供應(yīng)商主導(dǎo)的供應(yīng)鏈中，比較供應(yīng)商的三種方案：不減排，獨(dú)立減排，與制造商形成減排聯(lián)盟。研究得到供應(yīng)商確定單位產(chǎn)品減排率，且設(shè)定價(jià)格折扣合作契約，可與下游制造商形成減排聯(lián)盟，制造商為其承擔(dān)一定比例的減排投資。 同時(shí)，在減排合作聯(lián)盟形成的研究中，針對(duì)下游的多個(gè)制造商，分別考慮了制造商完全同質(zhì)的情況和制造商生產(chǎn)成本相異的情況。在價(jià)格折扣系數(shù)與制造商投資比例相關(guān)時(shí)，生產(chǎn)成本對(duì)投資比例沒有影響。同樣通過可采取價(jià)格折扣契約達(dá)成供應(yīng)鏈減排合作。
[Abstract]:The global emission reduction problem formed by mitigation of greenhouse effect has spread to China . Under the background of low - carbon economy , whether for government regulation or social responsibility of enterprises , production - type high - energy consumption enterprises have gradually felt the pressure of emission reduction . As a key link in supply chain , high - energy suppliers can affect the benefits of the rest of supply chain partners . Therefore , it is of great theoretical and practical significance to consider the overall low - carbonization optimization problem of supply chain from the perspective of downstream cooperation in the supply chain .

This paper mainly studies a pair of multi - supply chain structure , considering the cost of emission reduction and the enterprise profit function of carbon trade , monopoly supplier ' s emission reduction decision - making , and the decision - making of the downstream enterprises participating in the reduction and cooperation of multiple oligopolistic competition , and using contract mechanism and model optimization theory to analyze whether the alliance can be formed and the contract conditions formed by the alliance can be formed .

In the evolutionary game of the supplier ' s emission reduction degree decision - making and the manufacturer ' s population ' s investment decision - making , the influence of the cost of emission reduction , the proportion of cost - sharing , the proportion of income - sharing , cost and income on the evolution results are analyzed in consideration of the factors of the high emission reduction rate to the supply chain .

In the case of voluntary emission reduction market and carbon quota market , the supplier - led supply chain is compared with the supplier ' s three schemes : non - emission reduction , independent emission reduction and emission reduction alliance with the manufacturer . The research results in the supplier ' s determination of the emission reduction rate of the unit product , and sets the price discount cooperation contract , which can form the emission reduction alliance with the downstream manufacturer , and the manufacturer assumes a certain proportion of emission reduction investment .

At the same time , in the study of emission reduction and cooperation alliance , the case of complete homogeneity of the manufacturer and the manufacturer ' s production cost are considered separately for multiple manufacturers downstream . When the price discount coefficient is related to the manufacturer ' s investment proportion , the production cost has no effect on the investment proportion , and the supply chain emission reduction cooperation can be achieved through the price discount contract .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F205

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