本文選題：公平偏好　切入點(diǎn)：信息非對(duì)稱　出處：《商業(yè)研究》2017年08期

【摘要】：本文在考慮公平偏好信息非對(duì)稱下研究需求依賴努力的批發(fā)價(jià)格契約對(duì)零供博弈和供應(yīng)鏈的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):當(dāng)零售商為完全理性類(lèi)型時(shí),信息對(duì)稱下的努力水平低于非對(duì)稱情形,當(dāng)零售商為公平偏好類(lèi)型時(shí),信息對(duì)稱下的努力水平高于非對(duì)稱情形;當(dāng)零售商的公平偏好強(qiáng)度足夠大或者當(dāng)零售商完全理性且信息非對(duì)稱時(shí),零售商利潤(rùn)會(huì)超過(guò)處于先動(dòng)優(yōu)勢(shì)的供應(yīng)商利潤(rùn);無(wú)論公平偏好信息是否對(duì)稱,批發(fā)價(jià)格契約不能消除但能緩減"雙重邊際問(wèn)題"且起到供應(yīng)鏈利潤(rùn)分配機(jī)制的作用。本研究對(duì)現(xiàn)有供應(yīng)鏈契約研究的某些理論分析進(jìn)行了完善,并修改了某些研究結(jié)論。
[Abstract]:Considering the asymmetry of fair preference information, this paper studies the effect of wholesale price contract of demand dependence on zero-supply game and supply chain. It is found that when the retailer is a completely rational type, The level of effort under information symmetry is lower than that under asymmetric situation. When the retailer is the type of fair preference, the level of effort under information symmetry is higher than that under asymmetric situation. When the retailer's fair preference is strong enough or when the retailer is completely rational and the information is asymmetric, the retailer's profit will exceed that of the supplier in the preemptive advantage, regardless of whether the fair preference information is symmetrical or not, The wholesale price contract can not eliminate but alleviate the "double marginal problem" and play the role of profit distribution mechanism of supply chain. This study has perfected some theoretical analysis of the existing supply chain contract research and modified some research conclusions.
【作者單位】： 重慶理工大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社科基金項(xiàng)目“基于社會(huì)偏好及其認(rèn)知?jiǎng)討B(tài)演進(jìn)的供應(yīng)鏈契約優(yōu)化與協(xié)調(diào)”,項(xiàng)目編號(hào):16CGL017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F724.2

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本文編號(hào)：1661318