本文選題：逆向物流　切入點(diǎn)：博弈論　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：逆向物流能夠提高資源利用率并且減少日益嚴(yán)峻的固體污染物的危害，，其對(duì)生態(tài)污染現(xiàn)狀的改善作用被廣泛認(rèn)可。在實(shí)際市場(chǎng)中存在眾多且具有各自特點(diǎn)的行業(yè)、市場(chǎng)環(huán)境和供應(yīng)鏈形態(tài)，多種產(chǎn)品回收模式的市場(chǎng)適應(yīng)性研究、供應(yīng)鏈決策研究能夠?qū)⿷?yīng)鏈回收模式的選擇和具體操作提供實(shí)際意義的幫助，本文也以此為研究對(duì)象。 本文運(yùn)用博弈論的方法建立模型，將以納什博弈、生產(chǎn)商主導(dǎo)序貫博弈、零售商主導(dǎo)序貫博弈和合作博弈體現(xiàn)形式的四種供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)袌?chǎng)形態(tài)與現(xiàn)實(shí)中較為常見的零售商回收模式、生產(chǎn)商回收模式和第三方回收模式進(jìn)行組合研究。其中在單個(gè)生產(chǎn)商多個(gè)零售商的情況下，生產(chǎn)商主導(dǎo)時(shí)可對(duì)零售商制定區(qū)分價(jià)格或者統(tǒng)一價(jià)格。文章在逆向物流研究領(lǐng)域引入供應(yīng)鏈形態(tài)作為分析對(duì)比的依據(jù)，并使模型中零售商回收模式的優(yōu)勢(shì)得以更全面的體現(xiàn)出來，對(duì)生產(chǎn)商主導(dǎo)時(shí)的區(qū)別定價(jià)和統(tǒng)一定價(jià)策略也進(jìn)行了對(duì)比分析。 在求解模型和算例的實(shí)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)分析中，通過對(duì)比同一產(chǎn)品回收模式下不同供應(yīng)鏈形態(tài)的最優(yōu)決策及利潤(rùn)結(jié)果，可知零售商主導(dǎo)的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下能夠達(dá)到供應(yīng)鏈共同利潤(rùn)的最大化，供應(yīng)鏈成員控制力越強(qiáng)所獲得的利潤(rùn)及利潤(rùn)份額越大，反之則越小。通過對(duì)比同種供應(yīng)鏈形態(tài)下不同產(chǎn)品回收模式的最優(yōu)決策及利潤(rùn)結(jié)果，可知零售商更加偏好零售商回收模式，產(chǎn)品回收數(shù)量和成本等因素對(duì)生產(chǎn)商回收模式的偏好構(gòu)成影響。在新產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)需求較為穩(wěn)定、可回收產(chǎn)品更易獲得的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境下，供應(yīng)鏈整體能夠獲取更高的利潤(rùn)。
[Abstract]:Reverse logistics can improve the utilization rate of resources and reduce the harm of the increasingly severe solid pollutants, and its role in improving the status of ecological pollution is widely recognized. There are many industries with their own characteristics in the actual market. The research on market environment and supply chain form, market adaptability of various product recovery models, and supply chain decision making can provide practical significance for the selection and operation of supply chain recovery mode. This paper also takes this as the research object. In this paper, the game theory is used to set up the model, and the Nash game is used, and the producer dominates the sequential game. There are four kinds of supply chain market patterns in which retailers dominate sequential game and cooperative game, and the more common retailer recovery mode in reality. A combination study of the manufacturer's recycling model and the third party's recycling model. In the case of a single manufacturer with multiple retailers, When the manufacturer is leading, the retailer can be divided into different prices or unified prices. In this paper, supply chain shape is introduced as the basis for analysis and comparison in the field of reverse logistics. It also makes the advantages of the retailer recovery model more comprehensive, and makes a comparative analysis of the differentiated pricing and unified pricing strategy when the manufacturer is leading. In the experiment data analysis of solving model and example, the optimal decision and profit result of different supply chain under the same product recovery mode are compared. Under the market environment dominated by retailers, we can maximize the common profits of the supply chain, and the stronger the controlling power of the members of the supply chain is, the greater the profit and profit share of the supply chain members will be. By comparing the optimal decision and profit results of different product recovery models in the same supply chain, we can see that retailers prefer the retailer recovery model. Factors such as the quantity and cost of product recovery affect the preference of producer recycling mode. In the market environment where the market demand for new products is more stable and recyclable products are more easily available, the supply chain as a whole can obtain higher profits.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F713.2

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