本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：損失規(guī)避　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)全球化的不斷進(jìn)展,市場競爭也隨之更加激烈,其競爭方式逐漸由單個(gè)企業(yè)演變成供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭。然而,不管是供應(yīng)鏈所處的外部市場環(huán)境還是供應(yīng)鏈自身內(nèi)部環(huán)境都具有高度風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性。由于決策主體在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)條件下所具有的態(tài)度以及行為偏好特征都是不一樣的,而且決策主體的行為偏好特征隨著環(huán)境的變化不斷發(fā)生改變。本文以供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)作為研究對(duì)象,以異質(zhì)偏好理論作為切入點(diǎn),通過對(duì)相關(guān)理論和方法進(jìn)行分析,對(duì)兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈的最優(yōu)決策以及協(xié)調(diào)問題進(jìn)行深入探討和研究。首先,本文對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)以及異質(zhì)偏好供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的發(fā)展進(jìn)行相關(guān)綜述及總結(jié)。其次,對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)的相關(guān)理論進(jìn)行研究分析,著重分析展望理論以及最大衰減函數(shù)理論。然后,對(duì)損失規(guī)避零售商的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)進(jìn)行研究,主要分析單個(gè)損失規(guī)避型零售商和單個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中性供應(yīng)商組成的供應(yīng)鏈,通過建立收益共享契約使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)的問題。最后,分析內(nèi)生偏好零售商的供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題,供應(yīng)商通過建立收益共享契約同樣能使供應(yīng)鏈達(dá)到協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)。研究結(jié)果表明,具有損失規(guī)避行為偏好零售商的最優(yōu)訂購量隨著其損失規(guī)避程度的提高而不斷減少。零售商的最優(yōu)訂購量與供應(yīng)商的批發(fā)價(jià)格具有負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,與收益共享系數(shù)具有正相關(guān)關(guān)系。通過建立收益共享契約可以使由損失規(guī)避零售商參與的兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈以及由內(nèi)生偏好零售商參與的兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)調(diào)狀態(tài)。
[Abstract]:With the development of economic globalization, market competition is becoming more and more intense, and the competition mode is gradually changing from single enterprise to supply chain competition. Both the external market environment of the supply chain and the internal environment of the supply chain have a high risk, because the decision makers have different characteristics of attitude and behavior preference under the risk conditions. Moreover, the behavior preference characteristics of decision makers change with the change of environment. This paper takes supply chain coordination as the research object and heterogeneity preference theory as the breakthrough point, through the analysis of relevant theories and methods. First, this paper summarizes and summarizes the development of supply chain contract coordination and heterogeneity preference supply chain coordination. The related theories of supply chain coordination are studied and analyzed, especially prospect theory and maximum attenuation function theory. Then, the supply chain coordination of loss averse retailers is studied. This paper mainly analyzes the supply chain composed of a single loss-averse retailer and a single risk-neutral supplier, and analyzes the coordination of the supply chain by establishing a revenue-sharing contract. Finally, the supply chain coordination problem of the endogenous preferred retailer is analyzed. The supplier can also make the supply chain coordinate by establishing the revenue-sharing contract. The research results show that, The optimal order quantity of retailer with loss aversion behavior preference decreases with the increase of loss aversion degree, and the optimal order quantity of retailer has negative correlation with the wholesale price of supplier. By establishing a revenue-sharing contract, a two-level supply chain involving loss averse retailers and a two-level supply chain with endogenous preference retailers can be coordinated.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 劉秋生;胡曉s，

本文編號(hào)：1692214