天堂国产午夜亚洲专区-少妇人妻综合久久蜜臀-国产成人户外露出视频在线-国产91传媒一区二区三区

當(dāng)前位置:主頁 > 管理論文 > 供應(yīng)鏈論文 >

考慮市場結(jié)構(gòu)和效率差異的競爭電信供應(yīng)鏈渠道選擇模型研究

發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-03-27 11:08

  本文選題:電信供應(yīng)鏈 切入點(diǎn):競爭 出處:《電子科技大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文


【摘要】:隨著移動(dòng)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)時(shí)代的到來,移動(dòng)終端設(shè)備逐漸成為人們生活中的必需品。移動(dòng)終端市場競爭越來越激烈,同樣電信運(yùn)營市場的競爭也越來越激烈。終端制造商以及電信服務(wù)運(yùn)營商組成的電信供應(yīng)鏈除了提供更好的產(chǎn)品以及服務(wù),他們也寄希望于通過合理的定價(jià)以及銷售策略使自己保持足夠的競爭力。比較常見兩種銷售渠道選擇:自由銷售和捆綁銷售,捆綁銷售是指終端制造商與電信運(yùn)營商將終端設(shè)備和電信服務(wù)捆綁以一個(gè)價(jià)格出售。本文在線性需求的市場假設(shè)下,以兩條電信行業(yè)中的電信供應(yīng)鏈作為研究對象,其中每條電信供應(yīng)鏈分別由一個(gè)終端制造商和一個(gè)電信運(yùn)營商組成。探究兩個(gè)維度(效率差異和市場結(jié)構(gòu)),四種不同的市場情形下,兩條電信供應(yīng)鏈的在競爭情況下的渠道選擇問題。四種市場情形分別為:供應(yīng)鏈成本結(jié)構(gòu)對稱且市場權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)對稱,供應(yīng)鏈成本結(jié)構(gòu)對稱且市場權(quán)力不對稱,供應(yīng)鏈成本結(jié)構(gòu)不對稱且市場權(quán)力對稱,供應(yīng)鏈成本結(jié)構(gòu)不對稱且市場權(quán)力不對稱。通過求解分析得到的主要結(jié)論如下:1.在兩條電信供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)袌鰴?quán)力相當(dāng)?shù)那闆r下,當(dāng)市場競爭強(qiáng)度相對較小的時(shí)候兩條電信供應(yīng)鏈選擇捆綁銷售的方式參與競爭;當(dāng)市場競爭強(qiáng)度較大的時(shí)候兩條電信供應(yīng)鏈選擇自由銷售的方式參與競爭。2.在電信供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)袌鰴?quán)力有差異的情況下,市場權(quán)力占優(yōu)的供應(yīng)鏈采取捆綁銷售的方式參與市場競爭。如果兩條供應(yīng)鏈成本結(jié)構(gòu)對稱,對于市場權(quán)力處于劣勢的供應(yīng)鏈,當(dāng)市場競爭強(qiáng)度相對較小的時(shí)候其采取捆綁銷售的方式參與市場競爭,當(dāng)市場競爭強(qiáng)度相對較大的時(shí)候其采取自由銷售的方式參與競爭。如果兩條供應(yīng)鏈成本結(jié)構(gòu)不對稱,對于市場權(quán)力處于劣勢的供應(yīng)鏈,當(dāng)占優(yōu)供應(yīng)鏈的成本總和較小的時(shí)候,其選擇捆綁銷售參與競爭,當(dāng)占優(yōu)供應(yīng)鏈成本總和較大的時(shí)候,其選擇自由銷售的方式參與競爭。
[Abstract]:With the advent of the mobile Internet era, mobile terminal equipment has gradually become a necessity in people's lives. The market competition for mobile terminals is becoming more and more fierce. In the same way, the competition in the telecom operation market is becoming more and more intense. Besides providing better products and services, the telecommunications supply chain composed of terminal manufacturers and telecom service operators, They also hope to keep themselves competitive enough through reasonable pricing and marketing strategies. In this paper, under the assumption of linear demand, two telecom supply chains in telecom industry are taken as the research object. Each telecom supply chain is composed of a terminal manufacturer and a telecom operator. The four market situations are as follows: supply chain cost structure symmetry and market power structure symmetry, supply chain cost structure symmetry and market power asymmetry. The cost structure of the supply chain is asymmetric and the market power is symmetrical, the cost structure of the supply chain is asymmetric and the market power is asymmetric. The main conclusions obtained by solving the analysis are as follows: 1. Under the condition that the market power of the two telecom supply chains is equal, When the market competition intensity is relatively small, the two telecom supply chains choose the way of bundling sale to participate in the competition; When the market competition intensity is high, the two telecom supply chains choose the way of free sale to participate in the competition. 2. When the market power of the telecommunication supply chain is different, If the cost structure of the two supply chains is symmetrical, the supply chain with market power is at a disadvantage. When the market competition intensity is relatively small, it takes the form of bundling to participate in the market competition, and when the market competition intensity is relatively high, it takes the free sale way to participate in the competition. If the cost structure of the two supply chains is asymmetric, For the supply chain where the market power is at a disadvantage, when the total cost of the dominant supply chain is small, it chooses bundled sales to participate in the competition, and when the cost sum of the dominant supply chain is larger, it chooses the way of free sale to participate in the competition.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F626;F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前6條

1 袁媛;樊治平;尤天慧;;手機(jī)產(chǎn)品與電信服務(wù)套餐捆綁銷售方案的選擇方法[J];東北大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(自然科學(xué)版);2016年04期

2 鄭倩倩;;產(chǎn)品混合捆綁銷售的定價(jià)研究[J];市場研究;2015年05期

3 劉國亮;范云翠;;基于合作研發(fā)與推廣的運(yùn)營商與終端廠商的雙邊激勵(lì)研究[J];科技進(jìn)步與對策;2010年02期

4 顧成彥;胡漢輝;;捆綁銷售理論研究評述[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)動(dòng)態(tài);2008年07期

5 曹洪;捆綁銷售的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)層面思考[J];安徽大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào);2004年02期

6 曹洪;捆綁銷售的社會(huì)福利分析[J];學(xué)術(shù)研究;2004年02期

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王曉晨;移動(dòng)終端捆綁銷售模式運(yùn)營策略研究[D];電子科技大學(xué);2014年

,

本文編號:1671260

資料下載
論文發(fā)表

本文鏈接:http://sikaile.net/guanlilunwen/gongyinglianguanli/1671260.html


Copyright(c)文論論文網(wǎng)All Rights Reserved | 網(wǎng)站地圖 |

版權(quán)申明:資料由用戶dc8a2***提供,本站僅收錄摘要或目錄,作者需要?jiǎng)h除請E-mail郵箱bigeng88@qq.com