本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈　切入點(diǎn)：供應(yīng)鏈金融　出處：《浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：在供應(yīng)鏈管理的發(fā)展過(guò)程中,盡管資金管理一直以來(lái)也被視為其內(nèi)在的重要組成部分,但一直未受到應(yīng)有的重視。隨著相關(guān)理論的發(fā)展和國(guó)外一些大型的企業(yè)和銀行在供應(yīng)鏈資金管理方面的不斷實(shí)踐,供應(yīng)鏈金融的概念被提出,并不斷發(fā)展。目前供應(yīng)鏈金融已發(fā)展成為一個(gè)多行業(yè)參與、面向供應(yīng)鏈管理全過(guò)程的、伴隨物流、信息流和技術(shù)流的、以降低供應(yīng)鏈資金流轉(zhuǎn)成本從而為供應(yīng)鏈創(chuàng)造價(jià)值的管理系統(tǒng)。將博弈論的思想引入供應(yīng)鏈管理,是近幾年新發(fā)展起來(lái)的一個(gè)研究領(lǐng)域,目前國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)其進(jìn)行系統(tǒng)闡述的并不多。本文首先系統(tǒng)性的闡釋了供應(yīng)鏈金融的理論基礎(chǔ),并在此基礎(chǔ)上從供應(yīng)鏈的構(gòu)成、供應(yīng)鏈運(yùn)行的目的和不對(duì)稱信息在供應(yīng)鏈中的應(yīng)用三個(gè)方面分析了供應(yīng)鏈適用博弈論的可行性。然后利用博弈理論對(duì)供應(yīng)鏈金融背景下的供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)合作進(jìn)行了深入的分析。利用“囚徒困境”建立了供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)合作的一般模型,得出了供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)合作的不穩(wěn)定性；利用Stackelberg博弈模型分析了兩級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作的情形,指出了合作能達(dá)到帕累托最優(yōu)。最后分析了供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)之間的沖突,就合作時(shí)總體收益的分配提出了解決建議。
[Abstract]:In the development of supply chain management, although financial management has always been regarded as an inherent important component, However, the concept of supply chain finance has been put forward with the development of relevant theories and the continuous practice of some large enterprises and banks in supply chain capital management. At present, supply chain finance has developed into a multi-industry participation, oriented to the whole process of supply chain management, accompanied by logistics, information flow and technology flow, In order to reduce the cost of capital flow in supply chain and create value for supply chain, it is a new research field to introduce the idea of game theory into supply chain management in recent years. At present, there are few systematic exposition on it in our country. Firstly, this paper systematically explains the theoretical basis of supply chain finance, and on this basis, from the composition of supply chain, The purpose of supply chain operation and the application of asymmetric information in supply chain are analyzed in this paper, and the feasibility of applying game theory to supply chain is analyzed. Then, supply chain enterprise cooperation under the background of supply chain finance is analyzed by game theory. Based on the Prisoner's Dilemma, a general model of enterprise cooperation in supply chain is established. The instability of supply chain enterprise cooperation is obtained, and the competition and cooperation of two level supply chain enterprises are analyzed by using Stackelberg game model, and the Pareto optimal cooperation is pointed out. Finally, the conflict between supply chain enterprises is analyzed. The paper puts forward some suggestions on the distribution of total income in cooperation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F832

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本文編號(hào)：1680632